A first look at auto-trading Tim Sykes using Covestor Investment Management

About a month ago I signed up for Covestor Investment Management (CV.IM). I put $10,000 into a new account at Interactive Brokers controlled by them and then signed up for that $10,000 to be auto-traded following Timothy Sykes. I mainly did this out of curiosity to see how well the trade replication worked. Please note that only Sykes’ trades in one of his two Interactive Brokers accounts are replicated by those following his strategy on CV.IM (trades in his other IB account are replicated with the CV.IM Tim Sykes Aggressive strategy, while trades in his SogoTrade and ThinkorSwim accounts are not replicated anywhere).

My biggest problem with CV.IM is that it subdivides orders and then sends those orders at two minute intervals, guaranteeing that the last shares filled will be filled long after the first shares were filled [Edit 12/10/09 see comment #7 below for an explanation from Covestor]. While this may make sense to minimize market impact for longer-term traders, it is absurd to have an order-replication algorithm that does such a thing when trying to track a day-trader of volatile stocks. Even ignoring the problems with subdividing the orders, out of 7 total trades (three round-trips), 2 had initial fills over 15 minutes after Sykes’ order was filled (the initial short on DRAM and the buy on LZB). Because of this risk of delayed replication time I must emphatically recommend against signing up with CV.IM to follow Tim Sykes or any other short term trader.

Below are my round-trip trades so far and the comparisons to where Tim Sykes made the trade and when I received an alert from his TimAlerts trade alert service. First I compare my profit margin per trade with Sykes’ profit margins:

IMGG —  Me: +14.3%
IMGG — Tim: +13.1%
Difference: +1.2% in my favor

DRAM —  Me: (8.3%)
DRAM — Tim: +5.6% (approximate)
Difference: (13.9%) to my detriment

LZB —  Me: (4.4%)
LZB — Tim: (2.0%) (approximate)
Difference: (2.4%) to my detriment

From these three trades I have lost a net of $30.78, including commissions and short stock borrow fees.

The first trade, IMGG, was replicated quickly:

My CV.IM account short sold 571 IMGG on 11/17/09 at  $1.645 at 9:34:40
My CV.IM account covered 571 IMGG on 11/18/09 at $1.41 at 9:36:20

Tim Sykes short sold IMGG on 11/17/09 at $1.64 and I received the TimAlert email at 9:39
He covered IMGG on 11/18/09 at $1.425 and I received the TimAlert email at 9:38

For IMGG, everything worked well and both sides of the trade were replicated quickly and almost exactly at the same price Tim Sykes trades were at.

The second trade, DRAM, was not replicated quickly:

My CV.IM account short sold 131 shares of DRAM at $4.28 at 12:03:07.
My CV.IM account short sold 146 more shares of DRAM at an average price of $4.53 between 13:50:19 and 13:58:34. This was submitted as four separate orders spaced 2 minutes apart on average.
My CV.IM account covered all 277 shares of DRAM at an average price of $4.746 between 9:42:18 and 9:48:26. This was submitted as four separate orders spaced 2 minutes apart on average.

Tim Sykes short sold DRAM on 11/23/09 at $4.68 and I received the TimAlert at 11:46.
He short sold more DRAM on 11/23/09 at $4.59 and I received a TimAlert (text only) circa 14:25.
Tim covered all his shares of DRAM on 11/24/09 at $4.40ish and I received a TimAlert email at 9:47.

For DRAM, the first short trade was over 17 minutes after the TimAlert (so probably just about 20 minutes after Sykes actually made the trade). It was also at a price over 8% lower than Sykes’ trade. Because I do not have adequate records of when I received the second short alert, I cannot say how close the first trade at CV.IM was to it. However, there was still 8 minutes between first and last fill on the subdivided short orders. The cover orders began before I received the TimAlert, but the fills on the buy to cover orders were still over 7% higher than Sykes’ cover.

The third trade, LZB, was not replicated quickly:

My CV.IM account bought 123 shares of LZB on 12/8/09 at an average price of $10.125 between 15:24:18 and 15:40:28. This was submitted as five separate orders spaced 3 minutes apart on average.
MY CV.IM account sold those 123 shares of LZB on 12/9/09 at an average price of $9.761 between 9:52:15 and 10:00:16. This was submitted as five separate orders spaced 2 minutes apart on average.

Tim Sykes bought LZB on 12/8/09 at $10.00 and I received the TimAlert email at 15:06.
He sold LZB on 12/9/09 at $9.80ish and I received the TimAlert email at 9:55.

For LZB, even the initial buy order from CV.IM came 25 minutes after Tim Sykes bought and 18 minutes after I received the TimAlert. The fills on the sell were better, with the initial fills beating the TimAlert, but because of the spacing of the subdivided sell orders, many of the shares were not sold until after the TimAlert was received.

Here are the details from each of my trades copied from my Interactive Brokers activity statement:

Symbol Date/Time Exchange Quantity T. Price C. Price T. Amount Comm/Tax Basis Realized P/L MTM P/L Code
Stocks
USD
DRAM 2009-11-23, 12:03:07 -131 4.2800 4.4800 -560.68 -1.00 -559.68 0.00 -26.20 O
DRAM 2009-11-23, 13:50:19 -57 4.5900 4.4800 -261.63 -1.00 -260.63 0.00 6.27 O
DRAM 2009-11-23, 13:52:35 -39 4.5900 4.4800 -179.01 -1.00 -178.01 0.00 4.29 O
DRAM 2009-11-23, 13:56:59 -28 4.4300 4.4800 -124.04 -1.00 -123.04 0.00 -1.40 O
DRAM 2009-11-23, 13:58:34 -22 4.4000 4.4800 -96.80 -1.00 -95.80 0.00 -1.76 O
DRAM 2009-11-24, 09:42:18 57 4.5750 5.3900 260.78 -1.00 243.52 -18.25 46.46 ML;C
DRAM 2009-11-24, 09:44:52 11 4.6900 5.3900 51.59 -1.00 47.00 -5.59 7.70 ML;C
DRAM 2009-11-24, 09:46:23 5 4.6400 5.3900 23.20 -1.00 21.36 -2.84 3.75 ML;C
DRAM 2009-11-24, 09:48:26 204 4.799608 5.3900 979.12 -1.02 905.28 -74.86 120.44 P;ML;C
Total DRAM 0 92.53 -9.02 0.00 -101.54 159.54
IMGG 2009-11-17, 09:34:40 -571 1.6450 1.4850 -939.30 -2.86 -936.44 0.00 91.36 O
IMGG 2009-11-18, 09:36:20 571 1.4100 1.2100 805.11 -2.86 936.44 128.47 -114.20 ML;C
Total IMGG 0 -134.18 -5.72 0.00 128.47 -22.84
LZB 2009-12-08, 15:24:18 22 10.1400 10.1100 223.08 -1.00 224.08 0.00 -0.66 O
LZB 2009-12-08, 15:26:17 22 10.1300 10.1100 222.86 -1.00 223.86 0.00 -0.44 O
LZB 2009-12-08, 15:28:14 17 10.1300 10.1100 172.21 -1.00 173.21 0.00 -0.34 O
LZB 2009-12-08, 15:36:14 11 10.1000 10.1100 111.10 -1.00 112.10 0.00 0.11 O
LZB 2009-12-08, 15:40:28 51 10.1200 10.1100 516.12 -1.00 517.12 0.00 -0.51 O
LZB 2009-12-09, 09:52:15 -5 9.8200 9.8700 -49.10 -1.00 -50.95 -2.85 -0.25 ML;C
LZB 2009-12-09, 09:54:16 -5 9.8200 9.8700 -49.10 -1.00 -50.95 -2.85 -0.25 ML;C
LZB 2009-12-09, 09:56:17 -5 9.7900 9.8700 -48.95 -1.00 -50.95 -3.00 -0.40 ML;C
LZB 2009-12-09, 09:58:19 -97 9.7600 9.8700 -946.72 -1.00 -985.98 -40.26 -10.67 ML;C
LZB 2009-12-09, 10:00:16 -11 9.7000 9.8700 -106.70 -1.00 -111.54 -5.84 -1.87 ML;C
Total LZB 0 44.80 -10.00 0.00 -54.80 -15.28
Total in USD 3.14 -24.74 0.00 -27.87 121.42

Disclosure: No positions in any stocks mentioned in this post. I currently have $5,200 subscribed to follow Tim Sykes at CV.IM. I receive a commission for every DVD or TimAlerts subscription bought through my affiliate link to Sykes’ web store. To see more details on my relationship with Sykes, please see my disclosures. I have a disclosure policy and you can find all my disclaimers there as well; those disclosures & disclaimers are incorporated by reference into this post.

Why I don’t like to short stocks at 52 week highs

This video is for everyone who sees a stock at new highs and immediately thinks it should be shorted. That is not a good idea. Stocks that are at 52 week highs tend to keep going up. I like shorting things that go up, but only if they go up a lot very quickly (like 100% in three days) and then I will only short once they start to fade (I particularly like to short once they go red on the day in the afternoon after fading gradually).

Disclosure: No positions in any stocks mentioned in this post. I have a disclosure policy and you can find all my disclaimers there as well; those disclosure & disclaimers are incorporated by reference into this post.

The seven rules of trading

I post this today as a reminder to anyone who is caught short in the big NLST short-squeeze.

Sometimes I’m asked why I don’t make more money. I have two responses to this: first, I am not actually a very talented trader; second, I trade for a living, so my goal is to make a certain income while taking as little risk as possible. Those who focus on making as much money as possible while ignoring risk will invariably lose almost everything, no matter how talented they are, just as Livermore and Niederhoffer did.

1. Hope is not a strategy.
2. Plan your entry and exit before you make a trade.
3. If you are unsure of what to do, get out.
4. Only trade when you have an edge.
5. Track all your trades. If a strategy loses money, abandon it.
6. Do not focus only on potential gains but also on potential losses. Trade only when the risk/reward ratio is favorable.
7. Don’t let a very good profit disappear or turn into a loss because you want an even bigger profit.

NLST goes supernova

There is no watchlist tonight. That would be superfluous. There is only NLST (okay, IMGG is also interesting, but NLST is much better). Did you follow my advice to ALFSS? I did and I am ready. (And by the way, ALFSS certainly does not mean short it as soon as you can. Supernovae make great longs before they make great shorts and I tried to long it Friday). If you are interested in trading supernovae, watch this video where I lay out my battle plan.

For further edification, see my trade recaps of recent supernova GGC.

nlst

nlst_3day

nlst_1day

Disclosure: No net positions in any stocks mentioned in this post. I have a disclosure policy and you can find all my disclaimers there as well; those disclosure & disclaimers are incorporated by reference into this post.

Trade recap for Friday the 13th: Previous resistance becomes support; set stops accordingly

I have to be the only one to lose money going long NLST today. Oyvey.

After recording the video I bought 50,000 VGPR at $0.0201 and sold 50,000 at $0.021  +$23.62 realized

BOT    2,300    NLST    false    Stock (NMS)    2.3200    USD    SMART    09:32:00        11.50
SLD    2,300    NLST    false    Stock (NMS)    2.1700    USD    ISLAND    09:33:56        11.50
+    SLD    200    VRMLQ    false    Stock    23.500    USD    SMART    09:34:01        1.00
SLD    200    VRMLQ    false    Stock    22.90    USD    SMART    09:38:04        1.00
+    BOT    2,300    NLST    false    Stock (NMS)    2.337    USD    ISLAND    09:43:37        11.50
+    SLD    2,300    NLST    false    Stock (NMS)    2.280    USD    SMART    09:44:34        11.50
+    BOT    2,300    NLST    false    Stock (NMS)    2.430    USD    ISLAND    09:46:39        11.50
+    SLD    2,300    NLST    false    Stock (NMS)    2.453    USD    SMART    09:47:42        11.50
BOT    1,000    IMGG    false    Stock (OTCBB)    1.6400    USD    ARCAEDGE    14:14:35        5.00
SLD    1,000    IMGG    false    Stock (OTCBB)    1.6500    USD    ARCAEDGE    14:22:40        5.00
BOT    50,000    VGPR    false    Stock    0.0200    USD    SMART    14:56:19        5.00
SLD    25,000    VGPR    false    Stock    0.0220    USD    SMART    15:02:48        2.75
+    SLD    25,000    VGPR    false    Stock    .019    USD    SMART    15:26:42        2.42

Daily profit: ($99.86)

Weekly profit: $3264.56

For Livestock viewers, here’s the Grand Canyon from a helicopter:

helicopter

Disclosure: No net positions in any stocks mentioned in this post. I have a disclosure policy and you can find all my disclaimers there as well; those disclosure & disclaimers are incorporated by reference into this post.

Trade recap for November 12th: Reverse pseudo-arbitrage

Good recap today that explains how I practice share-class pseudo-arbitrage. Watch it.

+    BOT    1,000    CNLG    false    Stock (SCM)    1.815    USD    ARCA    09:36:18        5.00
+    SLD    1,000    CNLG    false    Stock (SCM)    1.850    USD    SMART    09:45:23        5.00
+    SLD    1,000    PLA    false    Stock    3.930    USD    SMART    11:39:39        5.00
+    BOT    1,000    PLA    false    Stock    3.830    USD    SMART    11:44:16        5.00
+    BOT    400    VRMLQ    false    Stock    21.500    USD    SMART    12:49:06        2.00
+    SLD    200    VRMLQ    false    Stock    22.450    USD    SMART    12:55:49        1.00
+    BOT    1,200    KNDI    false    Stock (SCM)    4.014    USD    DRCTEDGE    13:56:07        6.00
+    SLD    200    VRMLQ    false    Stock    23.260    USD    SMART    13:56:20        2.00
+    SLD    1,200    KNDI    false    Stock (SCM)    4.050    USD    SMART    14:10:12        6.00
SLD    30    BRK B    false    Stock    3396.70    USD    NYSE    14:53:56        1.00
BOT    1    BRK A    false    Stock    101965.00    USD    NYSE    14:53:58        1.00
BOT    1    BRK A    false    Stock    101989.00    USD    NYSE    14:56:02        1.00
SLD    30    BRK B    false    Stock    3396.54    USD    NYSE    14:56:37        1.00
+    BOT    400    VRMLQ    false    Stock    22.268    USD    SMART    15:43:27        2.38

Daily profit: $684.23

Disclosure: Long 60 BRK-B, short 2 BRK-A, long 400 VRMLQ. I have a disclosure policy and you can find all my disclaimers there as well; those disclosure & disclaimers are incorporated by reference into this post.

Update on trading like Tim Sykes: $101,000 in profits

If you are not familiar with my history with Tim Sykes, I suggest reading The truth about Tim Sykes from a former critic, followed by my Update on trading Tim Sykes’ system, and Making money by buying stocks on my watchlist. I first started trading like Tim Sykes in June of 2006. I had initially been skeptical of his system but it was hard to argue with his performance. Before I bought his book and DVD and subscribed to his TimAlerts (I am now a lifetime subscriber), I first read every single one of his previous blog posts and I examined every single of his previous trades since he started blogging in November 2007 (his trades are verified on Covestor). If someone wishes to learn from Sykes and does not wish to buy his DVDs, I heartily recommend reading his blog posts to study all his previous trades.

From the very beginning I was successful trading based on Sykes’ alerts and using his strategy for my own trades. I have now surpassed $101,000 in total profit using his strategy. In terms of my total trading account, this is not a huge amount (I have a multi-hundred-thousand dollar account), but considering that I rarely use very much capital to trade in Sykes’ style and the trades are short-term, I have most of my trading capital available to trade my other trading strategies.

Below are a few stats on my trades this year and last. Like what you see? Why not check out Tim Sykes’ DVDs? I recommend Pennystocking Part Deux and TimFundamentals Part Deux (I own both). I don’t recommend TimTactics.

Total profit in 2009: $53,323.78

Watchlist longs (stocks I buy based on my own watchlist): $1,765.69
Weighted average profit margin: 1.45%

Other self-initiated trades: $26,689.68
Weighted average profit margin: 0.95%

Trades based on TimAlerts: $21,314.40
Weighted average profit margin: 1.65%

Total profit in 2008: $48,224.60

Self-initiated trades: $30,991.11
Weighted average profit margin: 3.92%

Trades based on TimAlerts: $17,233.49
Weighted average profit margin: 1.10%

timprofit_11-11-09
(Note: the above chart does not include my profits from my watchlist longs, currently at $1765 since June 2009)

Biggest winners 2009

Here are some of my best trades this year.

ALAN    Short    12550    5/14/2009    $1.012    —  Cover    5/14/2009    $0.605
Profit: $5,104.96    40.21%
Stockpreacher pump, shorted into biggest volume around 1, exhausted all IB borrows quickly; was up from 0.48 previous day; goal was to cover around .60
ALAN    Short    44500    5/14/2009    $1.009    —  Cover    5/14/2009    $0.734
Profit:  $12,217.48    27.21%
As above, in other acct, messed up big time; hit buy instead of cancel, and bought 9300 at 1.03 right as I achieved my full position (this is reflected in the average prices; so I really only took 36k shares from 1.01 to .63)

SPNG.ob    Short    20000    6/12/2009    $0.177   —  Cover   6/15/2009    $0.125
Profit: $1,041.20    29.43%
had death drop from .28 to .08, shorted (with tim) on bounce on a Friday, covered after almost 30 straight minutes of slow drop next Monday morning

SMTX    Long    2613    6/30/2009    $0.752    —  Sold    6/30/2009    $1.142
Profit: $1,019.07    51.86%
Stockpreacher pump, three separate buy orders all partially filled at .68, .755, and .78; sold near hod of 1.19 (little volume there; was significant volume at 1) and then immediately went short with all 4k shares IB had
SMTX    Short    4313    6/30/2009    $0.970   —  Cover    6/30/2009    $0.905
Profit: $280.00    6.69%
Stockpreacher pump, shorted quickly to get shares (IB only had 4k shares), shorted when up 40% from .68
SMTX    Short    35750    6/30/2009    $0.978    —  Cover    6/30/2009    $0.899
Profit: $2,831.40    8.09%
Stockpreacher pump, got plenty of shares shorting with best ask in other account; very aggressive position; an hour later only 220k shares had traded; Stockpreacher losing his mojo; covered 10k after a few hours, covered rest 2 hours before close when big size on ask started getting eaten

OPXA    Short    1000    9/9/2009    $4.459    —  Cover    9/10/2009    $3.874
Profit: $585.10    13.12%
Tim shorted 30 minutes after me; up from 1.50 to 5.65 the previous day on what was really a small subset of results from phase 2 MS drug trial, shorted when down 20% on day but broke below morning’s lows (not absolute lows, but lows with volume at 4.50), averaged into position; looked to hold overnight, but couldn’t resist covering into drop below lods 30 minutes before close
OPXA    Short    1000    9/9/2009    $4.459    —  Cover    9/9/2009    $4.184
Profit: $275.10    6.17%
Tim shorted 30 minutes after me; up from 1.50 to 5.65 the previous day on what was really a small subset of results from phase 2 MS drug trial, shorted when down 20% on day but broke below morning’s lows (not absolute lows, but lows with volume at 4.50), averaged into position; covered 1k so the position wouldn’t be all my account overnight
OPXA    Short    2000    9/9/2009    $4.459    —  Cover    9/9/2009    $4.111
Profit: $697.20    7.82%
same as above, covered when TimAlert cover hit as it tanked a bunch
OPXA    Short    2000    9/9/2009    $4.459    —  Cover    9/9/2009    $3.969
Profit: $980.20    10.99%
same as above, covered more when it broke $4 and then bounced … was down 30% on the day then so I doubted it had much more; looked to hold 1k overnight

XSNX.ob    Short    35000    9/10/2009    $0.202   —  Cover    9/10/2009    $0.156
Profit: $1,612.10    22.82%
Stockpreacher / Beacon Equity pump from .12, shorted right at highs of .21 and 10k again after Tim Sykes alerted

Biggest losers 2009

Here are some of my worst trades of 2009.

CBOU    Long    19500    7/20/2009    $4.951    —  Sold    7/20/2009    $4.800
Profit: -$2,944.50    -3.05%
TimAlert, he shorted @ 5, I thought he bought, so I bought; oh crap. Then I shorted but at crappy price (4.78) which added $900 to my loss

GVBP.ob    Short    18500    9/14/2009    $0.396    —  Cover   9/15/2009    $0.633
Profit: -$4,395.42    -60.06%
TimAlert, true pump and dump, were shares available at IB sho Tim shorted into +40% morning spike, I took the rest of the available shares; covered when Tim covered

OPTT    Short    5000    10/14/2009    $7.695    —  Cover    10/14/2009    $7.970
Profit: -$1,375.00    -3.57%
shorted 4 minutes after open on red, first down day after one 50% up day, had faded last hour of previous day, hit a lod of 7.56 and then quickly jumped green and I got out as quickly as I could

Biggest winners 2008

Here are some of my best trades from 2008.

USS    Short    7000    7/29/2008    $4.030    —  Cover    7/29/2008    $3.336
Profit: $4,852.77    17.20%
USS    Short    3000    7/29/2008    $4.027    —  Cover    7/30/2008    $2.725
Profit: $3,904.17    32.32%
I made up for my earlier loss by shorting this supernova.

GFET    Short    22100    8/11/2008    $0.300    —  Cover    8/12/2008    $0.231
Profit: $1,521.78    22.99%
up 300% on no news; shorted during morning panic, didn’t spike back up; held o/n

COIN    Short    11500    9/4/2008    $5.592    —  Cover   9/5/2008    $5.363
Profit: $2,628.26    4.09%
shorted on breakdown of 5.80 resistance level in afternoon; crappy entry due to BSOD on computer; added on bounces

VM    Short    4600    9/22/2008    $3.293    —  Cover    9/22/2008    $2.864
Profit: $1,974.96    13.04%
huge one-day spike in last minutes of previous day, companies with similar spikes OMN, RTK, NGD all tanked pre-market, so I shorted at open; covered as it got close to 2.75 from before the spike and big bidders appeared at 2.82

SIL    Short    32000    9/24/2008    $3.321    —  Cover   9/25/2008    $2.685
Profit: $20,368.00    19.17%
shorted a bunch on green to red after noon, shorted more on attempted break of 3, covered many times, shorted more on bounces; held full position overnight; covered as it dropped

VLKAY    Short    100    10/28/2008    $192.990    —  Cover    10/30/2008 $143.735
Profit:   $4,925.50    25.52%
shorted more on short squeeze; covered prior to forced buy-in

Biggest losers 2008

Here are some of my worst trades from 2008:

USS    Short    5000    7/28/2008    $4.500    —  Cover    7/28/2008    $4.935
Profit:  -$2,176.25    -9.67%
This was an accidental trade due to placing my limit order too low at ThinkorSwim to reserve shares to short.

COIN    Short    4200    9/4/2008    $6.000    —  Cover    9/4/2008    $6.263
Profit:  -$1,102.92    -4.38%
Shorted at break of 6.00 on TimAlert; got whipsawed out and covered as it bounced to 6.25 (Tim and others held)

WRSP    Short    7073    9/19/2008    $1.359    —  Cover  9/24/2008    $1.683
Profit: -$2,296.53    -23.90%
shorted on second up day from .7 to 1.1 … didn’t wait for first down day to assure getting shares, averaged up; covered in next couple days when volume died; later spiked to 1.90

VLKAY    Short    100    10/27/2008    $109.990   —  Cover   10/30/2008    $143.735
Profit: -$3,374.50    -30.68%
Up 100% on massive short squeeze; Volkswagen ADR; Previous big bump month ago on short squeeze led quickly to drop off; was first big up day; should have waited until next day to short; gapped up next day

Disclosure: No positions in any stocks mentioned in this post. I receive a commission for every DVD bought through my affiliate link to Sykes’ web store. To see more details on my relationship with Sykes, please see my disclosures. I have a disclosure policy and you can find all my disclaimers there as well; those disclosure & disclaimers are incorporated by reference into this post.


GFET Short 22100 8/11/2008 $0.300 $6,620 8/12/2008 $0.231 $1,521.78 22.99%

eOn Communications (EONC): Up on earnings or hype?

I sold short a number of shares of eOn (Nasdaq: EONC) today, realizing $1176.40 in profits and retaining a 2000 share short position over night (I tried to sell short more shares on a spike but my main broker, Interactive Brokers, ran out of shares and the spike faded before I could short in my secondary brokerage account) . I initially shorted in response to a trade alert from Tim Sykes (sign up for TimAlerts here) although I re-shorted once I realized how good of a potential short EONC was. Sykes is one of the few day traders around who uses fundamental research as well as technical indicators to decide how to trade.

After Sykes shorted EONC because

this company is up 100% today on “positive” earnings on an apparent 50%+ increase in revenues…what they fail to mention is that that increase is only due to including revenues numbers from an acquisition and without it, revenues actually dropped because their products aren’t in great demand. Not to mention these “positive earnings” might get a lot of hype from today’s PR but they’re nothing new, here’s the SEC filing from a week ago where they talk about revenues

Quote excerpted from the alert Syks sent to his TimAlert subscribers. See his post about the trade.

This trade is a great example of how traders can benefit from understanding fundamentals … the company’s earnings press release was not actually news because the information in it had already been released in the 10-k (annual report) the company filed back on October 29th. Normally companies release earnings in press releases as soon as the data are available, maybe a week or so before the quarter’s results are sent to the SEC in a 10-Q or 10-K. Considering that the company’s results were available for over a week, why did the stock spike over 100% today when the earnings report hit the newswires?

The likely reason for the stock spiking today is that most traders do not read the SEC filings before deciding what to trade. They take a brief look at Yahoo! Finance and look at the news there. Earnings releases are usually new information (because they usually precede the SEC filings) so stock traders and individual investors all bought EONC today in response to the ‘good’ news. As they pushed the price up it showed up on the screens of momentum day-traders who then bought en masse, sending EONC up even more. Even though the press release today caused the stock rise, it was not new information, so the stock will likely dive in the coming days.

How is eOn doing?

eOn’s business involves VoIP and telephone routing products. After a quick glance at the company’s recently filed 10-K, I am glad I am short and not long.

eOn, while it was profitable in its most recent two quarters, has never been consistently profitable.

For the year ended July 31, 2009, eOn had a net loss of $339,000. eOn has incurred substantial losses since inception through July 31, 2009 resulting in an accumulated deficit of $48,856,000. eOn may not be able to achieve profitability from operations in the future.

eOn was also only profitable in the most recent quarters because of its acquisition of Cortelco. While it earned $111,000 in the most recent quarter, it would have lost money were it not for the Cortelco acquisition (Cortelco has earned $430,000 since being bought by eOn and it has only been 4 months since the deal closed).

Financial results for the current fiscal year include net income of $430,000 of Cortelco Systems Holding Corp., which was acquired on April 1, 2009.

While the earnings press release from today noted that:

Total year revenue increased 52% to $10,645,000 from $6,994,000 in fiscal year 2008.

This is due entirely to the Cortelco acquisition. Here the company describes revenues in the 10-K:

Net revenue increased approximately 52% to $10,645,000 for the year ended July 31, 2009 from $6,994,000 for the previous fiscal year. The increase reflects $4,231,000 in Cortelco revenue subsequent to the acquisition on April 1, 2009, partially offset by lower eQueue revenue from products, maintenance and professional services, and lower Millennium revenue compared to the prior year.

In actuality, were it not for the acquisition of Cortelco, eOn’s revenues would have decreased by 8%! But an 8% decrease does not sound as good as a 52% increase, so the company chose not to put the 8% figure in the press release.

Related party transactions

One thing an investor never wants to see is related-party transactions. These are always red flags, indicative of a company’s executives enriching themselves at shareholder expense. Related-party transactions also sometimes accompany fraud. Here are some of eOn’s related party transactions. All quotes are from the most recent 10-K unless otherwise noted.

Let’s start with the chairman of the board, who was also CEO and president until June 2008. Here is an interesting transaction between eOn and Symbio:

On August 1, 2007 and August 27, 2007, the Company made strategic investments in Symbio of $500,000 and $400,000 for 250,000 and 200,000 shares, respectively, or approximately 3% of Symbio. Symbio is a China-based provider of software development, testing, and globalization outsourcing services to multinational companies. The investment is expected to establish eOn as a preferred provider of telephony and contact center solutions for Symbio’s outsourcing engagements requiring customer interaction management. eOn also gains the ability to provide Symbio outsourcing services to its customer base. Symbio is a privately held entity and the Company accounts for its 3% investment by the cost method.

At the time of the second investment in Symbio for $400,000, the Company received a put option from David Lee, effective beginning January 1, 2008 and expiring January 1, 2011. The put option allows the Company to sell to David Lee a maximum aggregate of 200,000 shares of its investment in Symbio for a per share price of $2.00.

In consideration of the put option, in the event that the 200,000 shares are sold without exercise of the put option before January 1, 2011, the Company has agreed to pay David Lee 50% of the proceeds in excess of $1,000,000.

So Lee entered into a derivative contract with eOn hedging the value of Symbio’s shares. Here is a question for management: if Symbio is worth investing in, is it not worthwhile for the company to retain all the upside of the investment?

Lee was also the controlling shareholder in Cortelco, which was acquired by eOn back on April 1, 2009. Here are some details on that transaction, from the press release announcing it:

In exchange for all the outstanding shares of Cortelco stock, Cortelco shareholders will receive an initial aggregate payment of $500,000. All subsequent payments will be made to Cortelco stockholders quarterly in an amount based upon Cortelco’s quarterly earnings after closing, less $25,000 quarterly distributions made to eOn until eOn has received $500,000. Contingent primarily upon the level of Cortelco earnings after closing, all Cortelco stockholders are eligible to receive quarterly payments in cash until the full $11,000,000 consideration has been paid. David Lee, Chairman and CEO of eOn, is the Chairman and the controlling shareholder of Cortelco.

Whenever an executive of a public company sells a private company to the public company, shareholders in the public company need to ask who benefits from the deal. Such transactions are rife with conflicts of interest.

Auditor issues

eOn’s auditor, GHP Horwath, receieved criticism from the PCAOB.

The inspection team identified what it considered to be audit deficiencies. The deficiencies identified in one of the audits reviewed included a deficiency of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer’s financial statements. That deficiency was the failure to sufficiently evaluate the appropriateness of the issuer’s recognition and presentation of revenue from certain maintenance service contracts.

While that does not mean that eOn is doing anything wrong or that their auditor is incompetent, it is certainly a negative.

Aggressive accounting

The company also has a bit of aggressive accounting:

The Company capitalized approximately $243,000 of software development costs related to a new IP PBX that is under development.

Capitalization of software costs is both allowed and required, according to FASB Statement No. 86, but it can only be capitalized once it is feasible. It is still software industry practice to capitalize very few software development costs. Furthermore, there are slightly different standards for software that is to be included with hardware. Here is what the FASB stated:

The Board concluded that both establishing technological feasibility of the software component and completing research and development activities for the hardware component are necessary for capitalization of software costs to begin.

As eOn states in their 10-K that the “IP PBX that is under development,” it does not appear to me to be eligible for capitalization of the software developed to run it. When I run my own calculations on the results of a company in this situation, I correct for the aggressive accounting, de-capitalizing the amount spent and expensing it instead, which of course reduces the company’s book value and earnings.

Incentive Payments on Cortelco Acquisition

One thing I hate to see is when a company acts in such a way to increase current earnings and revenues at the expense of future earnings. This was the crucial problem I identified with the master franchise agreements that Noble Roman’s used (Boston Chicken also used those back in the 1990s to generate nice earnings before ultimately heading into bankruptcy). It is hard to find a business idea worse than master franchise agreements. That being said, I also dislike earn-outs in acquisitions. Companies that purchase a company and then pay based partly on the earnings on the purchased company over a period of time lose out on a significant portion of the upside (although these agreements do somewhat mitigate downside risk). The quarterly payments that eOn will make to the former owners of Cortelco are as follows (quotes from the merger agreement):

For the first 20 Quarterly Payouts, each Quarterly Payout shall be equal to the sum of (i) the Adjusted Cash Flow for the Quarterly Payout Period, plus (ii) 50% of the Pro Forma Net Tax Savings, minus (iii) $25,000, plus (iv) the Quarterly True-Up. All subsequent Quarterly Payouts shall be equal to the sum of (i) the Adjusted Cash Flow for the Quarterly Payout Period, plus (ii) 50% of the Pro Forma Net Tax Savings, plus (iii) the Quarterly True-Up.

This indicates that for at least five years (and continuing until Cortelco shareholders have been paid $11 million), the former owners of Cortelco will receive all the earnings of Cortelco and 50% of the tax savings from the merger. Shareholders of eOn will get comparatively little.

1.2 Adjusted Cash Flow. The earnings of the Surviving Entity after payment of all expenses associated with the Surviving Entity before tax as adjusted as set forth on Schedule 1.2 attached hereto, calculated in accordance with GAAP and Schedule 1.2 of this Agreement.

Conclusion

The only good thing I can say about the company is that it has plenty of cash ($3 million as of the most recent 10-K). It is also a tiny company, with a market capitalization using the closing price of its stock today of $8.32 million. Considering the aforementioned red flags, the company’s long history of losses, limited upside from the Cortelco acquisition, and a tangible book value of only $5.4 million, I would have no interest in buying EONC stock and I am glad I am short it.

Learn more …

Want to learn how to read SEC filings like I can? It can help you whether you are a fundamental investor, fundamental short seller, or a short-term trader who uses fundamentals along with technicals. Check out my 10+ hour DVD on the subject. It has 5 hours of me and 5 hours of Tim Sykes (get a feel for how he looks at companies by seeing his post on EONC), with each of us talking about how we look through filings. Read more about the money I have made by understanding SEC filings. The DVD will sell for $497 but is currently available for only $397 for those who pre-order.

Disclosure: Short 2000 shares of EONC. I may close this position at any time. The SEC filing DVD is being produced and sold by Tim Sykes’ company Bullship Press LLC and I will receive royalties on every sale. I will also receive a commission for every DVD bought through my affiliate link to Sykes’ web store. To see more details on my relationship with Sykes, please see my disclosures. I have a disclosure policy and you can find all mydisclaimers there as well; those disclosure & disclaimers are incorporated by reference into this post.

Learn the secrets of reading SEC filings

Readers of my blog know me as a successful day-trader. However, before I had heard of Timothy Sykes and turned to day-trading, I had an incredible run as a fundamental short seller of penny stocks. I amassed a large amount of money by betting against fundamentally flawed companies after doing in-depth research. Now that I have a DVD coming out with Timothy Sykes on how to read SEC filings, you can learn my secrets for doing fundamental research using those filings. Pre-order the DVD now and save $100! [Note: the DVD is sold exclusively through Tim Sykes’ web store; it is entitled “Read SEC Filings”]

Below are my returns (time-weighted IRR and mark to market profit, as calculated by Interactive Brokers) from my main brokerage account when I started my fundamental short selling:

September 2007:  +24.85% , +$40,756.01 (pdf statement)
October 2007:  +17.15%,  +$37,497.50
November 2007:  +6.39%,  +$17,269.27
December 2007:  +2.48%,  +$7,287.55
January 2008:  -0.29%-$528.27
February 2008:  +19.48%,  +$71,491.06
March 2008:  +16.51$ , +$71,421.28
April 2008:  +4.59%,  +$22,387.36
May 2008:  -79.88%,  -$63,899.06 (note: in May I transferred most of my money to another account at Interactive Brokers, so the percentage loss is not meaningful)

Net profit over period: $203,682.70

While I was doing some short-term trading and value investing as well, most of the profits and losses from this time period came from my fundamental short selling. In fact, I was so good that I only suffered a meaningful loss on one position, although unfortunately that was my largest position ever. In May and June I was forced to cover that position due to a forced buy-in, and I received forced buy-ins in other stocks I had shorted, including KYUS and MNLU. I abandoned my fundamental shorting strategy after concluding I could no longer rely upon obtaining long-term borrows to short stocks. But while it lasted, I made a lot of money doing fundamental short selling, utilizing the skills of reading SEC filings that I had acquired.

I present a few of my favorite success stories below. I urge you to consider them and decide whether you might benefit by learning how an experienced trader / investor / short seller such as myself investigates companies to both dig up the dirt and find hidden gems. I have an instructional DVD now available for pre-order ($100 off!) that I am producing with Tim Sykes. There will be about 5 hours of Tim Sykes explaining and giving examples of how he researches companies and 5 hours of me doing the same. Buy the DVD by Friday, November 6th and you will also get to attend a free webinar where you can ask questions and learn more.

Fundamental short selling success story: Noble Roman’s

Perhaps my favorite of those companies, Noble Roman’s (OTC: NROM), had engaged in a rapid expansion using multi-level franchising (they would sell the rights to franchise their brand within a specific geographic area to ‘area developers’), and the stock surged as a result of the increased revenues from those agreements. But after digging into Noble Roman’s SEC filings and analyzing the numbers myself, I realized that most of their revenues were coming from the area developer agreements and they were running out of areas to sell! Furthermore, their franchisees were failing at an alarming rate and new restaurants were not being built at the rate they should have been built. I called out Noble Roman’s in a now-famous blog post, Noble Roman’s Strategy Falls Flat, saying:

All in all, things do not look good for Noble Roman’s stock or for its business. In my realistic scenario, the company is priced at over twice its intrinsic value. In a worst-case scenario most of the new franchises will never be sold, the area development agreements will flop, and Noble Roman’s will struggle to earn $1 million per year. In this scenario the company’s stock price could easily fall 75%.

When I published that post, the stock was at $2.48. I had taken a short position of about 27,887 shares at an average price of $4.67 a couple months earlier (I had first started accumulating my position in early August 2007). The stock dropped steadily as more and more bad news came out and I covered in January 2008 at an average of $1.85, making $78,692 (60.4%). The stock continued to dive after I covered as my prognosis about the company was proven almost entirely correct. Afterward, I was quoted in two articles by Cory Schouten of the Indianapolis Business Journal (Noble Roman’s is based in Indianapolis).

While anyone can look through an SEC filing, it takes expertise to really understand them and to know what to look for. Pre-order my DVD and you will be better prepared to research and understand companies and profit from that knowledge.

nrom

Fundamental research can give you a huge advantage

Noble Roman’s was not an isolated case. I was also proud of the research I put into my articles on Remote MDX (OTC: RMDX). I wrote two good articles on August 20, 2007. Noted short seller Andrew Left of Citron Research was late to the party, writing about the company in December 2007. I also beat noted micro-cap investigative journalist Carol Remond, who wrote about the company in February 2008. I made over $47,000 short selling Remote MDX, despite being way early.

My research was useful even when I was not short selling. I wrote a short piece about H2Diesel (OTC: HTWO), which has since changed its name to New Generation Biofuels (Nasdaq: NGBF). I did only brief analysis of the company’s SEC filings and concluded that the company’s product had little potential. I wrote a negative article on my blog in October 2007 that was syndicated on Seeking Alpha. The day after Seeking Alpha published my article the stock dropped 50% and never again reached the price it had been at before my article was published. Maybe if the morons who had invested in H2Diesel had read and understood the company’s SEC filings they would not have lost money investing in the company.

ngbf

Short selling an unknown bank into oblivion

In June 2008 I acquired a short position in Silver State Bancorp (SSBX at the time, now SSBXQ). While I covered some of my position at a small loss, I ended up building a total position of 3,700 shares short by late July, at prices ranging from $2.44 to $1.52. In early September 2008 the bank was closed by the FDIC. I covered my short position on September 11, 2008 at $0.06, for a net profit of $6,839.39.

How did I know that Silver State Bank was toast? For that matter, how did I know that the much larger Downey Financial (DSL, now DWNFQ) was a dead bank walking? [The link is to my blog on Motley Fool CAPS, which I no longer update.] I knew because I had not only read through the financial statements of those banks but I had also skimmed over the SEC filings of literally hundreds of other banks, and I had come to understand the fundamental problems with the loans these banks had made.

Not just for short selling

On September 5th, 2006 I bought 620 shares in a tiny biotech equiptment maker called Stratagene, paying $4.90 per share. I had seen something in one of the company’s more mundane SEC filings that indicated that the company was worth a lot more than its market value. Eight months later I sold my shares for $10.87 each and reaped a 122% profit ($3701.65 profit). I could have sold out months earlier after Agilent (Nasdaq: A) offered to buy Stratagene, but I held out to make a few extra cents per share. How did I know that Stratagene stock was worth so much more than I paid? Buy the DVD and find out!

Two ways to learn to read SEC filings

If you do not want to buy a $497 DVD (remember, it is only $397 during the preorder period; order it by November 6th to get free access to a follow-up webinar where you can ask questions), I encourage you to learn how to read SEC filings on your own. It is not that hard, although it will take a lot of time. First you must buy a few books on the basics of accounting, then read through hundreds of annual and quarterly reports, and finally read hundreds of academic finance articles on key indicators in SEC filings. Then, after hundreds or thousands of hours of reading, you would know as much as I know about how to interpret SEC filings. Or, if you want to save yourself a lot of time, buy my 10-hour DVD and you will learn most of what I know as well as most of what Timothy Sykes knows about reading SEC filings in a lot less time.

Disclosure: No positions in any stocks mentioned in this post. The SEC filing DVD is being produced and sold by Tim Sykes’ company Bullship Press LLC and I will receive royalties on every sale. I will also receive a commission for every DVD bought through my affiliate link to Sykes’ web store. To see more details on my relationship with Sykes, please see my disclosures. I have a disclosure policy and you can find all my disclaimers there as well; those disclosure & disclaimers are incorporated by reference into this post.

My review of Tim Sykes' DVD TimTactics: Buy his other DVDs instead

If you have considered or will consider buying Timothy Sykes’ DVD TimTactics, I have some simple advice: do not buy it. I say this not because I think it is a horrible DVD, but because Tim has covered much of the information in his other DVDs. I do recommend Sykes’ DVD Pennystocking Part Deux and I thought TimRaw was pretty nice (full reviews to come later; I need to re-watch them), but despite this DVD including so-called ‘advanced trading tactics’ I found little in this DVD that was not also in those other DVDs.  The advanced tactics that were only in this DVD were not particularly hard to figure out and I have learned most of them in one year of full-time day-trading. Also, if you are the patient sort, Sykes’ DVD TimFundamentals 2 will be coming out soon; it was recorded during his 2009 seminar in Las Vegas (which I attended) and I think that was an excellent seminar. TimFundamentals 2 plus Pennystocking Part Deux would give you 97% of the information available on DVD about Tim Sykes’ strategy (the seminar would be sufficient to learn his strategy, but Pennystocking Part Deux’s intra-day charts are invaluable).

Following is my full review:

Informational content: 2 of 5 stars. TimTactics is billed as advanced trading tactics, so I was hoping for strategies above and beyond what he showed in his other DVDs. For example, it would have been nice to see how he reads level 2 or time and sales. He did not show that. Also, any student of his who watches Livestock religiously and has followed his blog (TimAlerts or just his free blog) for a year or more likely will have learned many of his ‘advanced’ tactics, such as how the overall market affects penny stocks. This brings me to some advice that I have said and written multiple times: if you are cheap and are willing to invest a lot of time you can learn Sykes’ strategy without buying his DVDs. Of course, buying one of the better DVDs is useful and will save on time and help to speed up learning. And if that helps you to make more profitable trades sooner, it can easily be worth the investment.

A few tactics he had that he has not mentioned before were things I had heard from other traders or figured out myself, such as how to get faster OTC BB executions. Other than the tactic for faster OTC BB executions, the only tactic I had not heard from Tim before (or learned elsewhere in the last year that I have been a day-trader) was his strategy for trading after-hours or in pre-market trading.

Production quality: 2 of 5 stars. The resolution of the video is barely acceptable. All the video was screencast from Sykes’ laptop, and it started life as a webcast. However, there is no excuse for not recording and saving the full screen resolution without much compression rather than packaging the low-quality webcast video on DVDs. Likewise with the sound, it is far inferior to the sound quality on my daily trade recaps hosted by Youtube. Towards the end of the last DVD for a few minutes you can here someone else making noise besides Tim. While the production quality is not good, Tim is easily comprehensible and the viewer can still see everything important in the video, so if you are still interested in this video, do not let the production quality stop you.

Disclosure: I received TimTactics for ‘free’ for signing up to Sykes’ October 2009 seminar in Las Vegas. I have a disclosure policy that provides more details on other Sykes products and services I have purchased and my relationship with him. I have purchased other DVDs of his and I am a TimAlerts lifetime member;  I have now made over $93,000 trading using his methods since June 2008. I am an affiliate of Tim Sykes and make money when people buy his stuff through my links.