

**In the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court
For the State of Michigan**

SCOTTSDALE CAPITAL ADVISORS
CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

MORNINGLIGHTMOUNTAIN, LLC,
MICHAEL GOODE, and
DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

HARDER LLP


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**MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT**

Defendants MorningLightMountain, LLC ("MLM") and Michael Goode ask the Court to dismiss the First Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

 BUTZEL LONG


Dated: JUNE 6, 2018

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**MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT**

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This is a defamation action. As a matter of constitutional law, all torts predicated upon defamation, including invasion-of-privacy claims, must satisfy a special, heightened pleading standard that demands detailed facts supporting each element of the claim.

QUESTION NO. 1: Has Scottsdale satisfied the special, heightened pleading requirements required under constitutional law for its defamation claim?

QUESTION NO. 2: Corporate entities like Scottsdale have no legally cognizable right to privacy. Should the Court dismiss Scottsdale's privacy claim for failure to state a proper claim?

QUESTION NO. 3: If not, has Scottsdale satisfied the special, heightened pleading requirements required under constitutional law for its defamation-based privacy claim?

Under MCR 2.116(C)(8), MLM and Mr. Goode offer this Memorandum in support of their Motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) with prejudice on summary disposition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

INTRODUCTION

This is a defamation action. Scottsdale has sued MLM and Mr. Goode for allegedly libelous statements posted in online articles at goodetrades.com, a blog reporting on news about penny-stock trading.

A “penny stock” refers to a security issued by a very small company that trades at less than \$5.00 per share.¹ Also known as “microcap stocks,” penny stocks are issued by companies, many of which do not file financial reports with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission.² The SEC describes these securities as “among the most risky,” suffering from a scarcity of publicly-available information that allows “fraudsters [to] easily spread false information about microcap companies, making profits while creating losses for unsuspecting investors.”³ They are very speculative investments, and Congress has tightly regulated broker-dealers who facilitate penny-stock trading under the Exchange Act.⁴

One fraud particularly affecting penny stocks is the classic pump-and-dump scheme. The scheme involves touting a company’s stock through false and mislead-

¹ U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Penny Stock Rules (May 9, 2013) (“PENNY STOCK RULES”) (available at <http://bit.ly/SEC-Penny-Stock-Rules>).

² United States Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, Introduction (Sept. 13, 2013) (“Microcap Guide”) (available at [http://bit.ly/ SEC-Micro cap-Guide](http://bit.ly/SEC-Microcap-Guide)).

³ *Id.*

⁴ PENNY STOCK RULES, *supra* at n.1

ing statements to the marketplace to ignite a buying frenzy that “pumps” the price of a stock (usually a penny stock). The hucksters then sell (or “dump”) their stocks at the “pumped” up price, realizing a handsome profit. Once they dump their shares and stop hyping the stock, the price falls and investors lose their money.⁵

MLM and Mr. Goode reported on pump-and-dump schemes, including one involving stock in Biozoom, which was touted as a biomedical technology company. Before April 2013, Biozoom was known as Entertainment Art, Inc., and it produced leather bags. In April 2013, it announced that it was changing its name to Biozoom and exiting the leather-bag business to develop biomedical technology. From March 2013 (the month before the announcement) to June 2013, at least eight people opened accounts with broker-dealers and deposited millions of shares of Biozoom that they (falsely) claimed were purchased from the original shareholders of Entertainment Art in the previous few months and could be freely traded.⁶ From May 16, 2013 to June 17, 2013, these people sold 14 million shares yielding almost \$34 million, of which nearly \$17 million was wired to overseas bank accounts.⁷ Eventually, the stock collapsed. The SEC brought an enforcement action, *U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Tavella*, to recover the ill-gotten gains and make swindled investors whole.⁸

Scottsdale, a broker-dealer that facilitated penny-stock trading and claims to be one of the dominant companies in the microcap securities market for handling

⁵ U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, “Pump-and-Dumps” and Market Manipulations (Jun. 25, 2013) (available at <http://bit.ly/SEC-Pump-and-Dumps>).

⁶ Answer Exh. A, *U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tavella*, Civ. No. 13-4609 (SDNY), Complaint at 2, ¶¶ 3–5 (Jul. 3, 2013).

⁷ *Id.* at 2–3, ¶¶ 6–7.

⁸ See Answer Exh. C, *Tavella Biozoom Fair Fund Notice* at 2, Plan of Allocation (“The purpose of this distribution is to compensate investors in the [*Tavella*] defendants misrepresentations and omissions in its sale of Biozoom common stock.”)

more than \$125 million worth of trades in 2015 alone,⁹ accepted Biozoom stocks for deposit and facilitated trading in the microcap market. Many of the trading accounts frozen through the SEC’s enforcement action were held at Scottsdale.¹⁰ And, notably, since Scottsdale filed this lawsuit against MLM and Mr. Goode, the SEC entered an order sanctioning Scottsdale’s representative Timothy Scarpino for facilitating the sale of 8.2 million Biozoom shares that generated \$18.5 million in gains—just over half the shares and half the gains—for the fraudsters.¹¹ His offense was “fail[ing] to conduct a searching inquiry into facts surrounding the proposed sales” of unregistered Biozoom stock, despite the presence of “significant red flags.”¹²

Among other things, it was this same kind of failure to conduct searching inquiries that resulted in the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority taking disciplinary action against Scottsdale.¹³ FINRA imposed a \$1.5 million fine against Scottsdale for “institutionaliz[ing] misconduct as its standard way of doing business,” among other aggravating factors.¹⁴ Part of the institutionalized misconduct included

⁹ Complaint at 3, ¶ 11.

¹⁰ Answer Exh. B, *U. S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tavella*, Civ. No. 13-4609 (SDNY), Stipulation and Order Granting Prelim. Inj., Asset Freeze, and Other Relief (R. 16, Jul. 16, 2013); Answer Exh. D, Final J. Defs. Graciarena and Loureiro (R. 67, Dec. 8, 2014); Answer Exh. E, Final Default J. and Order Granting Inj. and Other Relief Against Defendants Tavella, Ficicchia, Blaya, Hernando, Lorenzo, Bagattin, Goldman, and Ferrari (R. 69, Jan. 9, 2015).

¹¹ Answer Exh. F, *In the Matter of Timothy C. Scarpino*, SEC No. 3-18483, Order Instituting Admin. and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Making Findings, Imposing Remedial Sanctions, and a Cease-and-Desist Order (May 15, 2018).

¹² *Id.* at 2, Part III, Summary.

¹³ Answer Exh. G, *FINRA v. Scottsdale Capital Advisors Corp.*, No. 2014041724 601, Amended Extended Hr’g Panel Decision (Jun. 20, 2017) (available at <http://bit.ly/FINRA-Panel-Decision>).

¹⁴ *Id.* at 107, Part IV(A)(3).

Scottsdale's failure to revise its procedures to focus on potential sham transactions after botching its gatekeeping role in the Biozoom pump-and-dump scheme that led to the SEC's enforcement action.¹⁵

FINRA had equally harsh words for Scottsdale's owner, John Hurry. FINRA found that he "violat[ed] his duty to observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade," and it was "purposeful and egregious," which led FINRA to conclude that "[he] is a threat to investors and the integrity of the markets."¹⁶ Worse yet, FINRA found that Mr. Hurry "repeatedly testified falsely, and that there was a pattern of doing so when he thought no contradictory evidence would come to light."¹⁷ FINRA barred Mr. Hurry from associating with any other FINRA member for any reason.¹⁸ Scottsdale and Mr. Hurry are appealing this decision.

Which brings us to this lawsuit. The statements that Scottsdale claims are libelous are contained within two articles written by Mr. Goode and published by MLM about three years after the Biozoom fraud. (The articles are attached to the Complaint, and are therefore "a part of the pleading for all purposes."¹⁹) Both articles include extensive quotations from FINRA proceedings, SEC press releases, and court records from SEC enforcement actions. They also include links and citations to those source records.

The first article (the "April Article") reported on FINRA's sanctions against Scottsdale and Mr. Hurry. The second article (the "June Article") was a follow-up article about FINRA's 111-page decision and new SEC enforcement action against

¹⁵ *Id.* at 11–12, 101–102, 104.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 107, Part IV(B).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Id.* at 108.

¹⁹ *Slater v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ.*, 250 Mich. App. 419, 427 (2002).

another company with close ties to Scottsdale and Mr. Hurry. Scottsdale doesn't argue that the reporting about the FINRA and SEC actions is inaccurate. Rather, it plucks a few sentences from the articles and claims that they wrongfully accuse it of actively engaging in a pump-and-dump scheme. In context, however, the articles do nothing more than note that penny stocks were illegally traded through Scottsdale brokerage accounts. And the notion that these articles damaged Scottsdale in any way—much less in some way unique and independent of (a) FINRA castigating and fining Scottsdale, (b) FINRA excommunicating Mr. Hurry from the securities industry, and (c) the SEC's Biozoom enforcement actions—is risible.

This lawsuit is about one thing: shutting down free speech. It is commonly known as a “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” It is brought with the intent to censor the speaker's message because it is unwanted, not because it is false or defamatory. But the First Amendment no more allows a “litigation veto” than it does a “heckler's veto.”

For the reasons that follow, the Court should dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

SPECIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR FIRST AMENDMENT CASES

As in all cases, motions for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) in defamation actions test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.²⁰ The Court must limit its review to the pleadings—which by court rule includes both the complaint *and* the answer.²¹ The Court must take the well-pleaded factual allegations

²⁰ *Singerman v. Municipal Serv. Bureau*, 455 Mich. 135, 139 (1997).

²¹ MCR 2.116(G)(5) (review of a (C)(8) motion is limited to the pleadings); MCR 2.110(A) (defining a pleading to include complaints and answers).

as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.²²

Importantly, however, under *Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union*, courts have a special, heightened duty under the First Amendment to review the sufficiency of the allegations and evidence before them in defamation actions because of the constitutional implications for free speech.²³ Michigan courts take this duty seriously. Recognizing that summary disposition is “an essential tool” to protect against “forbidden intrusions into the field of free expression,”²⁴ our courts long ago adopted an *Iqbal*-like pleading standard that requires plaintiffs to specifically plead: (1) the defamatory words and the facts that would establish that the words are false; (2) the facts identifying the publication of those words to a third party; (3) the level of fault that must be proved and the facts that would establish that the speaker acted with that level of fault; and (4) the harm suffered by the publication.²⁵ Pleading specific facts is a “relatively simple requirement”; defendants are entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) “on this ground alone” when plaintiffs fail to follow it.²⁶

Also important, in *Thomas M. Cooley Law School v. Doe 1*, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the heightened pleading requirement in defamation cases permits courts to resolve several questions of law on the pleadings, including: (1) whether a statement is capable of being defamatory; (2) the nature of the speaker

²² *Dalley v. Dykema Gossett*, 287 Mich. App. 296, 304–305 (2010).

²³ *Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union*, 466 U. S. 485 (1984).

²⁴ *Kevorkian v. American Med. Ass’n*, 237 Mich. App. 1, 5 (1999) (citing *Ireland v. Edwards*, 230 Mich. App. 607, 613 and n.4 (1998)).

²⁵ *Gonyea v. Motor Parts Fed. Credit Union*, 192 Mich. App. 74, 76–77 (1991). *Accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U. S. 662 (2009) (requiring plaintiffs in federal cases to “plausibly” plead claims through specific factual allegations).

²⁶ *Rouch v. Enquirer & News (After Remand)*, 440 Mich. 238, 279 (1992) (“*Rouch II*”) (Riley, J., concurring).

and the level of constitutional protections afforded to the statement; and (3) whether actual malice exists, if the plaintiff is required to show that level of fault.²⁷ In making these assessments, a court must read the challenged statement in context, fairly and reasonably construing the entire article to determine whether the challenged statement is libelous.²⁸ A statement “does not become actionable merely because it could be taken out of context.”²⁹

ARGUMENT

The Complaint does not state a claim under the heightened pleading standard for defamation cases. And, from what is pleaded, the Court can hold that the challenged statements are incapable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.

1. *No Defamation: Scottsdale has not plausibly pleaded the elements for libel as to any of the allegedly defamatory statements.*

In Michigan, a libel plaintiff must prove that the defendant: (1) made a false statement, (2) that was defamatory, (3) which was “of and concerning the plaintiff, (4) in the form of an unprivileged publication to a third party, (5) with a level of fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and (6) thereby damaged the plaintiff.”³⁰

A. *Fault Not Pleaded: The Complaint fails to plead facts establishing that MLM and Mr. Goode acted negligently.*

To adequately plead fault, a plaintiff must identify the level of fault that ap-

²⁷ *Thomas M. Cooley Law School v. Doe 1*, 300 Mich. App. 245, 342 (2013).

²⁸ *Sanders v. Evening News Ass’n*, 313 Mich. 334, 340 (1946); *Croton v. Gillis*, 104 Mich. App. 104, 108 (1981).

²⁹ *Nehls v. Hillsdale Coll.*, 178 F. Supp. 2d 771, 779 (ED Mich. 2001), *aff’d* 65 Fed. Appx. 984 (CA6 2003) (citing Michigan law).

³⁰ *Northland Wheels Roller Skating Ctr. v. Detroit Free Press*, 213 Mich. App. 317, 323 (1995) (citing *Rouch II*).

plies to the claim *and* allege facts that would establish that level of fault if proved.³¹ There are two levels of fault: negligence and actual malice.³² The negligence standard applies in cases involving private figures; the actual-malice standard applies in cases involving public officials and public figures.³³ Scottsdale alleges that it is a private figure and that MLM and Mr. Goode are the direct and proximate cause of its damages,³⁴ so it impliedly pleads the level of fault to be negligence.

Negligence is defined as the failure to use the care that an ordinary person would use under the circumstances.³⁵ Thus, in order to meet the *Iqbal*-like pleading standard, Scottsdale must plead facts as to what a reasonable reporter and publisher would have done under the circumstances and then plead that MLM and Mr. Goode failed to do it. It does not do this for any of the challenged statements in either of the two articles.

To the extent that Scottsdale apparently tries to plead actual malice in the alternative—“notwithstanding [its] status as a private figure, . . . [MLM and Mr. Goode] knew that the [challenged statements] were false and/or acted in reckless disregard of whether [they] were true or false”—the Complaint is likewise devoid of any factual allegations supporting *how* they knew the statements were false or *why* they were reckless in their alleged disregard of the truth.

Under *Rouch II*, a failure to plead both the level of fault that must be proved *and the facts that would establish that the speaker acted with that level of fault* entitles MLM and Mr. Goode to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) “on this

³¹ *Gonyea*, 192 Mich. App. at 76–77; *Rouch II*, 440 Mich. at 279.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Complaint at 6, ¶ 25.

³⁵ Mich. Civ. J. Instr. 10.02

ground alone.”³⁶ The failure to plead any facts supporting negligence or actual malice is fatal to the Complaint.

B. *April Article:* None of the three statements identified in the April Article adequately pleads a claim for libel.

(1) Scottsdale has not pleaded facts sufficient to show that Statement No. 1 is false.

If you have followed penny stocks and pump and dumps for a few years then you know Scottsdale Capital Advisors.

To be actionable, the challenged statement must be false.³⁷ Scottsdale has not plausibly pleaded that Statement No. 1 in the April Article is false.

Not False. Scottsdale alleges that Statement No. 1 is false because it has “never been involved in any ‘pump and dump’ schemes, has never been a defendant in any ‘pump and dump’ lawsuits, and has never been convicted of engaging in ‘pump and dump’ activity.”³⁸ But, on its face, Statement No. 1 doesn’t accuse Scottsdale of any of these things. It simply says that those who have followed pump-and-dumps know about Scottsdale. And that statement is true by Scottsdale’s own allegations. It admits that it’s a broker-dealer in penny stocks.³⁹ It also admits that accounts traded through Scottsdale were frozen in connection with the Biozoom pump-and-dump scheme.⁴⁰ It is factually accurate to note that observant readers, who have followed news about pump-and-dumps (particularly the “big Biozoom pump”) would be familiar with Scottsdale’s name.⁴¹

³⁶ *Rouch II*, 440 Mich. at 279 (Riley, J., concurring).

³⁷ *Northland Wheels*, 213 Mich. App. at 323.

³⁸ First Am. Compl. at 4, unnumbered paragraph immediately after ¶ 13a.

³⁹ *Id.* at 3, ¶ 11.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 4, ¶ 13c and unnumbered paragraph immediately thereafter.

⁴¹ *Id.* at Exh. 1, ¶ 1.

(2) Scottsdale has not pleaded facts sufficient to show that Statement No. 2 is false or capable of defamatory meaning.

They are one of the few brokers left that have continued to allow the deposit and sale of shares of illiquid penny stocks. Larger brokers and discount brokers stopped allowing that over five years ago.

Scottsdale has failed to plausibly plead a claim for libel based on this statement because it is neither false nor defamatory.

Not False. Statement No. 2 says that Scottsdale is one of the few brokers that still allow both the deposit and trade of penny stock. Scottsdale says Statement No. 2 is false because many other brokers still trade in penny stocks.⁴² But there is a difference between *trading existing shares* of penny stocks and accepting the *deposit of new shares*. Scottsdale does not allege that any of the brokers it identifies in the Complaint accept the deposit of new penny stocks. Thus, it has not pleaded facts showing that Statement No. 2 is false.

Not Defamatory. In any event, nothing about Statement No. 2 is defamatory. It does not say or imply that there is anything illegal or improper about accepting the deposit of shares of penny stocks. Indeed, the statement acknowledges that a few other brokers do, in fact, accept penny stocks for deposit. It simply notes that most brokers have exited this segment of the securities market. There is nothing defamatory in stating that Scottsdale and a few others continue to serve a niche area.

(3) Scottsdale has not pleaded facts sufficient to show that Statement No. 3 is false or capable of defamatory meaning; and the statement is protected by the fair-report privilege.

“When the big Biozoom (BIZM) pump happened back in 2013 many of the frozen accounts were at Scottsdale Capital.”

Scottsdale has likewise failed to plausibly plead a claim for libel based on this statement because it too is neither false nor defamatory. The statement is also pro-

⁴² *Id.* at 4, unnumbered paragraph immediately after ¶ 13b.

tected under the statutory fair-report privilege.

Not False. Statement No. 3 says that “many of the frozen [Biozoom] accounts” were at Scottsdale. Scottsdale alleges that this is false for two reasons, but both reasons are non-sequiturs.

First, Scottsdale says that “only a handful” of Scottsdale accounts were frozen because of the Biozoom scam.⁴³ This may well be true—and the Court must accept this allegation as true for purposes of this Motion—but that isn’t what MLM and Mr. Goode said. They said that “many of the frozen accounts” were at Scottsdale. While the number of frozen accounts might represent a small percentage of Scottsdale’s overall brokerage accounts, they represent “many” of the accounts frozen in the Biozoom enforcement litigation. Tellingly, Scottsdale does not allege otherwise.

Second, Scottsdale says it has “never been a defendant in any lawsuit involving the trading of Biozoom stock.”⁴⁴ Even accepting this as true, Statement No. 3 doesn’t say that Scottsdale was sued in connection with the Biozoom scam. It simply notes that accounts at Scottsdale were frozen.

Not Defamatory. A defamatory communication is one that “tends so to harm the reputation of persons so as to lower them in the estimation of the community or to deter others from associating or dealing with them.”⁴⁵ Publishing the mere fact that accounts were frozen at Scottsdale is not defamatory. Criminals frequently use third parties to facilitate their wrongdoing. Embezzlers may deposit their ill-gotten gains in bank accounts. When the government learns of the theft, it seizes the funds in the bank accounts for restitution and other purposes. No one would ever

⁴³ *Id.* at 4, unnumbered paragraph immediately after ¶ 13c.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Locricchio v. Evening News Ass’n*, 438 Mich. 84, 115 (1991).

credibly argue that a newspaper reporting on such seizures defames *the bank*. Here, the brokerage accounts and the funds acquired from trading Biozoom stocks are like the embezzled funds and Scottsdale is like the bank. Reporting that Biozoom accounts at Scottsdale were frozen in connection with a pump-and-dump scheme no more lowers Scottsdale's reputation in the community than it would lower the bank's reputation.

Privileged Statement. Finally, Statement No. 3 is protected by the statutory fair-report privilege, which provides: "Damages shall not be awarded in a libel action for the publication or broadcast of a fair and true report of *matters of public record*"⁴⁶ The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York froze the defendants' Biozoom accounts in connection with the SEC's enforcement action in *Tavella*.⁴⁷ Most of the *Tavella* defendants had trading accounts at Scottsdale for Biozoom stock that were frozen and/or recovered.⁴⁸ Accordingly, the statement is a fair and true report of a matter of public record. It is not actionable.

C. *June Article: The statement identified in the June Article does not support a claim for defamation, either.*

Lest anyone think that these are just minor paperwork deficiencies with no real consequences, I remind you that one pump and dump alone, Biozoom (BIZM) led to over \$17 million in fraudulent profits for manipulators/insiders, and many of their accounts were at Scottsdale Capital.

Scottsdale plucks this sentence out of a three-page article without regard for its context. As noted earlier, the Court must fairly and reasonably construe the en-

⁴⁶ MCL 600.2911(3) (emphases added).

⁴⁷ Answer at 7-8, Answer to Compl. ¶ 13, and Answer Exhs. A-E. (The exhibits are part of the pleadings under MCR 2.113(F)(2)). *See also Slater*, 250 Mich. App. at 427.

⁴⁸ Answer at 7-8, Answer to Compl. ¶ 13, and Answer Exhs. A-E.

tire article to determine whether a statement is libelous.⁴⁹

The challenged statement in the June Article comes after quoting excerpts from FINRA's disciplinary order against Scottsdale and Mr. Hurry for doing an exceedingly poor job at preventing illegal sales by penny-stock insiders.⁵⁰ The statement also follows extended excerpts from an SEC press release and the SEC's lawsuit against Scottsdale-affiliate Alpine Securities Corporation, which cleared thousands of suspicious deposits of penny stock introduced by Scottsdale.⁵¹ The Patriot Act requires broker-dealers to monitor and report suspicious trading activity to help crack down on money laundering.⁵² Charging Scottsdale's affiliate with thousands of reporting violations, the SEC alleged in its complaint that Scottsdale's affiliate routinely and systematically failed to file Suspicious Activity Reports ("SARs") with the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network for stock transactions that the affiliate had internally flagged as suspicious.⁵³ And, when it did file SARs, the affiliates allegedly omitted the very information that formed the bases for knowing, suspecting, or having reason to suspect that a transaction was suspicious.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ *Sanders*, 313 Mich. at 340; *Croton*, 104 Mich. App. at 108.

⁵⁰ Complaint Exh. 2 at 1-2.

⁵¹ *Ibid* (citing *U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm'n v. Alpine Secs. Corp.*, No. 17-04179 (SDNY) (R. 1, Compl., Jun. 5, 2017), and quoting SEC Litig. Release No. 23853 (Jun. 5, 2017) (available at <http://bit.ly/SEC-Alpine-Litigation-Release>).

⁵² 31 U.S.C. §§ 3512(a)(2)(G) and 3518; 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320.

⁵³ Complaint Exh. 2 at 2.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*. Interestingly, although not offered in support of the Motion because it is beyond the pleadings, a federal court has since ruled that the SARs, when filed, were so "woefully inadequate" as a matter of law as to warrant partial summary judgment for the government. *Alpine Secs. Corp.*, No. 17-04179 (SDNY), Order on Mot. for Summ. J., R. 101 at 65 (Mar. 30, 2018).

The challenged statement must be assessed against this backdrop. By failing to investigate and report suspicious activity, opportunities are lost to prevent criminal activity, including securities fraud. The challenged statement gives an example of how investors lost tens of millions of dollars to securities fraud when a broker-dealer was asleep at the switch. It contains nothing false. Given the FINRA disciplinary action, Scottsdale has an *adjudicated* track record of failing to diligently investigate penny stocks before accepting them for deposit, which in the case of Biozoom permitted fraudsters to steal almost \$34 million from investors through trading facilitated by Scottsdale. On this point, it is noteworthy that Scottsdale has *not* alleged that the first sentence in the June Article is false: “As I wrote back in April, FINRA fined Scottsdale Capital Advisors \$1.5 million *for doing a really poor job at preventing illegal sales by penny stock insiders.*”⁵⁵

2. *No False Light: The Complaint does not adequately plead a claim for invasion of privacy by false light.*

A. *No Corporate Right to Privacy. Corporations cannot assert a claim for invasion of privacy because they have no legal right to privacy.*

Businesses cannot maintain tort claims for invasion of privacy, by false light or otherwise. In *Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Kent County Treasurer*, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that corporations have no right to privacy under the State constitution or at common-law: “Since the right to privacy is primarily designed to protect the feelings and sensibilities of human beings rather than to safeguard property, business, or other pecuniary interests, the courts have denied this right to corporations and other institutions.”⁵⁶ Scottsdale is erroneously attempting to assert a right

⁵⁵ Complaint Exh. 2 at 1, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).

⁵⁶ *Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Kent County Treas.*, 175 Mich. App. 523, 528–529 (1989). See also R. Sack, *Defamation* § 12:3.5 (5th ed. 2018) (citing Restatement

it does not have. The Court should not permit it to do so.

B. *No Private Facts.* The challenged statements are all about matters of public record, which cannot support a privacy claim.

Even if corporations could assert privacy claims, it is blackletter law that information already a matter of public knowledge or of public record *cannot* serve as the basis for an invasion of privacy claim.⁵⁷ Here, Scottsdale's connection to the Biozoom pump-and-dump is a matter of public record in the SEC enforcement proceedings in *Tavella*, *Villena*, and *Scarpino*, and in the FINRA disciplinary proceeding against Scottsdale and Mr. Hurry. Discussing these matters of public record, *complete with links to the source documents*, defeats any possible privacy claim.

C. *No False Statement.* Scottsdale does not adequately allege that the challenged statements are false.

The heightened First Amendment pleading and proof standards apply equally to privacy torts predicated upon defamation.⁵⁸ So, because Scottsdale hasn't adequately pleaded that the challenged statements are false for defamation purposes, it also hasn't adequately pleaded falsity for its privacy claim.

D. *No Actual Malice Pleaded.* Scottsdale does not adequately allege that MLM and Mr. Goode published the challenged statements with actual malice.

Even if corporations could assert privacy claims and the relevant public records did not automatically defeat Scottsdale's claim, it would still fail as pleaded. The elements of this claim are: (1) that the defendant broadcast a communication to the

(Second) of Torts § 652I Comment *c* (1997), and collecting State and federal cases applying this rule).

⁵⁷ *Cf. Doe v. Mills*, 212 Mich. App. 73, 82 (1995) (so holding in a case involving a claim for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of embarrassing facts).

⁵⁸ *Ireland*, 230 Mich. App. at 624.

public or a large number of people; and (2) the communication placed the plaintiff in a light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; with (3) knowledge that the publicized matter was false or reckless disregard for the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed.⁵⁹ The communications at issue are the same challenged statements that Scottsdale relies upon for its defamation claim; there are no new facts offered in support of its privacy claim. Although Scottsdale generically alleges that MLM and Mr. Goode “knew” that the challenged statements were false (or that they recklessly disregarded their falsity), the Complaint is devoid of any facts alleging *how* they knew the statements were false or *why* they recklessly disregarded whether the statements were false. Under *Rouch II*, this automatically dooms the claim.

3. *Dismissal with Prejudice: Scottsdale cannot cure the flaws in the Complaint by further amendment.*

Leave to amend should be withheld when amendment would be futile.⁶⁰ Amendment would be futile in this case because: (1) all of the statements are true when considered in light of FINRA’s disciplinary proceeding and the SEC’s enforcement proceedings; and (2) corporations cannot assert privacy claims. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this case with prejudice.

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⁵⁹ *Early Detection Ctr., P.C. v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, 157 Mich. App. 618, 630 (1986).

⁶⁰ *Allegheny-Ludlam Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treas.*, 207 Mich. App. 604, 605 (1994).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For these reasons, MLM and Mr. Goode respectfully request that the Court grant summary disposition in their favor under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted,

 BUTZEL LONG



Dated: JUNE 6, 2018

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JUDGE BUCHWALD

13 CIV 4609

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,


v.

MAGDALENA TAVELLA,
ANDRES HORACIO FICICCHIA, GONZALO
GARCIA BLAYA, LUCIA MARIANA
HERNANDO, CECILIA DE LORENZO,
ADRIANA ROSA BAGATTIN,
DANIELA PATRICIA GOLDMAN,
MARIANO PABLO FERRARI,
MARIANO GRACIARENA, and
FERNANDO LOUREYRO,

Defendants.

Civil Action No.

Jury Trial Demanded



COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") for its
Complaint alleges as follows:

1. The Commission brings this civil law enforcement action against
Magdalena Tavella, Andres Horacio Ficicchia, Gonzalo Garcia Blaya, Lucia Mariana
Hernando, Cecilia De Lorenzo, Adriana Rosa Bagattin, Daniela Patricia Goldman, and
Mariano Pablo Ferrari (collectively, the "Selling Defendants") on an emergency basis to
prevent millions of dollars of proceeds from unlawful sales of securities being transferred
out of the country. Over the past month, the Selling Defendants have sold almost \$34
million worth of securities in Biozoom, Inc. ("Biozoom") (f/k/a Entertainment Art, Inc.),
a penny stock company traded on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board ("OTCBB"), and

millions more shares are sitting in defendants' brokerage accounts and likely to be sold unlawfully to the public. No registration statement was in effect for the Selling Defendants' resale of securities, thus their sales were in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15 U.S.C. § 77e]. Further, almost \$17 million of the Selling Defendants' ill-gotten proceeds have been transferred out of the United States. Unless an asset freeze covering the Selling Defendants' Biozoom shares is issued, the unlawful sales of securities and transfer or dissipation of the proceeds from sales of the securities will likely continue.

2. The Commission also brings this civil law enforcement action against Mariano Graciarena and Fernando Loueyro. These defendants recently deposited over a total of approximately 4.4 million shares of Biozoom stock into their respective brokerage accounts. Like the shares sold by the Selling Defendants, there is no registration statement in effect permitting the lawful resale of the Biozoom shares held by Graciarena and Loueyro. Because Graciarena and Loueyro are likely to engage in the sale of securities in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act, the Commission seeks to enjoin them from offering for resale their Biozoom shares until such time as a registration statement is filed and in effect.

3. From March 2013 to June 2013, defendants opened brokerage accounts at broker-dealers and deposited millions of shares of Biozoom, Inc. (f/k/a Entertainment Art, Inc.) that they claimed did not bear a restrictive legend and were free-trading shares. All of the defendants claimed that they had purchased all or some of their shares from some of the original shareholders of Entertainment Art in transactions between November 2012 and March 2013.

4. To bolster their claims, each of the defendants submitted stock purchase agreements dated between November 2012 and March 2013 that purportedly evidenced their purchase of Entertainment Art stock from the former Entertainment Art shareholders. Based on these stock purchase agreements and other documentation, the defendants – between March 2013 and June 2013 – deposited a total of 20,130,000 shares of Biozoom into their brokerage accounts.

5. The defendants could not, however, have purchased any of their shares from the original Entertainment Art shareholders as they claimed because those shareholders ceased to have any interest in the company on or around May 2009 –more than *three years* earlier than the defendants' claimed purchases.

6. Almost immediately after defendants deposited shares of Biozoom in their brokerage accounts, Biozoom began issuing a series of press releases and a stock promotional campaign for the company began. Following these press releases and stock promotional campaign, from May 16, 2013 to June 21, 2013, the company's stock price and volume increased dramatically. For example, prior to May 16, 2013, no shares in Biozoom had traded. However, from May 16, 2013 to June 21, 2013, Biozoom's stock price shot past \$4 per share, with total volume of more than 87 million shares.

7. During this same period, eight of the defendants sold millions of Biozoom shares into the rising market — reaping millions of dollars in proceeds as a result. In total, over an approximately one month period from May 16, 2013 – June 17, 2013, eight of the defendants sold a total of over 14 million shares of Biozoom stock into the public markets for proceeds of almost \$34 million.

8. None of these sales were made pursuant to an effective registration statement. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, the eight Selling Defendants violated the registration provisions of the federal securities laws, Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") [15 U.S.C. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e(c)].

9. While the remaining two defendants – Graciarena and Loureyro – have yet to sell any of their Biozoom shares, they are likely to do so unless restrained. They recently deposited millions of shares into their respective brokerage accounts, claiming (as the other defendants) that these shares have no restrictive legend and are available for resale to the public. Therefore, the Commission seeks an order pursuant to Securities Act Section 20(b) [15 U.S.C. 77t(b)] to enjoin them from violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. The SEC brings this action pursuant to Section 5 [15 U.S.C. § 77e] and Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") [15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)]. Defendants have directly or indirectly made use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or the facilities of a national securities exchange in connection with the acts, practices, transactions, and courses of business alleged in this Complaint.

11. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 22 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77v], and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

12. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77v], because certain acts, practices, and courses of business constituting the violations alleged herein have occurred within the Southern District of New York.

13. Defendants will, unless restrained and enjoined, continue to engage in the acts, practices, transactions, and courses of business alleged in this Complaint, or in acts, practices, transactions, and courses of business of similar purport and object.

THE DEFENDANTS

14. Defendant Andres Horacio Ficicchia resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina and is an Argentine citizen.

15. Defendant Gonzalo Garcia Blaya resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is an Argentine citizen.

16. Defendant Luciana Mariana Hernando resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is an Argentine citizen.

17. Defendant Cecilia De Lorenzo resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is an Argentine citizen.

18. Defendant Magdalena Tavella resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is an Argentine citizen.

19. Defendant Adriana Rosa Bagattin resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is an Argentine citizen.

20. Defendant Daniela Patricia Goldman resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is an Argentine citizen.

21. Defendant Mariano Pablo Ferrari resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is an Argentine citizen.

22. Defendant Mariano Graciarena resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is an Argentine citizen.

23. Defendant Fernando Loureyro resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is an Argentine citizen.

OTHER RELEVANT ENTITIES

24. Biozoom, Inc. (f/k/a Entertainment Arts, Inc.) is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Kassel, Germany. Biozoom purports to be in the business of researching, developing, and licensing technologies relating to the mobile remote collection of biomedical data as well as bilateral diagnostic communication. Biozoom's common stock is registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. §781] and is quoted on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board ("OTCBB") under the trading symbol "BIZM."

25. Legend Securities ("Legend") is a registered broker-dealer located in New York, New York.

26. Scottsdale Capital Advisors ("Scottsdale") is a registered broker-dealer located in Phoenix, Arizona.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Creation of Entertainment Art and Initial Sale of Company

27. On June 15, 2007, Entertainment Art was incorporated under the laws of the state of Nevada. In public filings, Entertainment Art represented that it was a developmental stage company formed to design, produce, and sell a line of leather bags, with offices located in West Hempstead, New York. Entertainment Art was controlled by the three members of company management.

28. From November 2007 through March 2008, Entertainment Art offered and sold a total of 610,000 shares to 34 different investors in private placement transactions.

A share certificate reflecting Entertainment Art share ownership was issued to each investor.

29. On July 18, 2008, Entertainment Art filed a Form S-1 registration statement with the Commission to register the resale transactions for the 34 shareholders who acquired Entertainment Art stock in these private placements ("the Form S-1 Shareholders"). In particular, of the total 1,810,000 shares outstanding at the time of the Form S-1, Entertainment Art's S-1 covered 610,000, or approximately one-third, of the company's then outstanding shares.

30. The remaining 1,200,000 shares of Entertainment Art stock were held by the three company officers in three identical 400,000 share blocks.

31. On May 1, 2009, Entertainment Art announced, in a public filing with the Commission, that the three Entertainment Art officers sold their total 1,200,000 shares of Entertainment Art to Medford Financial Ltd. ("Medford Financial"), a Belizean entity, for a purchase price of \$120,000.

32. Contrary to this disclosure, however, Medford Financial purchased more than 1,200,000 shares of Entertainment Art. In fact, Medford Financial also purchased all of the 610,000 shares that had been purchased by the Form S-1 shareholders. Thus, in this transaction, Medford Financial purchased *all* of the outstanding shares, including the shares then held by the Form S-1 Shareholders.

33. Each of the Form S-1 shareholders received their initial investment back, with an additional, small return on their investment. Thus, by on or around May 2009, each of the Form S-1 shareholders had no remaining shares or other interest in Entertainment Art.

34. According to company filings, on June 30, 2009, Entertainment Art's board of directors approved the implementation of a 33:1 forward split for Entertainment Art stock without correspondingly increasing the authorized shares of common stock for Entertainment Art. On July 21, 2009, the forward split became effective, and as a result of the forward split, the company had 59,730,000 shares of common stock outstanding – which was *all* owned by Medford Financial.

B. Another Sale of Entertainment Art and Acquisition of Biozoom Technology

35. On October 25, 2012, Entertainment Art reported, in a public filing with the Commission, that on October 19 Medford Financial sold 39,600,000 common shares of Entertainment Art in a private transaction with Le Mond Capital for a purchase price of \$430,000, which equates to approximately \$0.01 per share.

36. Le Mond Capital purports to be a foreign entity based in the British Virgin Islands. As a result of the sale, Entertainment Art disclosed that Le Mond Capital controlled over 66.3% of the Company's issued and outstanding common stock.

37. However, on information and belief, Le Mond Capital purchased the *entire* company from Medford Financial – and all of 59,730,000 outstanding shares.

38. The owner of Le Mond Capital, Sara Deutsch, became Entertainment Art's new President, Chief Executive Officer, Principal Executive Officer, Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary, Treasurer, and Director. On information and belief, Deutsch is a resident of Buenos Aires, Argentina.

39. From September 2011 to at least October 2012, Deutsch worked as a manager of Magdalena's Party. According to the business' website, Magdalena's Party is

a restaurant located in Buenos Aires, Argentina. According to another website describing Magdalena's Party, it is co-owned by Deutsch, defendant Magdalena Tavella, and others.

40. On March 12, 2013, Entertainment Art filed a Form 8-K with the Commission in which it announced a dramatic change in its business operations from a company that developed fashionable leather bags to a company that was involved in the biomedical industry. In particular, Entertainment Art announced a transaction pursuant to which its newly formed subsidiary, Biozoom Technologies, Inc., acquired certain patents, licenses, and related assets from each of three separate companies: Opsolution Spectroscopic Systems, Opsolution NanoPhotonics, and Opsolution GmbH, (the "Opsolution acquisition") in exchange for cash of \$50,000 and 39 million shares of Entertainment Art common stock.

41. Entertainment Art described that, through Biozoom, it was now in the business of "researching, developing, and licensing technologies relating to the mobile remote collection of biomedical data as well as bilateral diagnostic communication."

42. Entertainment Art further disclosed that – as of immediately after closing of the Opsolution acquisition and filing of the Form 8-K – Deutsch would step down as CEO and Chief Financial Officer of Entertainment Art, but would stay on as a Director only.

43. As a result of the transaction, the 59,730,000 outstanding shares of Entertainment Art were allocated in the following manner. First, Le Mond Capital returned 39,000,000 shares to the company, and then those 39,000,000 shares were allocated – as shares bearing a restrictive legend – to four entities that were associated with the Opsolution entities.

44. Thus, after these allocations, 20,730,000 shares of Entertainment Art remained. Le Mond Capital retained 600,000 of these shares bearing a restrictive legend. The remaining 20,130,000 shares – which represented the total shares purchased by the Form S-1 Shareholders (and subsequently sold in the Medford Financial transaction on or around May 2009) – were unallocated.

45. On April 1, 2013, Entertainment Art changed its name to Biozoom, under the trading symbol “BIZM” on the OTC Bulletin Board.

C. Defendants Deposit Biozoom Shares In Their Newly Opened Brokerage Accounts

46. From January 2013 to May 2013, brokerage accounts were opened at Legend, a registered broker-dealer based in New York, in the name of four of the defendants: Ficicchia, Blaya, Hernando, and De Lorenzo.

47. In May 2013, brokerage accounts were opened at Scottsdale, a registered broker-dealer based in Phoenix, Arizona, in the name of another four defendants: Tavella, Bagattin, Goldman, and Ferrari.

48. According to the account opening documentation – and as reflected in the table below – with one exception, none of the defendants worked in fields related to securities.

| Defendant | Profession |
|------------|------------------------------------|
| Ficicchia | Self-employed music producer |
| Blaya | Music producer-stock investments |
| Hernando | Marketing Manager |
| De Lorenzo | Self-employed marketing specialist |

| Defendant | Profession |
|-----------|--|
| Tavella | Attorney practicing administrative, political, intellectual property, and patent law |
| Bagattin | Retired Teacher |
| Ferrari | Sales and Marketing |
| Goldman | Delicatessen owner |

1. Accounts at Legend

Andres Horacio Ficicchia

49. Defendant Ficicchia opened his account at Legend on or about January 24, 2013 and funded the account with \$26,000 cash.

50. On November 30, 2012, Entertainment Art's transfer agent issued an Entertainment Art certificate for 165,000 shares to Ficicchia.

51. On March 13, 2013, Entertainment Art's transfer agent issued an Entertainment Art certificate for 1,237,500 shares to Ficicchia.

52. The certificate for 1,237,500 shares was accompanied by a corporate certification stating that Deutsch certified – at a board meeting of Entertainment Art on March 22, 2013 – the company approved the issuance of that certificate to Ficicchia.

53. In order to deposit the certificate for 1,237,500 shares and the certificate of 165,000 shares of Entertainment Art into his brokerage account at Legend, defendant Ficicchia completed a "Deposit for Securities Request Certificate Questionnaire" that was required by Legend, and provided additional documentation.

54. The documentation reflected that Ficicchia acquired the 1,237,500 shares pursuant to two private sales that were completed on February 19, 2013: (1) a purchase of 412,500 shares from Investor A and (2) a purchase of 825,000 shares from Investor B. The documentation also reflected that Ficicchia paid a total of approximately \$6,300 for these shares, which equals approximately \$.005 per share. For the following reasons, the documentation submitted by Ficicchia was false.

55. Investor A was one of the Form S-1 shareholders who had sold his shares of Entertainment Art on or around May 2009 – almost four years before Ficicchia's claimed purchase of shares from Investor A. Investor B was purportedly a shareholder that acquired its shares from some of the Form S-1 shareholders in 2011 – approximately two years after the Form S-1 shareholders actually sold their shares.

56. The documentation further reflected that Defendant Ficicchia acquired the 165,000 shares pursuant to a private sale that was completed on November 30, 2012 with Investor C – shares that he acquired for \$24,750, which equals \$0.15 per share. Investor C was also one of the Form S-1 Shareholders who had sold his shares of Entertainment Art on or around May 2009 – over three years before Ficicchia's claimed purchase of shares from Investor C.

57. On March 5, 2013, Ficicchia deposited 165,000 shares of Entertainment Art not bearing a restrictive legend into his brokerage account at Legend; and then on March 27, 2013, Ficicchia deposited an additional 1,237,500 shares (again not bearing a restrictive legend) – for a total of 1,402,500 shares.

58. On April 1, 2013, due to the name change of Entertainment Art to Biozoom, these shares became Biozoom shares. Thus, defendant Ficicchia held

1,402,500 shares of Biozoom that were purportedly available to be sold on the public markets.

Gonzalo Garcia Blaya

59. On or about March 26, 2013, defendant Blaya opened an account at Legend and funded this account with \$26,000 cash.

60. On March 22, 2013 – just four days prior to opening this account – Entertainment Art’s transfer agent issued a certificate for 1,485,000 Entertainment Art shares to Blaya.

61. In order to deposit his certificate for 1,485,000 shares of Entertainment Art into his brokerage account at Legend, defendant Blaya completed a “Deposit for Securities Request Certificate Questionnaire” that was required by Legend, and provided additional documentation. For the following reasons, the documentation submitted by Blaya was false.

62. The documentation reflected that Blaya acquired the 1,485,000 shares in four separate private sales that were completed on March 4, 2013: (1) a purchase of 165,000 shares from Investor D; (2) a purchase of 495,000 shares from Investor E; (3) a purchase of 165,000 shares from Investor F; and (4) a purchase of 660,000 shares from Investor G. The documentation also reflected that Blaya paid a total of approximately \$6,765 for these shares, which equals approximately \$.005 per share.

63. Each of Investors D, E, F, and G were Form S-1 Shareholders who had sold their Entertainment Art shares on or around May 2009 – almost four years before Blaya’s claimed purchase of shares from these investors.

64. On April 16, 2013, Blaya deposited 1,485,000 shares of Entertainment Art not bearing a restrictive legend into his brokerage account at Legend. As a result of the business name change on April 1, 2013, these shares became Biozoom shares. Thus, defendant Blaya held 1,485,000 shares of Biozoom that were purportedly available to be sold on the public markets.

Luciana Mariana Hernando

65. On or about March 7, 2013, defendant Hernando opened an account at Legend and funded the account with \$50,000 cash.

66. On March 22, 2013, Entertainment Art's transfer agent issued a certificate for 1,815,000 Entertainment Art shares to Hernando.

67. In order to deposit her 1,815,000 shares of Entertainment Art into her brokerage account at Legend, defendant Hernando completed a "Deposit for Securities Request Certificate Questionnaire" that was required by Legend, and provided additional documentation. For the following reasons, the documentation submitted by Hernando was false.

68. The documentation reflected that Hernando acquired the 1,815,000 shares pursuant to two separate private sales that were completed on March 5, 2013: (1) a purchase of 1,650,000 shares from Investor H; and (2) a purchase of 165,000 shares from Investor I. The documentation also reflected that Hernando paid a total of approximately \$5,445 for these shares, which equals approximately \$.003 per share.

69. Both Investors H and I were Form S-1 shareholders who had sold their Entertainment Art shares on or around May 2009 – almost four years before Hernando's claimed purchase of shares from these investors.

70. On May 14, 2013, defendant Hernando deposited 1,815,000 shares of Entertainment Art not bearing a restrictive legend into her brokerage account at Legend Securities. As a result of the business name change on April 1, 2013, these shares became Biozoom shares. Thus, defendant Hernando held 1,815,000 shares of Biozoom that were purportedly available to be sold on the public markets.

Cecilia De Lorenzo

71. On or about February 4, 2013, defendant De Lorenzo opened an account at Legend and funded the account with \$50,000 cash.

72. On March 13, 2013, Entertainment Art's transfer agent issued a certificate for 2,062,500 shares to De Lorenzo.

73. The certificate was accompanied by a corporate certification stating that Deutsch certified – at a board meeting of Entertainment Art on March 22, 2013 – the company approved the issuance of the above certificate to De Lorenzo.

74. In order to deposit her 2,062,500 shares of Entertainment Art into her brokerage account at Legend, De Lorenzo completed a "Deposit for Securities Request Certificate Questionnaire" that was required by Legend, and provided additional documentation. For the following reasons, the documentation submitted by De Lorenzo was false.

75. The documentation reflected that De Lorenzo acquired the 2,062,500 shares pursuant to two separate private sales that were completed on February 19, 2013 – the same day as the purported purchases of Entertainment Art stock by Ficicchia: (1) a purchase of 1,650,000 shares from Investor J; and (2) a purchase of 412,500 shares from

Investor K. The documentation also reflected that Defendant De Lorenzo paid a total of approximately \$8,300 for these shares, which equals approximately \$.004 per share.

76. Both Investors J and K, however, were Form S-1 shareholders who had sold their Entertainment Art shares on or around May 2009 – almost four years before defendant De Lorenzo's claimed purchase of shares from these investors.

77. On March 22, 2013, defendant De Lorenzo deposited 2,062,500 shares of Entertainment Art not bearing a restrictive legend into her brokerage account at Legend. As a result of the business name change on April 1, 2013, these shares became Biozoom shares. Thus, defendant De Lorenzo held 2,062,500 shares of Biozoom that purportedly could be sold on the public markets.

2. Accounts at Scottsdale

Magdalena Tavella

78. On March 22, 2013, Entertainment Art's stock transfer agent issued a certificate for 1,815,000 shares of Entertainment Art to Tavella.

79. On or about May 16, 2013, defendant Tavella opened an account at Scottsdale.

80. In order to deposit her 1,815,000 shares of Entertainment Art into her brokerage account, Scottsdale, using information and documentation provided by Tavella, completed a securities deposit checklist. For the following reasons, the documentation submitted by Tavella was false.

81. The documentation reflected that Tavella acquired the 1,815,000 shares pursuant to three separate private sales that were completed on March 5, 2013 – the same day as the purported purchases of Entertainment Art by defendant Hernando: (1) a

purchase of 165,000 shares from Investor L; (2) a purchase of 165,000 shares from Investor M; and (3) a purchase of 1,485,000 shares from Investor N. The documentation reflected that Tavella paid a total of approximately \$9,075 for these shares, which equals approximately \$.006 per share.

82. Investors L and M were two of the Form S-1 shareholders who had sold their shares of Entertainment Art on or around May 2009 – almost four years before Tavella's claimed purchase of shares from them. Investor N was purportedly a shareholder that acquired its shares from some of the Form S-1 shareholders in March 2011 – almost two years after the Form S-1 shareholders sold their shares.

83. On May 22, 2013, defendant Tavella deposited 1,815,000 shares of Entertainment Art not bearing a restrictive legend into her brokerage account at Scottsdale. As a result of the business name change on April 1, 2013, these shares became Biozoom shares. Thus, defendant Tavella held 1,815,000 shares of Biozoom that were purportedly available to be sold on the public markets.

Adriana Rosa Bagattin

84. On March 13, 2013, Entertainment Art's transfer agent issued a certificate for 2,310,000 Entertainment Art shares to defendant Bagattin.

85. On or about May 10, 2013, defendant Bagattin opened an account at Scottsdale.

86. In order to deposit her 2,310,000 shares of Entertainment Art into her brokerage account, Scottsdale, using information and documentation provided by Bagattin, completed a securities deposit checklist. For the following reasons, the documentation submitted by Bagattin was false.

87. The documentation reflected that Bagattin acquired the 2,310,000 shares pursuant to three private sales that were completed on February 26, 2013: (1) a purchase of 1,650,000 shares from Investor O; (2) a purchase of 330,000 shares from Investor P; and (3) a purchase of 330,000 shares from Investor Q. The documentation reflected that Defendant Bagattin paid approximately \$6,930 for these shares, which equals approximately \$.003 per share.

88. Each of Investors O, P, and Q, however, were Form S-1 Shareholders who had sold their Entertainment Art shares on or around May 2009 – almost four years before defendant Bagattin's claimed purchase of shares from these persons.

89. On May 22, 2013, Bagattin deposited 2,310,000 shares of Entertainment Art not bearing a restrictive legend into her brokerage account at Scottsdale. As a result of the business name change on April 1, 2013, these shares became Biozoom shares. Thus, defendant Bagattin held 2,310,000 shares of Biozoom that were purportedly available to be sold on the public markets.

Daniela Patricia Goldman

90. On March 22, 2013, Entertainment Art's transfer agent issued a certificate for 2,485,000 Entertainment Art shares to Goldman.

91. On or about May 13, 2013, defendant Goldman opened an account at Scottsdale.

92. In order to deposit her 2,485,000 shares of Entertainment Art into her brokerage account, Scottsdale, using documentation and information provided by Goldman, completed a securities deposit checklist. For the following reasons, the documentation submitted by Goldman was false.

93. The documentation reflected that Goldman acquired the 2,485,000 shares pursuant to two private sales that were completed on March 4, 2013: (1) a purchase of 1,485,000 shares from Investor R; and (2) a purchase of 1,000,000 shares from Investor S. The documentation also reflected that Goldman paid approximately \$7,455 for these shares, which equals approximately \$.003 per share.

94. Investor R purportedly obtained its shares from some of the Form S-1 Shareholders in March 2011 – almost two years after the Form S-1 shareholders sold their shares. Investor S was one of the Form S-1 shareholders and sold his shares on or around May 2009 – almost four years before defendant Goldman's claimed purchase of shares from him.

95. On May 22, 2013, Goldman deposited 2,485,000 shares of Entertainment Art not bearing a restrictive legend into her brokerage account at Scottsdale. As a result of the business name change on April 1, 2013, these shares became Biozoom shares. Thus, defendant Goldman held 2,485,000 shares of Biozoom that were purportedly available for sale on the public markets.

Mariano Pablo Ferrari

96. On March 22, 2013, Entertainment Art's transfer agent issued a certificate for 2,310,000 Entertainment Art shares to Ferrari.

97. On or about May 20, 2013, Ferrari opened an account at Scottsdale.

98. In order to deposit his 2,310,000 shares of Entertainment Art into his brokerage account, Scottsdale, using documentation and information provided by Ferrari, completed a securities deposit checklist. For the following reasons, the documentation provided by Ferrari was false.

99. The documentation reflected that Ferrari acquired the 2,310,000 shares pursuant to two private sales that were completed on March 5, 2013: (1) a purchase of 1,650,000 shares from Investor T; and (2) a purchase of 660,000 shares from Investor U. The documentation also reflected that Goldman paid approximately \$9,240 for these shares, or approximately \$.004 per share.

100. Investor T was one of the Form S-1 shareholders and sold his shares on or around May 2009 – almost four years before defendant Ferrari's claimed purchase of shares from him. Investor U purportedly obtained its shares from some of the Form S-1 shareholders in September 2009.

101. On May 22, 2013, Ferrari deposited 2,310,000 shares of Entertainment Art not bearing a restrictive legend into his brokerage account at Scottsdale. As a result of the business name change on April 1, 2013, these shares became Biozoom shares. Thus, defendant Ferrari held 2,310,000 shares of Biozoom that were purportedly available for sale on the public markets.

Two Other Accounts in Names of Defendants Graciarena and Loureyro

102. On March 22, 2013, Manhattan Transfer issued a certificate for 2,145,000 Entertainment Art shares to Graciarena and 2,300,000 Entertainment Art shares to Loureyro. Graciarena and Loureyro submitted documentation reflecting that they had obtained their shares in the same manner as the other eight defendants – i.e. – by purportedly purchasing shares from the Form S-1 shareholders.

103. On or about June 14, 2013, Fernando Loureyro and Mariano Graciarena opened separate accounts at Scottsdale. Like the other eight defendants, both stated in brokerage firm documents that they resided in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

104. On June 18, 2013, these shares were deposited in the brokerage accounts of these two individuals. To date, none of these shares have been sold.

105. In sum, from November 2012 to June 2013, the ten defendant accounts received a total of 20,130,000 shares of Entertainment Art. These shares represented all of the shares that were unallocated after the Opsolution acquisition. Moreover, these shares represented 100% percent of the total shares without a restrictive legend outstanding in Biozoom at the time, and more than 33% percent of the total outstanding shares of Biozoom.

D. Defendants Sell Millions of Biozoom Shares

106. Beginning on May 22, 2013 – and after nearly all of the defendants had deposited their Biozoom shares not bearing a restrictive legend in their accounts – Biozoom began issuing a series of press releases in which it claimed it “created the world’s first portable, handheld consumer device” to instantly and non-invasively measure certain biomarkers. These claims were also made by other entities, including Global Financial, Inc., Stock Preacher.com, among others.

107. Following these positive claims concerning Biozoom’s prospects, the accounts in the name of eight of the selling defendants sold substantial amounts of their Biozoom stock that did not bear a restrictive legend for massive proceeds. In particular, and as reflected in the chart below, eight of the defendants sold 14,078,406 shares of BIZM stock for proceeds of \$33,997,152.

| Defendant | Shares Sold | Dates Sold | Proceeds | Shares Remaining |
|------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------|
| Blaya | 1,312,053 | 5/16/13 – 6/13/13 | \$3,014,965 | 172,947 |
| De Lorenzo | 1,328,000 | 6/17/13 – 6/18/13 | \$4,809,836 | 734,500 |
| Hernando | 1,815,000 | 6/6/13 – 6/17/13 | \$5,048,217 | 0 |

| Defendant | Shares Sold | Dates Sold | Proceeds | Shares Remaining |
|-----------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| Ficcichia | 1,402,500 | 5/20/13 – 6/5/13 | \$1,979,389 | 272,620 ¹ |
| Tavella | 1,592,444 | 6/7/13 – 6/11/13 | \$3,116,894 | 382,956 ² |
| Bagattin | 2,176,726 | 6/10/13 – 6/18/13 | \$6,223,310 | 133,724 |
| Ferrari | 1,994,038 | 6/7/13 – 6/19/13 | \$5,456,690 | 315,962 |
| Goldman | 2,457,645 | 5/28/13 – 6/6/13 | \$3,771,761 | 27,355 |

108. All of the eight selling defendants placed their orders to sell Biozoom stock in the same manner – via e-mail and instant message to either Legend or Scottsdale.

109. Upon selling shares in Biozoom, several of the defendants instructed their brokerage firms to wire the proceeds of their sales to foreign bank accounts in various countries:

- Ficcichia: On June 7, 2013, defendant Ficcichia instructed Legend, to wire \$1 million to Alpine Securities, Inc., a registered clearing broker-dealer. Alpine provides clearing services for Scottsdale, and as described earlier, Ficcichia opened an account at Scottsdale on or around June 10, 2013 and funded it with this \$1 million. On June 25, 2013 – the same day as the Commission's order suspending trading in Biozoom – Ficcichia instructed Scottsdale to wire \$325,000 to a bank account in Cyprus. This wire was not executed. Ficcichia's brokerage account at Legend currently has a cash balance of slightly over \$1 million, and Ficcichia's brokerage account at Scottsdale currently has a cash balance of approximately \$328,000.

¹ On or around June 10, 2013, Ficcichia opened an account at Scottsdale and funded this account with \$1 million from his account at Legend. Ficcichia's "Shares Remaining" column reflects Biozoom purchases that he has made in his account at Scottsdale.

² Tavella's "Shares Remaining" column includes 160,400 Biozoom shares that she purchased in the open market on June 19, 2013.

- **Blaya:** On June 14, 2013, Blaya instructed Legend to wire "all settled funds except \$30,000" to an account held in Geneva, Switzerland. This wire was not executed. This account currently has a cash balance of approximately \$3.5 million.
- **Hernando:** On June 13, 2013, Hernando instructed his broker-dealer, Legend, to wire "all available settled cash" in her account, which at the time, was approximately \$600,000, to an account held at Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited in Lemesos, Cyprus. This wire was executed. On June 17, 2013, Hernando instructed his broker-dealer, Legend, to wire \$2 million, again to an account held at Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited in Lemesos, Cyprus. This wire was not executed by Legend. This account has a cash balance of approximately \$4.5 million.
- **De Lorenzo:** De Lorenzo has not yet attempted to wire any money out of her account. De Lorenzo has a bank account in Dar Es Salaam. The account has a cash balance of approximately \$4.8 million.
- **Tavella:** On June 25, 2013 – the day of the Commission's order suspending trading in the securities of Biozoom – Tavella attempted to wire approximately \$2,450,000 out of her account at Scottsdale to a bank account in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. This wire has not been executed. The current cash balance in Tavella's brokerage account is approximately \$2.47 million.
- **Bagattin:** On June 20, 2013, Bagattin instructed Scottsdale to wire approximately \$4.33 million to a bank account in Cyprus. This wire was executed. On June 24, 2013, Bagattin instructed Scottsdale to send an additional

approximately \$1.89 million to the same bank account. This wire was also executed. The current cash balance in Bagattin's brokerage account is \$3,000.

- **Goldman:** On June 11, 2013, Goldman instructed Scottsdale to wire approximately \$3.77 million to an account held at a bank in Geneva, Switzerland – a bank where Blaya also holds an account. This wire was executed. The cash balance in Goldman's account is \$0.
- **Ferrari:** On June 19, 2013, Ferrari instructed Scottsdale to wire \$500,000 to an account held at a bank in Panama. This wire was executed. On June 24, 2013, Ferrari instructed Scottsdale to wire an additional \$4.9 million, this time to a bank in Belize. This wire was also executed. The cash balance in Ferrari's account is \$0.

F. No Registration Statement Was In Effect At the Time Defendants Sold Biozoom Shares

110. Section 5 of the Securities Act makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to offer or sell securities, using the U.S. mails or interstate commerce, unless such offer or sale is registered with the Commission.

111. No registration statement was in effect for the shares sold by the Selling Defendants.

112. No registration statement is in effect for the Biozoom shares held by defendants Graciarena and Loureyro.

G. Biozoom Is A Penny Stock As Defined By The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")

113. Biozoom's stock is a "penny stock" as defined by the Exchange Act. At times relevant to this Complaint, the stock's shares traded at less than \$5.00 per share. During the same time period, Biozoom's stock did not meet any of the exceptions to

penny stock classification pursuant to Section 3(a)(51) and Rule 3a51-1 of the Exchange Act.

114. For example, the company's stock: (1) did not trade on a national securities exchange; (2) was not an "NMS stock," as defined in 17 C.F.R. § 242.242.600(b)(47); (3) did not have net tangible assets (i.e., total assets less intangible assets and liabilities) in excess of \$5,000,000; and (4) did not have average revenue of at least \$6,000,000 for the last three years. (See Exchange Act, Rule 3a51-1(g).)

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF SECTION 5 OF THE SECURITIES ACT, 15 U.S.C. §77e

(Defendants Tavella, Ficicchia, Blava, Hernando, De Lorenzo, Bagattin, Ferrari, Goldman)

115. Paragraphs 1 through 114 are hereby re-alleged and incorporated by reference.

116. Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, directly or indirectly, and without a registration statement in effect as to such securities:

(a) made use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell, through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise; or

(b) carried or caused to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, securities for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.

117. Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, also directly or indirectly, made use of the means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or

medium of any prospectus or otherwise securities, without a registration statement having been filed as to those securities.

118. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, Defendants directly or indirectly, violated, and unless restrained and enjoined will continue to violate Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e(c)].

COUNT II

INJUNCTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 20(b) OF THE SECURITIES ACT

(Defendants Graciarena and Loureyro)

119. Paragraphs 1 through 114 are re-alleged and incorporated by reference herein.

120. Securities Act Section 20(b) provides that “whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged in or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this title, the Commission may in its discretion, bring an action in district court to enjoin such acts or practices . . .”

121. Defendants Graciarena and Loureyro have deposited shares of Biozoom in their respective brokerage accounts. Those shares do not bear a restrictive legend. However, no registration statement is in effect for the offer of sale of those shares.

122. Unless restrained and enjoined, Graciarena and Loureyro are likely to offer or sell their Biozoom shares to the public in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court:

I.

Issue findings of fact and conclusions of law that defendants Ficicchia, Blaya, Hernando, De Lorenzo, Tavella, Goldman, Bagattin, and Ferrari committed the violations charged and alleged herein.

II.

Enter an order temporarily restraining and enjoining defendants Ficicchia, Blaya, Hernando, De Lorenzo, Tavella, Goldman, Bagattin, Ferrari, Graciarena, and Loureyro, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys and those persons in active concert or participation with defendants who receive actual notice of the Order, by personal service or otherwise, and each of them from, directly or indirectly, engaging in the transactions, acts, practices or courses of business described above, or in conduct of similar purport and object, in violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e(c)].

III.

Enter an order freezing the brokerage accounts and any assets of defendants Ficicchia, Blaya, Hernando, De Lorenzo, Tavella, Goldman, Bagattin, and Ferrari derived from the sale of Biozoom stock; and, freezing the brokerage accounts of defendants Graciarena and Loureyro holding Biozoom shares.

IV.

Enter an order requiring defendants Ficicchia, Blaya, Hernando, De Lorenzo, Tavella, Goldman, Bagattin, and Ferrari to return to the United States any proceeds from the sale of Biozoom stock that have been transferred abroad and those proceeds which are

returned be frozen in a domestic bank during the pendency of this action to preserve such assets for the satisfaction of disgorgement.

V.

Enter an Order of Permanent Injunction restraining and enjoining defendants Ficicchia, Blaya, Hernando, De Lorenzo, Tavella, Goldman, Bagattin, Ferrari, Graciarena, and Loureyro, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys and those persons in active concert or participation with defendants who receive actual notice of the Order, by personal service or otherwise, and each of them from, directly or indirectly, engaging in the transactions, acts, practices or courses of business described above, or in conduct of similar purport and object, in violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e(c)].

VI.

Enter an Order requiring defendants Ficicchia, Blaya, Hernando, De Lorenzo, Tavella, Goldman, Bagattin, and Ferrari to disgorge the ill-gotten gains received as a result of the violations alleged herein, including prejudgment interest.

VII.

Issue an Order imposing upon defendants Ficicchia, Blaya, Hernando, De Lorenzo, Tavella, Goldman, Bagattin, and Ferrari appropriate civil penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)].

VIII.

Issue an order permanently and unconditionally barring, pursuant to Section 20(g) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(g)], the Selling Defendants from participating in an

offering of penny stock as defined by Exchange Act Section 3(a)(51) [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(51)] and Rule 3a51-1 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1].

IX.

Retain jurisdiction of this action in accordance with the principles of equity and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to implement and carry out the terms of all orders and decrees that may be entered or to entertain any suitable application or motion for additional relief within the jurisdiction of this Court.

X.

Grant such other relief as this Court deems appropriate.

Dated: July 3, 2013

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

MAGDALENA TAVELLA,
ANDRES HORACIO FICICCHIA, GONZALO
GARCIA BLAYA, LUCIA MARIANA
HERNANDO, CECILIA DE LORENZO,
ADRIANA ROSA BAGATTIN,
DANIELA PATRICIA GOLDMAN,
MARIANO PABLO FERRARI,
MARIANO GRACIARENA, and
FERNANDO LOUREYRO,

Defendants.

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED: 07/17/2013

Civil Action No. 13-CIV-4609 (NRB)

Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald

**STIPULATION AND ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, ASSET
FREEZE AND OTHER RELIEF**

This cause having come before the Court previously on July 3, 2013, on Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's ("Commission's") Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Asset Freeze and For an Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Be Issued, the Court having considered the Commission's Complaint, motion, supporting memorandum of law, and the exhibits and declarations submitted in support of the Plaintiff's motion, and the Plaintiff and all Defendants by counsel having appeared and, without admitting any wrongdoing, consented to the entry of this Order, this Court finds as follows:

1. On July 3, 2013, this Court entered an order that, among other relief granted, enjoined the disposition, sale, transfer, pledge, encumbrance, assignment, concealment, or other

disposal of stock of Biozoom, Inc. (hereafter "Biozoom") or the proceeds derived from the sale thereof; froze accounts holding funds or assets of the Defendants; and ordered preservation of documents related to Biozoom, any proceeds from the sale or transfer of Biozoom stock, or related to accounts through which Biozoom stock was traded or proceeds derived from the sale thereof were deposited, and all communications concerning the foregoing. The Order entered on July 3, 2013 also set a hearing for this matter on July 17, 2013 at 11:00 a.m.

2. There is no admission by Defendants that the allegations in the Complaint filed by the Commission are true or accurate.

3. Defendants have consented and stipulated to the entry of this Order, which continues the asset freeze and other relief set forth below, pending final adjudication of this case or until further order of this Court.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

A. ASSET FREEZE ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, until a final adjudication on the merits may be had, Defendants and each of their agents, servants, employees, attorneys-in-fact, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise, and each of them, hold and retain within their control, and otherwise prevent any disposition, sale, transfer, pledge, encumbrance, assignment, dissipation, concealment, or other disposal whatsoever of any shares of Biozoom and all proceeds derived from sales of Biozoom stock under their control or over which they exercise actual or apparent investment or other authority, wherever located, in whatever form such assets may presently exist, or in any account whatsoever.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the freeze described in this Section A, includes but is not limited to all Biozoom stock and all funds in the following accounts (hereafter, "Group A Accounts"):

- (i) Andres Horacio Ficicchia's account at Legend Securities, Inc. with account number ending in "CICC".
- (ii) Andres Horacio Ficicchia's account at Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 2927.
- (iii) Gonzalo Garcia Blaya's account at Legend Securities, Inc. with account number ending in "LAYA".
- (iv) Luciana Mariana Hernando's account at Legend Securities, Inc. with account number ending in "ANDO".
- (v) Cecilia De Lorenzo's account at Legend Securities, Inc. with account number ending in "ENZO".
- (vi) Magdalena Tavella's account Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 3831.
- (vii) Adriana Rosa Bagattin's account at Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 5435.
- (viii) Daniela Patricia Goldman's account at Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 3536.
- (ix) Mariano Pablo Ferrari's account at Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 5327.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the freeze described in this Section A further includes but is not limited to all Biozoom stock, and all proceeds from the sale or disposition of Biozoom

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stock in any other accounts whatsoever, including but not limited to the following accounts (hereafter, "Group B Accounts"), whether deposited directly or transferred from another account:

- (i) Luciana Mariana Hernando's account at Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited in Lemesos, Cyprus, with an account number ending in - 13 01.
- (ii) Adriana Rosa Bagattin's account at FBME Bank Limited in Nicosia, Cyprus, with an account number ending in - 644.
- (iii) Daniela Patricia Goldman's account at CBH Compagnie Bancaire Helvetique SA in Geneva, Switzerland with an account number ending in - 345.
- (iv) Mariano Pablo Ferrari's account at HSBC Bank in Panama City, Panama, with an account number ending in - 590.
- (v) Mariano Pablo Ferrari's account at Choice Bank Limited in Belize City, Belize, with an account number ending in - 521.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that any financial or brokerage institution or other person or entity holding any funds or other assets derived or related to the sale of Biozoom stock, in the name of, for the benefit of, or under the control of defendants, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys-in-fact, and those persons in active concert or participation with them, wherever located, shall hold and retain within their control and prohibit the withdrawal, removal, transfer or other disposal of any such funds or other assets except as otherwise ordered by this Court, including all shares of Biozoom held on behalf of Defendants, and including but not limited to: (a) all funds and Biozoom stock in the Group A Accounts; and (b) all funds in the Group B Accounts that are proceeds from the sale of Biozoom stock, whether deposited directly in those accounts or transferred from other accounts.

**B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FROM VIOLATIONS
OF SECURITIES ACT SECTION 5**

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IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants and Defendant's agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise shall be and are hereby preliminarily restrained and enjoined, pending entry of a Final Judgment in this action, from violating Section 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77e] by, directly or indirectly, in the absence of any applicable exemption:

- (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, making use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
- (c) Making use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed with the Commission as to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under Section 8 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77h].

C. ORDER PROHIBITING DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants and their agents, servants, employees, attorneys-in-fact, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise, and each of them, are hereby restrained from destroying, mutilating, concealing, altering, or disposing of any document referring or relating in any manner to any transactions involving or related in any way to Biozoom, any proceeds from the sale or transfer of Biozoom stock, any accounts holding or

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through which Biozoom stock was traded or proceeds derived from sales were deposited, including but not limited to the Group A Accounts and Group B Accounts, and any communications concerning the foregoing. As used in this Order, "document" means the original and all non-identical copies (whether non-identical because of handwritten notation or otherwise) of all written or graphic matter, whether in paper, electronic, or any other form, however produced, and any other tangible record, or electronic data compilation capable of reproduction in tangible form, including, without limitation, correspondence, memoranda, minutes, telephone records, e-mails, reports, studies, telexes, diaries, calendar entries, contracts, letters of agreement, and including any and all existing drafts of all documents.

D. ORDER PROVIDING ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF SERVICE

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service of all pleadings and other papers, this Order and all documents filed in support thereof, and all other documents to be served in this action, may be made personally, by facsimile, by overnight courier, or by electronic mail upon each Defendant, his or her attorney, his or her U.S. agents or his or her foreign agents to the extent permitted by law, or by an alternative provision for service permitted by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or as this Court may direct by further order.

E. ORDER IS BINDING ON ALL PERSONS WITH ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE ORDER

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, that this Order shall be, and is, binding upon each Defendant, and each of his or her agents, servants, employees, attorneys-in-fact, and those persons in active concert or participation with him or her who receive actual notice of this Order by personal service, facsimile service, or service in accordance with Section D of this Order, or otherwise.

Case 1:13-cv-04609-NRB Document 15-1 Filed 07/16/13 Page 7 of 7

F. OTHER RELIEF

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, that the United States Marshall in any district in which any Defendant resides, transacts business or may be found is authorized and directed to make service of process upon any Defendant at the request of the Commission.

G. TIME FOR DEFENDANTS TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT

Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the Commission's Complaint on or before August 26, 2013.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that this Stipulation and Order may be modified for good cause shown, and this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for all purposes.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), no security is required of the Commission.


SO ORDERED:

Dated this 17th day of July, 2013.


Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald

STIPULATED AND AGREED:

FOR PLAINTIFF:


Richard E. Simpson (RS5859)
David J. Gottesman (admitted pro hac vice)
Patrick M. Bryan (admitted pro hac vice)
U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE Washington, DC 20549
Telephone: (202) 551-4420
Fax: (202) 772-9245
SimpsonR@sec.gov
GottesmanD@sec.gov
BryanP@sec.gov

FOR DEFENDANTS:


Bruce A. Langer
McLaughlin & Stern, LLP
260 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10016-2404
Telephone (202) 448-6216
Fax: (202) 448-0066
sschuster@mclaughlinstern.com
blanger@mclaughlinstern.com

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

| | |
|--|--|
| SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. MAGDALENA TAVELLA, ANDRES HORACIO FICICCHIA, GONZALO GARCIA BLAYA, LUCIA MARIANA HERNANDO, CECILIA DE LORENZO, ADRIANA ROSA BAGATTIN, DANIELA PATRICIA GOLDMAN, MARIANO PABLO FERRARI, MARIANO GRACIARENA, and FERNANDO LOUREYRO, Defendants. | Civil Action No. 13-CIV-4609 Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald |
|--|--|

BIOZOOM, INC. FAIR FUND NOTICE

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission authorized this Notice.

This is not a solicitation from a lawyer.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Biozoom, Inc. (“Biozoom”; OTCBB ticker: BIZM; CUSIP: 09072T100) common shares in the United States during the Relevant Period, on or between May 16, 2013 and June 25, 2013, you are eligible for damages if the shares were sold at a loss or continue to be held. Per the Plan of Allocation you may be entitled to receive a monetary payment from the Biozoom Fair Fund (“Fair Fund”).

Background

On July 3, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) filed a complaint in United States District Court Southern District of New York alleging that Magdalena Tavella, Andres Horacio Ficicchia, Gonzalo Garcia Blaya, Lucia Mariana Hernando, Cecilia De Lorenzo, Adriana Rosa Bagattin, Daniela Patricia Goldman, and Mariano Pablo Ferrari (collectively, the “Defendants”) had unlawfully sold to the public almost \$34 million worth of securities in Biozoom (f/k/a Entertainment Art, Inc.) a penny stock company traded on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board. No registration statement was in effect for the selling Defendants’ resale of securities and thus their sales were in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act. Though the Defendants claimed that they had purchased the stock between November 2012 and March 2013 from the original shareholders, this was impossible because those original shareholders ceased to have any interest in the company more than three years earlier than the selling Defendants’ claimed purchases.

From March 2013 to June 2013, Defendants opened brokerage accounts at broker-dealers and deposited millions of shares of Biozoom that they claimed did not bear a restrictive legend and were free-trading shares. All of the Defendants claimed that they had purchased all or some of their shares from some of the original shareholders of Entertainment Art in transactions between November 2012 and March 2013.

On July 9, 2013, a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) was granted freezing the brokerage accounts of the Defendants holding Biozoom shares and any accounts held by financial institutions or brokers that have the proceeds of the Biozoom sales on behalf of the Defendants. Pursuant to the Final Judgment, a Fair Fund was

established to distribute the disgorged funds for the benefit of investors pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a).

In partial satisfaction of the amounts owed by Defendants, Defendants accounts that were frozen pursuant to the TRO, were ordered to be turned over. To date, the Commission recovered from the frozen assets a total of \$16,117,936. The Commission invested \$16,022,574 with United States Department of the Treasury at the Bureau of the Fiscal Service ("BFS"). It is doubtful, but possible, that additional funds will be recovered from the Defendants from various foreign sources.

Plan of Allocation

The purpose of this distribution is to compensate investors in the Defendants' misrepresentations and omissions in its sale of Biozoom common stock.

The Net Available Fair Fund for the Biozoom distribution will be allocated to Eligible Claimants according to the Plan of Allocation relative to the total disgorgement. The calculations made pursuant to the Plan of Allocation are not intended to be estimates of the amounts that investors might have been able to recover. Nor are the calculations pursuant to the Plan of Allocation intended to be estimates of the amounts that will be paid to Eligible Claimants. Appendix I to the Distribution Plan details the Plan of Allocation methodology and calculation which is designed to equitably distribute the Fair Fund to those Eligible Investors who suffered economic losses. Appendix I to the Distribution Plan is posted on the Fair Fund website at www.BiozoomFairFund.com.

Preliminary calculations will be made for all Eligible Claimants on a *pro rata* basis determined by an Eligible Claimant's investment in Biozoom common stock divided by the sum of all Eligible Claimants' investments in the Biozoom common stock. After the preliminary calculations have been made, any Eligible Claimant whose preliminary calculation amount is less than the Distribution *De Minimis* Amount of \$10 will be removed from the pool of Eligible Claimants.

Final calculations will then be made for all remaining Eligible Claimants on a *pro rata* basis as described above, but excluding Eligible Claimants whose preliminary calculation amounts are less than the Distribution *De Minimis* Amount, to arrive at a Recognized Claim amount. In the event that the number of claims submitted by Eligible Claimant(s) is such that the Eligible Claimant(s) would receive a recovery in excess of their Recognized Claim amount, the recovery per claim is limited to the Recognized Claim. The excess amount in the Fair Fund shall be distributed to the U.S Treasury.

Fund Administration

On August 25, 2015, the Commission issued an Order appointing KCC as the Distribution Agent, to assist in overseeing the administration and distribution of the Fair Fund in coordination with Commission staff, pursuant to the terms of the Distribution Plan.

Fair Fund

The Fair Fund is a "Qualified Settlement Fund" ("QSF") as defined in U.S. Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.468B-1 et seq. The distribution is intended to compensate you for losses incurred with respect to your investment in Biozoom common stock as a result of the conduct described in the Order.

Generally, your distribution is not income to you to the extent of your basis in your investment.² However, you must reduce your basis by the amount of your distribution. If your distribution exceeds your tax basis in your investment, then the excess is includable in your income as capital gain. Any such capital gain is long-term capital gain, unless you disposed of your investment before holding it for longer than one year. If you do not have reasonable access to records indicating the tax basis of your

investment, then you may assume that your tax basis is zero and that the entire losses component of your distribution is includable in your income as capital gain. *The QSF is not required to – and will not – issue a Form 1099 to you with respect to the losses component of the distribution.*

You should consult your tax advisor or accountant as to the treatment of the payment you are receiving under this Fair Fund, as the Distribution Agent and the SEC cannot provide you with tax advice.

How to Participate

If you believe you are a Potential Claimant and would like to participate, you must follow the enclosed instructions and complete the Proof of Claim Form included in this packet. Fill out the Proof of Claim Form completely, sign it, include copies of all required supporting documentation, and return it in the enclosed envelope to the Distribution Agent's address listed below.

Excluded Parties shall mean Defendants, Biozoom, and all other entities or individuals who improperly helped in establishing a market for, and escalating the price of, Biozoom stock, based on the stock trading of those entities or individuals.

The submission of the Proof of Claim Form and the receipt and acceptance of a distribution by an Eligible Claimant is not intended to be a release of an Eligible Claimant's rights and claims against any party.

Deadline to Submit a Claim

October 31, 2016

More Information

Website

www.BiozoomFairFund.com

Write

Biozoom Fair Fund
Distribution Agent
c/o KCC
P.O. Box 30233
College Station, TX 77842-3233

Phone

1-855-730-8647

Investor Options for this Fair Fund

Submit a Claim

The only way to get a payment from the Fair Fund.

Do Nothing

Receive no payment.

Questions

This notice provides only summary information regarding the Fair Fund. We strongly recommend that you read the Distribution Plan, including the Plan of Allocation, and other relevant case documents in their entirety for more complete details. The documents can be found at www.BiozoomFairFund.com.

If you need assistance completing the Proof of Claim Form or if you have any questions about this Fair Fund, you may obtain more information by visiting the Fair Fund website at www.BiozoomFairFund.com, by calling the dedicated toll-free number at 1-855-730-8647 or sending an email inquiry to info@BiozoomFairFund.com.

Special Notice to Brokers and Nominees

If you purchased or held Biozoom common stock for the beneficial interest of a person or organization other than yourself, within fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of this Fair Fund Notice you must either: (1) request additional copies of the Fair Fund Notice and Proof of Claim Form from the Distribution Agent, and, within fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of such copies, send copies by first-class mail directly to beneficial owners; or (2) provide a list of the names and last known addresses of the beneficial owners (preferably in excel format) to the Distribution Agent by email to notifications@Gilardi.com or by mail to the following address:

Biozoom Fair Fund
c/o KCC
P.O. Box 30233
College Station, TX 77842-3233

If you choose to mail the Fair Fund Notice and Proof of Claim Form yourself, you may obtain from the Distribution Agent (without cost to you) as many additional copies of these documents as you will need to complete the mailing. If you choose the second option, KCC will send a copy of the Fair Fund Notice and Proof of Claim Form to the persons and/or entities whose names and address you supply.

In either case, you may obtain reimbursement for reasonable administrative costs actually incurred in connection with forwarding the Fair Fund Notice that would not have been incurred but for the obligation to forward the Fair Fund Notice and Proof of Claim Form, upon submission of appropriate documentation to the Distribution Agent.-

Regards,

KCC

Distribution Agent

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

MAGDALENA TAVELLA,
ANDRES HORACIO FICICCHIA, GONZALO
GARCIA BLAYA, LUCIA MARIANA
HERNANDO, CECILIA DE LORENZO,
ADRIANA ROSA BAGATTIN,
DANIELA PATRICIA GOLDMAN,
MARIANO PABLO FERRARI,
MARIANO GRACIARENA, and
FERNANDO LOUREYRO,

Defendants.

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED: 12/08/2014

Civil Action No. 13-CIV-4609 (NRB)

Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald

FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANTS MARIANO GRACIARENA
AND FERNANDO LOUREYRO

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Plaintiff") having filed a Complaint and Defendants Mariano Graciarena ("Graciarena") and Fernando Loureyro ("Loureyro") (collectively, the "Defendants" for purposes of this Final Judgment), having entered a general appearance; consented to the Court's jurisdiction over Defendants and the subject matter of this action; consented to entry of this Final Judgment without admitting or denying the allegations of the Complaint (except as to jurisdiction); waived findings of fact and conclusions of law; and waived any right to appeal from this Final Judgment:

I.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that within three (3) days of service upon him of a copy of this Final Judgment, Graciarena shall provide written instruction in the form attached to Alpine Securities and Scottsdale Capital Advisors to return Entertainment Art, Inc. (currently known as Biozoom, Inc.) stock certificate number 1115, representing 2.145 million shares issued in the name Mariano Augusto Graciarena and deposited into Scottsdale Capital Advisors brokerage account -xxxxx8720 bearing his name, to the company's transfer agent, VStock Transfer, LLC, 18 Lafayette Place, Woodmere, NY 11598, with instructions that the transfer agent cancel the certificates, as "cancellation" is defined in Securities Exchange Act Rule 17Ad-19(a)(1) [17 CFR §240.17Ad-19(a)(1)]. Graciarena shall copy the Plaintiff on all correspondence to or from Alpine Securities or the company's transfer agent concerning cancellation of the foregoing stock certificate.

II.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that within three (3) days of service upon him of a copy of this Final Judgment, Loureyro shall provide written instruction in the form attached to instruct Alpine Securities and Scottsdale Capital Advisors to return Entertainment Art, Inc. (currently known as Biozoom, Inc.) stock certificate number 1111, representing 2.3 million shares issued in the name Fernando Loureyro and deposited into Scottsdale Capital Advisors brokerage account -xxxxx7518 bearing his name, to the company's transfer agent, VStock Transfer, LLC, 18 Lafayette Place, Woodmere, NY 11598, with instructions that the transfer agent cancel the certificates, as "cancellation" is defined in Securities Exchange Act Rule 17Ad-19(a)(1) [17 CFR §240.17Ad-19(a)(1)]. Loureyro shall

copy the Plaintiff on all correspondence to or from Alpine Securities or the company's transfer agent concerning cancellation of the foregoing stock certificate.

III.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants shall relinquish all claim, title or interest in Entertainment Art, Inc. (currently known as Biozoom, Inc.) stock certificates held in their name, except as necessary to effectuate the cancellations described in paragraphs I and II of this Final Judgment.

IV.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Consent is incorporated herein with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein, and that Defendants shall comply with all of the undertakings and agreements set forth therein.

V.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purposes of enforcing the terms of this Final Judgment.

Dated: December 4, 2014



Hon. Naomi Reice Buchwald
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

EXHIBIT A

Date: _____, 2014

Alpine Securities
Attn.: Legal – Physical Certificate Deposit
39 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Scottsdale Capital Advisors
Attn.: D. Michael Cruz
7170 E. McDonald Drive
Scottsdale, AZ 85253

Re: Entertainment Art, Inc. (currently known as Biozoom, Inc.) stock certificate
number 1115 - Alpine Securities brokerage account # [REDACTED] 8720

To Whom It May Concern:

By this letter, I am instructing Alpine Securities and Scottsdale Capital Advisors to return Entertainment Art, Inc. (currently known as Biozoom, Inc.) stock certificate number 1115 (representing 2.145 million shares issued in the name Mariano Augusto Graciarena and deposited into Scottsdale Capital Advisors brokerage account # [REDACTED] 8720 in my name) to the company's transfer agent, VStock Transfer, LLC, 18 Lafayette Place, Woodmere, NY 11598, with instructions that the transfer agent cancel the certificates, as "cancellation" is defined in Securities Exchange Act Rule 17Ad-19(a)(1) [17 CFR §240.17Ad-19(a)(1)].

Enclosed for your information is a copy of an order of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York directing the cancellation of the above-reference certificate.

Sincerely,

Mariano Augusto Graciarena
[REDACTED]
Buenos Aires, Argentina

cc: Patrick M. Bryan
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F. Street, NE
Washington, DC 20005

Date: _____, 2014

Alpine Securities
Attn.: Legal – Physical Certificate Deposit
39 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Scottsdale Capital Advisors
Attn.: D. Michael Cruz
7170 E. McDonald Drive
Scottsdale, AZ 85253

Re: Entertainment Art, Inc. (currently known as Biozoom, Inc.) stock certificate
number 1111 - Alpine Securities brokerage account # [REDACTED] 7518

To Whom It May Concern:

By this letter, I am instructing Alpine Securities and Scottsdale Capital Advisors to return Entertainment Art, Inc. (currently known as Biozoom, Inc.) stock certificate number 1111 (representing 2.3 million shares issued in the name Fernando Loureyro and deposited into Scottsdale Capital Advisors brokerage account # [REDACTED] 7518 in my name) to the company's transfer agent, VStock Transfer, LLC, 18 Lafayette Place, Woodmere, NY 11598, with instructions that the transfer agent cancel the certificates, as "cancellation" is defined in Securities Exchange Act Rule 17Ad-19(a)(1) [17 CFR §240.17Ad-19(a)(1)].

Enclosed for your information is a copy of an order of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York directing the cancellation of the above-reference certificate.

Sincerely,

Fernando Loureyro
[REDACTED]
Buenos Aires, Argentina

cc: Patrick M. Bryan
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F. Street, NE
Washington, DC 20005

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

MAGDALENA TAVELLA,
ANDRES HORACIO FICICCHIA, GONZALO
GARCIA BLAYA, LUCIA MARIANA
HERNANDO, CECILIA DE LORENZO,
ADRIANA ROSA BAGATTIN,
DANIELA PATRICIA GOLDMAN,
MARIANO PABLO FERRARI,
MARIANO GRACIARENA, and
FERNANDO LOUREYRO,

Defendants.

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED: 1/9/2015

Civil Action No. 13-CIV-4609

Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald

**FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND ORDER GRANTING INJUNCTIVE AND
OTHER RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS MAGDALENA TAVELLA, ANDRES
HORACIO FICICCHIA, GONZALO GARCIA BLAYA, LUCIA MARIANA
HERNANDO, CECILIA DE LORENZO, ADRIANA ROSA BAGATTIN, DANIELA
PATRICIA GOLDMAN, AND MARIANO PABLO FERRARI**

WHEREAS this matter came before this Court on the Motion of Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"), seeking entry of a judgment by default, and providing the relief requested in its Complaint against defendants Magdalena Tavella, Andres Horacio Ficicchia, Gonzalo Garcia Blaya, Lucia Mariana Hernando, Cecilia De Lorenzo, Adriana Rosa Bagattin, Daniela Patricia Goldman, and Mariano Pablo Ferrari (collectively, the "Defaulting Defendants"); and

WHEREAS the Court has entered a Memorandum and Order dated January 6, 2015, in which the Court concluded that the Commission is entitled to a final judgment

against the Defaulting Defendants that permanently enjoins them from violating Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") [15 U.S.C. § 77(e)], (2) orders the Defaulting Defendants to individually disgorge ill-gotten gains, and (3) imposes civil penalties; and

WHEREAS the Court deferred judgment to afford the Commission an opportunity to supplement its submission as to the amount of prejudgment interest that should be disgorged; and

WHEREAS the Commission has submitted a proposed order "in lieu of such supplemental submission on prejudgment interest," which the Court interprets as abandoning the Commission's claim to prejudgment interest on the disgorgement amounts; it is hereby

ORDERED THAT:

I.

Defaulting Defendants, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this final judgment by personal service or otherwise are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating, directly or indirectly, Section 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77e] by, in the absence of any applicable exemption:

- (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, making use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise;

- (b) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, carrying or causing to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale; or
- (c) Making use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed with the Commission as to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under Section 8 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77h].

II.

Defaulting Defendants (Magdalena Tavella, Andres Horacio Ficicchia, Gonzalo Garcia Blaya, Lucia Mariana Hernando, Cccilia De Lorenzo, Adriana Rosa Bagattin, Daniela Patricia Goldman, and Mariano Pablo Ferrari) are permanently barred from participating in an offering of penny stock, including engaging in activities with a broker, dealer, or issuer for purposes of issuing, trading, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock as defined by Section 3(a)(51) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(51) and Rule 3a51-1 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1].

III.

Defendants are liable for disgorgement (representing profits gained as a result of the conduct alleged in the Complaint), and civil penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)], in the following amounts:

| Defendant | Disgorgement Amount | Civil Penalty | Total |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Magdalena Tavella | \$3,107,819 | \$160,000 | \$3,267,819 |
| Andres Horacio Ficicchia | \$1,948,339 | \$160,000 | \$2,108,339 |
| Gonzalo Garcia Blaya | \$3,008,200 | \$160,000 | \$3,168,200 |
| Lucia Mariana Hernando | \$5,042,771 | \$160,000 | \$5,202,771 |
| Cecilia De Lorenzo | \$4,801,536 | \$160,000 | \$4,961,536 |
| Adriana Rosa Bagattin | \$6,216,380 | \$160,000 | \$6,376,380 |
| Daniela Patricia Goldman | \$3,764,306 | \$160,000 | \$3,924,306 |
| Mariano Pablo Ferrari | \$5,447,450 | \$160,000 | \$5,607,450 |

Defendants shall satisfy these obligations within ten business days and make payment of all funds to the Commission, which shall provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request. The Defendants shall satisfy these obligations from proceeds contained in their various accounts including, but not limited to, the following:

- Andres Horacio Ficicchia's account at Legend Securities, Inc. with account number ending in "CICC".

- Andres Horacio Ficicchia's account at Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 2927.
- Gonzalo Garcia Blaya's account at Legend Securities, Inc. with account number ending in "LAYA".
- Luciana Mariana Hernando's account at Legend Securities, Inc. with account number ending in "ANDO".
- Luciana Mariana Hernando's account at Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited in Lemesos, Cyprus, with an account number ending in – 1301.
- Cecilia De Lorenzo's account at Legend Securities, Inc. with account number ending in "ENZO".
- Magdalena Tavella's account Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 3831.
- Adriana Rosa Bagattin's account at Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 5435.
- Adriana Rosa Bagattin's account at FBME Bank Limited in Nicosia, Cyprus, with an account number ending in – 644.
- Daniela Patricia Goldman's account at Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 3536.
- Daniela Patricia Goldman's account at CBH Compagnie Bancaire Helvetique SA in Geneva, Switzerland with an account number ending in – 345.
- Mariano Pablo Ferrari's account at Scottsdale Capital Advisors, Inc. with account number ending 5327.

- Mariano Pablo Ferrari's account at HSBC Bank in Panama City, Panama, with an account number ending in – 590.
- Mariano Pablo Ferrari's account at Choice Bank Limited in Belize City, Belize, with an account number ending in – 521.

IV.

In partial satisfaction of the amounts owed by Defendants pursuant to this Final Judgment, the following entities shall transfer all funds and BIZM shares held in Defaulting Defendants' accounts (including the accounts listed below) and make payment such funds and shares held in Defaulting Defendants' names to the Commission, which shall provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request:

- A. Legend Securities LLC
 - 1. Gonzalo Garcia Blaya
 - 2. Lucia Mariana Hernando
 - 3. Andres Horacio Ficicchia
 - 4. Cecilia De Lorenzo
- B. Scottsdale Capital Advisors
 - 1. Magdalena Tavella
 - 2. Daniela Patricia Goldman
 - 3. Adriana Rosa Bagattin
 - 4. Mariano Pablo Ferrari
 - 5. Andres Horacio Ficicchia

Payment may also be made directly from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at <http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm>. Payment may also be made by

certified check, bank cashier's check, or United States postal money order payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission, which shall be delivered or mailed to

Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169

and shall be accompanied by a letter identifying the case title, civil action number, and name of this Court; the name of the defendant in this action; and specifying that payment is made pursuant to this Final Judgment. Defaulting Defendant payer shall simultaneously transmit photocopies of each such payment and letter to the Commission's counsel in this action: Patrick M. Bryan, 100 F Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20549-4030. Defaulting Defendants relinquish all legal and equitable right, title, and interest in all funds paid pursuant to this Final Judgment, and no part of the funds shall be returned to Defaulting Defendants. The Commission may enforce the Court's judgment for disgorgement by moving for civil contempt (and/or through other collection procedures authorized by law) at any time after ten days following entry of this Final Judgment. In response to any such civil contempt motion by the Commission, Defaulting Defendants may assert any legally permissible defense.

V.

Further to the Stipulation and Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Asset Freeze, and Other Relief, entered on 7/17/2013 (the "Asset Freeze Order") freezing the assets of Defendants, including those held in the accounts referenced above in Section III and previously enumerated in the Asset Freeze Order, the Court finds that such assets are the proceeds of the violations alleged in the Commission's Complaint. Accordingly, pursuant to the Court's personal jurisdiction over Defaulting Defendants, Defaulting

Defendants are hereby ordered to repatriate the referenced assets by 30 days after entry of a judgment of default, to the Commission, which shall provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request, and to execute any consents, pleadings, or other legal documents as the Commission may require to effect the transfer of such assets in accordance with this Final Judgment, with the understanding that such assets shall be used to satisfy disgorgement only.

VI.

The Commission shall deposit the funds received pursuant to sections III, IV, and V of this Final Judgment into an interest bearing account which, together with any interest and income earned thereon (collectively, the "Fund"), shall be held in the interest bearing account until further order of the Court.

The Commission may by motion propose a plan to distribute the Fund subject to the Court's approval. Such a plan may provide that Fund shall be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, amounts ordered to be paid as civil penalties pursuant to this Judgment shall be treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendants shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor Action based on any payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that he, she or it is entitled to, nor shall he, she or it further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, the

Defendant beneficiary of such Penalty Offset shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this Judgment. For purposes of this paragraph, a "Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against a Defendant in this action by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action. Defendants shall pay post-judgment interest on any delinquent amounts pursuant to 28 USC § 1961.

VII.


IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purposes of enforcing the terms of this Final Judgment.

VIII.

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION

There being no just reason for delay, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the clerk is ordered to enter this Final Judgment forthwith and without further notice.

DATED January 9, 2015.


NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Release No. 10496 / May 15, 2018

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 83236 / May 15, 2018

INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
Release No. 33097 / May 15, 2018

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-18483

In the Matter of

TIMOTHY C. SCARPINO,

Respondent.

ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CEASE-AND-
DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 8A OF THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933, SECTIONS 15(b) AND 21C OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, AND SECTION 9(b) OF THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT, MAKING
FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL
SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-AND-DESIST
ORDER AND NOTICE OF HEARING

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted against Timothy C. Scarpino ("Scarpino" or "Respondent") pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act ("Investment Company Act").

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer of Settlement (the "Offer") which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission's jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these

proceedings, which are admitted, and except as provided herein in Section IV, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order and Notice of Hearing ("Order"), as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent's Offer, the Commission finds¹ that:

Summary

From late May 2013 to mid-June 2013, Timothy Scarpino ("Scarpino"), then a registered representative at registered broker-dealer Scottsdale Capital Advisors ("Scottsdale"), willfully violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act when he engaged in the illegal distribution of the securities of Biozoom, Inc. ("Biozoom" or "BIZM") by offering and selling shares of BIZM, which was quoted on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board ("OTCBB"), on behalf of four Argentine customers (the "Argentines"). The scope of this illegal distribution was massive, as Scarpino offered and sold approximately 8.2 million BIZM shares, which constituted almost 14% of BIZM's total outstanding shares, and over 40% of BIZM's total number of shares that did not bear a restrictive legend. The Argentines reaped proceeds of over \$18.5 million from the less than four weeks of trading activity facilitated by Scarpino.

Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act make it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to offer or sell securities by any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce unless a registration statement has been filed with the Commission with respect to Section 5(c) and is in effect with respect to Section 5(a), or an applicable exemption from registration applies. This governs resales of deposited securities, such as Scarpino's sales of the BIZM shares on behalf of the Argentines. No registration statement was in effect as to Scarpino's BIZM offers and sales, and no exemption from registration was applicable to them. Although brokers may rely on an exemption under Section 4(a)(4) of the Securities Act, this exemption would be available to Scarpino for the offers and sales of BIZM only if, after engaging in a reasonable inquiry into the facts surrounding the proposed sales, Scarpino was not aware of facts indicating that the customers would be engaging in an unlawful distribution of securities. Moreover, because Scarpino was presented with red flags of a potential unlawful distribution, he needed to conduct a searching inquiry to determine that the proposed sales were not part of an unlawful distribution of securities. Despite these significant red flags, Scarpino failed to conduct a searching inquiry into facts surrounding the proposed sales, and thereby violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.

; Respondent

¹ The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent's Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.

1. Timothy Scarpino, 35, resides in Scottsdale, Arizona. Scarpino was, from 2009 until 2013, a registered representative at Scottsdale. Currently, he is not working in the securities industry.

Relevant Entity

2. Scottsdale has been registered with the Commission as a broker-dealer with its principal place of business in Scottsdale, Arizona since May 2002.

Facts

A. Scarpino Opens Foreign Accounts at Scottsdale Based on Referrals from James Benjamin Panther II

3. In or around early May 2013, James B. Panther II ("Panther"), a longtime Scottsdale customer, informed Scarpino and Scottsdale's owner (the "Owner") that Panther planned to refer several individuals to open brokerage accounts and deposit stock certificates at Scottsdale. The Owner told Scarpino that Panther had referred significant business to Scottsdale in the past and that Scarpino should provide special treatment to Panther's referrals because Panther was an important customer.

4. On May 2, 2013, Scarpino emailed an associate of Panther's ("Panther Associate"), writing that Panther had suggested that Scottsdale might be able to assist Panther Associate in "depositing OTC/Pinksheet stocks." Scarpino attached Scottsdale account opening forms for foreign customers to his email.

5. Panther Associate provided Scarpino the names and email addresses of four individuals who Panther was referring to Scottsdale – the Argentines. Scarpino then emailed each of the Argentines offering to assist them in opening accounts and depositing shares at Scottsdale.

6. Starting on May 10, 2013, the Argentines opened accounts at Scottsdale with Scarpino as their registered representative. During the account-opening process, Scarpino learned that the Argentines shared several unusual characteristics, which suggested that they might be acting in concert. In particular, Scarpino knew:

- Each of the Argentines stated that they intended to deposit physical certificates of BIZM stock in significant amounts, ranging from 1.815 million to 2.37 million shares for a total of 8.2 million shares; and
- Each of the Argentines requested the ability to place orders with Scarpino via instant message, which was not a functionality that Scottsdale offered its customers.

7. The initial account opening documents Scarpino received for each of the Argentines listed Panther as the referral source. In response to inquiries from Scarpino and compliance personnel at Scottsdale, however, the Argentines claimed they did not know Panther.

Ultimately, Panther's name was deleted from each of the account opening documents and the referring source was left blank.

B. Panther Confirms His Connections to Biozoom and the Argentines

8. On May 15, 2013, Scarpino and the Owner flew on the Owner's private jet to meet with Panther in California to discuss the Argentines. During their meeting, Panther told Scarpino that the Argentines planned to deposit share certificates into their respective accounts for trading.

9. Panther explained that he worked with Biozoom and similar start-up companies to maintain their share prices. Panther also told Scarpino and the Owner that the Argentines could bring a good amount of business to Scottsdale.

10. In return for what Panther suggested could be significant trading commissions to Scottsdale, he confirmed specific accommodations for the accounts, several of which he had previously requested. These accommodations included permitting the Argentines to place trades through instant message and significantly reducing commissions for the Argentines. Although some of these requests ran contrary to existing Scottsdale policies, the Owner directed Scarpino to grant them for Panther's referrals.

11. Panther's confirmation that he was connected with both Biozoom and the Argentines was a red flag that the Argentines were potentially affiliates of BIZM.

C. Scarpino Was Aware of Red Flags as He Deposited Substantial Amounts of Penny Stock for the Argentines

12. On May 16, 2013 – the day after Scarpino's meeting with Panther – the Argentines began working with Scarpino to deposit physical certificates of Biozoom stock into their new accounts. Scarpino knew that these certificates had been sent to Scottsdale from another broker-dealer that had rejected the Argentines' attempted deposits of the same certificates.

13. Each Argentine completed a Deposit Securities Request Questionnaire ("DSRQ"), which was necessary for the certificates to be deposited. These DSRQs required the Argentines to, among other things, explain how they obtained their shares and whether they planned to trade the shares in concert with anyone else. The Argentines' completed DSRQs provided no information on Panther's relationship or involvement with the Argentines, even though Scarpino knew that Panther had referred them to Scottsdale and was connected both to them and to BIZM.

14. The Argentines' DSRQs and related documentation raised numerous red flags of a potential unregistered distribution, which Scarpino knew or should have known:

- The Argentines were depositing a large volume of BIZM stock, which had no significant public trading in its history. Collectively, the Argentines' certificates represented 8.92 million BIZM shares, which constituted approximately 15% of BIZM's total outstanding shares, and approximately 44% of BIZM's total shares not bearing a restrictive legend;

- The Argentines claimed to have purchased their 8.9 million shares of BIZM at prices between \$0.003 and \$0.005 per share, spending a total of only approximately \$33,000; and
- All of the Argentines' certificates had been issued less than two months earlier, and they all purportedly acquired their shares in transactions with investors in Biozoom's predecessor company between February 26 and March 5, 2013.²

15. Because, as described above, Scarpino knew that the Argentines were connected to Panther and further knew that Panther had previously discussed Biozoom with Scarpino and the Owner, the numerous and significant red flags raised by the Argentines' share deposits – including the percentage of BIZM shares they controlled, nominal amounts they supposedly paid for the shares, the recent issuance of their share certificates, and other evidence of their connections to one another and to Panther – should have raised significant questions for Scarpino about their possible involvement in an unregistered distribution of BIZM stock coordinated by Panther. Scarpino, however, took no additional steps to investigate this possibility, and did not inform anyone else at Scottsdale about the accumulation of red flags of which he was aware.

D. Scarpino Was Aware of Additional Red Flags During the Unregistered Distribution of BIZM Stock

16. From May 28, 2013 until June 19, 2013, Scarpino offered and sold approximately 8.2 million BIZM shares through the OTCBB for proceeds of nearly \$18.6 million on behalf of the Argentines. Given that the Argentines claimed to have paid a total of \$32,700 for all of their deposited shares, they realized aggregate returns of more than 56,000% on Scarpino's sales of the shares they had supposedly purchased less than four months earlier.

17. No registration statement was filed or in effect with regards to Scarpino's offers and sales of the BIZM shares and no exemption from the registration requirements was available for those sales. Throughout the trading period, even more red flags of an illegal unregistered distribution appeared:

- The Argentines began liquidating their BIZM shares almost immediately after they were cleared for trading;
- Scarpino's offers and sales occurred amid a dramatic spike in trading of BIZM. Prior to May 16, 2013, the stock of BIZM and its predecessor company had traded once since its inception in 2007, a 300 share trade in November 2012 for \$1.02 per share. From May 16, 2013 to June 19, 2013, BIZM's stock price increased from a starting price of \$1.10 per share to as high as \$4.50 per share. Over the same period, daily volume spiked from 10,000 shares to a high of 11.6 million shares.

² Biozoom came into existence on April 1, 2013 via a reverse merger with a penny stock company named Entertainment Art, Inc. ("EERT"), followed by a name and ticker change. EERT was formed in 2007.

This market was completely inconsistent with the prior trading history of BIZM and its predecessor company;

- This spike in activity coincided with a promotional campaign touting BIZM in radio, web, and print ads. The promotional campaign also involved mailers put out by third party media sources and was supported by numerous press releases issued by the company; and
- As Scarpino completed liquidating all or substantially all of the BIZM shares on behalf of an Argentine, that Argentine quickly asked Scarpino to wire out the proceeds to offshore accounts. In total, between June 11 and June 24, the four Argentines requested to wire out nearly \$17 million, all of which was proceeds from the sale of the recently-deposited and sold BIZM shares.

18. On June 25, 2013, the Commission suspended trading in the BIZM securities. On July 3, 2013, the Commission charged four of the Argentine customers and others with violating Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act. The Commission obtained default judgments against all defendants in that matter. The Court granted injunctive relief and ordered the Argentines to pay disgorgement of \$18,535,955 and penalties of \$640,000.

E. Scarpino Did Not Engage in a Reasonable Inquiry

19. Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act prohibit the offer and sale of securities through interstate commerce or the mails, unless a registration statement is filed with the Commission and is in effect, or the offer and sale are subject to an exemption. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and (c).

20. Section 4(a)(4) of the Securities Act exempts from the registration requirements of Section 5 “brokers’ transactions executed upon customers’ orders on any exchange or in the over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such orders.” 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4). Rule 144(g)(4) provides that for a transaction to qualify as a “brokers’ transaction” under Section 4(a)(4), the broker must engage in a “reasonable inquiry” prior to the transaction, and after such inquiry he must not be “aware of circumstances indicating that the person for whose account the securities are sold is an underwriter³ with respect to the securities or that the transaction is a part of a distribution of securities of the issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(4); 17 CFR § 230.144(g)(4).

21. The “reasonable inquiry” should consider, among other factors:

- the length of time the seller has held the securities;
- the nature of the transaction in which the securities were acquired; and

³ Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act defines an underwriter as “any person who has purchased from an issuer, with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking.” 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11).

- the number of shares of the class outstanding or the relevant trading volume. Notes to 17 CFR § 230.144(g)(4).

22. However, certain facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction might require additional inquiry in order for the broker to rely on the Section 4(a)(4) exemption. For example:

A dealer who is offered a modest amount of a widely traded security by a responsible customer, whose lack of relationship to the issuer is well known to him, may ordinarily proceed with considerable confidence. On the other hand, when a dealer is offered a substantial block of a little-known security, either by persons who appear reluctant to disclose exactly where the securities came from, or *where the surrounding circumstances raise a question* as to whether or not the ostensible sellers may be merely intermediaries for controlling persons or statutory underwriters, then *searching inquiry* is called for.

Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, Securities Act Rel. No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962) (emphasis added). See also *Bloomfield et al.*, Exchange Act Rel. No. 71632, at 5 (Feb. 27, 2014) (“The accounts received large blocks of privately obtained shares of obscure penny stocks. Although the securities initially traded at low prices and in low volumes, the prices of, and trading volume in, these securities quickly escalated around the time of large deposits into the [] accounts. The escalation in prices and trading volume was generally associated with coordinated transactions among the various [] accounts and often accompanied by spam email campaigns touting the issuers’ prospects. Once prices had risen substantially, the accounts started selling blocks of stocks. Eventually the stocks’ prices collapsed. These indicia raised red flags of a possible unlawful distribution and market manipulation.”); *Midas Securities, LLC and Jay S. Lee*, Exchange Act Rel. No. 66200, at 14 (Jan. 20, 2012) (holding that because “[t]he amount of inquiry required necessarily varies with the circumstances of the proposed transaction,” in certain circumstances, a broker-dealer may need to “conduct a searching inquiry to assure itself that . . . proposed sales [are] exempt from the registration requirements and not part of an unlawful distribution.”).

23. When conducting a reasonable inquiry, a registered representative may not rely on others, such as counsel’s advice, to fulfill his reasonable inquiry obligation. *Wonsover v. SEC*, 205 F.3d 408, 415-16 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting registered representative’s reliance on clearing firm, the transfer agent, counsel, and reliance on the clearance of sales by the “Restricted Stock Department” of his firm); see also *World Trade Financial Corp. v. SEC*, 739 F.3d 1243, 1249 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that duty of reasonable inquiry was satisfied by reliance on third parties in conformity with industry practice and stating “brokers rely on third parties at their own peril, and will not avoid liability through that reliance when the duty of reasonable inquiry rests with the brokers”).

24. It is not sufficient “for [the registered representative] merely to accept ‘self-serving statements of his sellers and their counsel without reasonably exploring the possibility of contradictory facts.’” *Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities*, Securities Act Rel. No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962) (quoting *SEC v. Culpepper*, 270 F.2d 241, 251 (2d Cir. 1959)). Nor may a broker “rely upon the absence of restrictive legends on the stock certificates when the circumstances surrounding the transaction indicate the need for a thorough investigation.”

Transactions in the Securities of Laser Arms Corporation by Certain Broker-Dealers, Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-28878, 1991 WL 292009 (Feb. 14, 1991).

25. No registration statement was filed or in effect as to Scarpino's offer and sale of the BIZM shares on behalf of the Argentines and no exemption from the registration requirements was available for these sales. Scarpino made use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell, sell, and deliver after sale the BIZM shares to the public.

26. Scarpino was presented with numerous and significant red flags raised by the deposits of BIZM shares and subsequent sales of those shares, which should have raised questions as to whether the Argentines were engaged in an unlawful distribution by, for example, acting as underwriters. These red flags included:

- the Argentines opened new accounts and delivered physical certificates representing a large block of thinly traded and low-priced securities;
- the deposited share certificates had been recently issued and represented a large percentage of the float for the security;
- the Argentines had a pattern of depositing physical share certificates, immediately selling the shares and then wiring out the proceeds to offshore accounts;
- there was a sudden spike in volume, coupled with a rising price in, a thinly traded and low-priced security; and
- Scarpino had reason to believe the Argentines were acting in concert with one another and in coordination with an affiliate of the issuer.

27. Throughout the process of opening the Argentines' accounts, depositing their certificates, and then offering and selling those shares into the market on behalf of the Argentines, Scarpino was confronted with red flag after red flag that he was facilitating an unregistered distribution of those shares. Despite the presence of these ample and glaring red flags, Scarpino did not perform a "reasonable inquiry" regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding those transactions, let alone the "searching inquiry" he was required to perform.

Violation

28. As a result of the conduct described above, Scarpino willfully violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.

IV.

Pursuant to this Order, Respondent Scarpino agrees to additional proceedings in this proceeding to determine what, if any, civil penalties pursuant to Section 8A(g) of the Securities Act against Respondent Scarpino are in the public interest. In connection with such additional proceedings: (a) Respondent Scarpino agrees that he will be precluded from arguing that he did not violate the federal securities laws as described in this Order; (b) Respondent Scarpino agrees

that he may not challenge the validity of this Order; (c) solely for the purposes of such additional proceedings, the allegations of the Order shall be accepted as and deemed true by the hearing officer; and (d) the hearing officer may determine the issues raised in the additional proceedings on the basis of affidavits, declarations, excerpts of sworn deposition or investigative testimony, and documentary evidence.

V.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent Scarpino's Offer.

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act, Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Exchange Act, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:

- A. Respondent Scarpino shall cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 5(a) or 5(c) of the Securities Act.
- B. Respondent Scarpino be, and hereby is:
 - barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization;
 - prohibited from serving or acting as an employee, officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser or depositor of, or principal underwriter for, a registered investment company or affiliated person of such investment adviser, depositor, or principal underwriter; and
 - barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock,
 - with the right to apply for reentry after five (5) years to the appropriate self-regulatory organization, or if there is none, to the Commission.
- C. Any reapplication for association by Respondent Scarpino will be subject to the applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against the Respondent, whether or not the Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration award related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any self-regulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; and (d) any restitution order by a self-regulatory

organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order.

D. Payment must be made in one of the following ways:

- (1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
- (2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at <http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm>; or
- (3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier's check, or United States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:

Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying Timothy Scarpino as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Antonia Chion, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F St., NE, Washington, DC 20549.

It is further ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 100(c) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.100(c), in the interest of justice and without prejudice to any party to the proceedings, that a public hearing for the purpose of taking evidence on the questions set forth in Section IV hereof shall be convened at a time and place to be fixed by, and before, an Administrative Law Judge to be designated by further order as provided by Rule 110 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.110, following the entry of a final judgment against the last remaining defendant(s) in any action(s) arising out of or related to the facts in this Order ("Related Actions").

If Respondent Scarpino fails to appear at a hearing after being duly notified, Respondent Scarpino may be deemed in default and the proceedings may be determined against him upon consideration of this Order, the allegations of which may be deemed to be true as provided by Rules 155(a), 220(f), 221(f), and 310 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155(a), 201.220(f), 201.221(f), and 201.310.

This Order shall be served forthwith upon Respondent Scarpino personally or by certified mail.

It is further ORDERED pursuant to Rule 100(c) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.100(c), in the interest of justice and without prejudice to any party, that the

Administrative Law Judge shall issue an initial decision no later than 150 days from the date of the entry of a final judgment in any Related Actions.

VI.

It is further Ordered that, solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523, the findings in this Order are true and admitted by Respondent, and further, any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by Respondent under this Order or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by Respondent of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19):

By the Commission.

Brent J. Fields
Secretary

**FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF HEARING OFFICERS**

DEPARTMENT OF ENFORCEMENT,

Complainant,

v.

SCOTTSDALE CAPITAL ADVISORS
CORPORATION
(CRD No. 118786),

JOHN J. HURRY
(CRD No. 2146449),

TIMOTHY B. DIBLASI
(CRD No. 4623652),

and

D. MICHAEL CRUZ
(CRD No. 2450344),

Respondents.

Disciplinary Proceeding
No. 2014041724601

Hearing Officer–LOM

**AMENDED EXTENDED HEARING
PANEL DECISION¹**

June 20, 2017

The Respondent firm violated FINRA Rule 2010 by selling securities without registration and without an exemption, in contravention of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. The firm's owner, Respondent John Hurry, also violated Rule 2010, because he engaged in activities designed to enable the unlawful transactions and evade regulatory scrutiny.

The Respondent firm and its Chief Compliance Officer, Respondent Timothy DiBlasi, violated NASD Rules 3010(a) and (b) and FINRA Rule 2010 by failing to establish and maintain a supervisory system, including written

¹ The original Extended Hearing Panel Decision has been amended to correct a factual error. The amendment does not change the substance of the decision.

supervisory procedures, reasonably designed to ensure that the firm complied with Section 5 of the Securities Act.

The Respondent firm and its President, Respondent Michael Cruz, violated NASD Rule 3010(b) and FINRA Rule 2010 by failing to supervise and failing to respond appropriately to numerous red flags indicative of unlawful unregistered distributions.

The Respondent firm is fined \$1.5 million. Hurry is barred in all capacities. He would also be fined \$100,000, but, in light of the bar, the fine is not imposed. DiBlasi is suspended for two years and fined \$50,000. Cruz is suspended for two years and fined \$50,000. In addition, Respondents are ordered to pay costs, for which they are jointly and severally liable.

Appearances

For the Complainant: Jeffrey D. Pariser, Esq., Gregory R. Firehock, Esq., Laura Leigh Blackston, Esq., and Heather L. Freiburger, Esq., Department of Enforcement, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

For the Respondents: Kevin J. Harnisch, Esq., Michael J. Edney, Esq., and Ryan E. Meltzer, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP.

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DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Respondent Firm

The Respondent firm, Scottsdale Capital Advisors Corporation (“Scottsdale” or the “Firm”), is primarily engaged in the business of liquidating penny stocks for its customers without registration. The sale of securities without registration is unlawful unless an exemption exists. In selling securities without registration, Scottsdale usually relies on a “safe harbor” exemption created by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Rule 144. But the securities at issue here did not qualify for the Rule 144 exemption. Thus, the sales were unlawful.

1. The Firm Relied On The Rule 144 Exemption

SEC Rule 144 is highly detailed and technical. It both restricts some transactions and permits others that meet certain conditions. It comes into play where securities have been acquired from the issuer or an affiliate in an unregistered private transaction. Such securities typically are marked with a restrictive legend, and the holder may not sell such securities in the public marketplace unless an exemption applies to the sale.

In determining whether a sale of securities is exempt from registration under Rule 144, a broker-dealer must conduct an inquiry that focuses primarily on identifying the individual who is the beneficial owner of the securities to be sold, analyzing that person’s relationship (if any) to the issuer of the securities, investigating the circumstances of that person’s acquisition of the securities, and calculating how long the person has held the securities. Rule 144 imposes different holding periods on affiliates and non-affiliates of an issuer before they can resell the issuer’s securities. In some circumstances, the holder can “tack” his holding period to that of his predecessor in the chain of holders to meet the applicable holding period.

The purpose of the Rule 144 inquiry is to ensure that the transaction is not a subterfuge for an issuer or its affiliates to distribute securities to the public while evading the disclosure requirements that accompany registration. Representations made by the parties interested in selling the securities must be carefully scrutinized by a broker-dealer firm because of the incentive to misrepresent the circumstances and conceal the true beneficial owners.

2. The Firm Lacked A Basis For “Tacking” To Achieve The Required Holding Period Under SEC Rule 144

In the transactions at issue, the purported beneficial owners claimed that neither they nor their predecessors were affiliates of the issuer. Their lack of affiliate status was critical to their ability to sell the shares pursuant to SEC Rule 144 because of the shorter holding period and fewer restrictions on non-affiliates.

Even as non-affiliates, however, none of the purported beneficial owners of the shares that Scottsdale accepted for resale had held the shares long enough to qualify for the Rule 144 safe harbor holding period. Each seller therefore claimed that the applicable Rule 144 holding period was satisfied by tacking his holding period to the holding period of a prior holder.

In the transactions at issue, one prior holder claimed that he had forgiven a loan that he had made to the issuer and had exchanged the right to payment on the loan for stock. One of the prior holders forgave a promissory note that the issuer had used to pay him for consulting services. Another prior holder claimed to have extended an oral line of credit to the issuer and then to have accepted shares in satisfaction of a sum owed on the line of credit. A third prior holder forgave a portion of a promissory note extending an open-ended line of credit.

Each of these prior holders received the shares around the same time that he transferred them. Thus, the prior holder did not actually hold the shares long enough for his successor to satisfy the applicable holding period by tacking, creating an impediment to resale.

To overcome that impediment, the sellers of the securities claimed the benefit of another tacking provision under Rule 144. Rule 144 provides that where a holder of a security exchanges that security for another of the same issuer's securities, without any additional compensation, the holder may tack the holding period of the first security to the holding period of the second. The theory is that the exchange of one security for another of the same issuer does not change the nature of the holder's capital at risk, so the holding period for the new security can tack back to the date the old security was acquired. The sellers here characterized their prior holders' exchanges of notes for stock as exchanges of one security for another. On that basis, the sellers claimed that they could tack back to the inception of the prior holders' loans.

Whether the first instrument in the chain was a security is thus a threshold issue. The Firm treated the prior holders' promissory notes and lines of credit as securities and the conversion of that debt into stock as the exchange of one security of the issuer for another security of the same issuer. As a result, the Firm concluded that the sellers were permitted to tack their holding period all the way back to the inception of the prior holders' loans.

The Firm erred. The promissory notes and lines of credit were not securities. Rather, they were ordinary debt liabilities. Accordingly, the purported beneficial owners could not establish the requisite holding period, and the Rule 144 exemption did not exist.

3. The Firm Also Failed To Address Red Flags Signaling Unlawful Distributions

The transactions at issue involved persons seeking to sell large blocks of thinly traded, little-known securities acquired in a chain of private transactions originating with the issuer—generally a red flag that the SEC and FINRA have both said requires a “searching inquiry.” The sellers acquired the shares from the prior holders and sought to resell the shares almost immediately. The immediate resale of a large block of stock that has never been the subject of registration disclosures strongly suggests an attempt to distribute securities to the public without

registration. In addition, there were a large number of discrepancies and suspicious circumstances indicating that sham transactions, false documents, and nominees were being used to evade the securities laws and effect unlawful securities sales without registration. These red flags ought to have been investigated and appropriately resolved before the securities could be sold.

The Firm, however, blinded itself to the multiple red flags signaling that the transactions were unlawful public distributions of securities. It did not conduct the required searching inquiry. It sold the securities without a reasonable basis for a Rule 144 exemption. Because of the suspicious circumstances known to the Firm, it also was not entitled to the so-called “broker’s exemption” under Section 4(4) of the Securities Act for ordinary trading.

B. Other Respondents

1. John Hurry

Scottsdale is owned indirectly by Respondent John Hurry and his wife, Justine Hurry, through other entities they own and control. John Hurry also owns the clearing firm that handles Scottsdale’s business, Alpine Securities Corporation (“Alpine”), and an off-shore foreign financial institution (“FFI”) located in the Cayman Islands, Cayman Securities Clearing and Trading SECZ, Ltd. (“CSCT”).

Hurry set up CSCT in 2013 to act as a conduit through which other FFIs could deposit penny stocks at Scottsdale for resale in the U.S. securities market. During the relevant period, December 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014, CSCT deposited billions of shares of penny stocks for resale by Scottsdale. All the transactions at issue were routed through CSCT to Scottsdale.

2. Timothy DiBlasi

Respondent Timothy DiBlasi became Scottsdale’s chief compliance officer (“CCO”) shortly before the events at issue, and he remains its CCO. He maintains, however, that his responsibilities do not extend to the Firm’s Rule 144 business.

3. Michael Cruz

Respondent Michael Cruz was the Firm’s president, but now serves as general counsel to the collection of Hurry enterprises. During the relevant period, Cruz had final approval authority over the Rule 144 transactions at issue. In that role, he reviewed the information collected by others and determined whether it was sufficient to approve a deposit of stock certificates for resale. Everyone at the Firm, including Henry Diekmann, who headed the Firm’s Rule 144 team at the time of the transactions at issue, and who is now the Firm’s president, considered Cruz responsible for Rule 144 compliance.

C. Parties To The Transactions At Issue

This case concerns Scottsdale's sales of stock issued by three little-known companies—Neuro-Hitech Inc. ("NHPI"), VoipPal.com ("VPLM"), and Orofino Gold Corp. ("ORFG"). CSCT deposited millions of the three issuers' shares in certificate form at Scottsdale for resale. Alpine cleared them, and Scottsdale sold them into the U.S. securities market pursuant to Rule 144 without registration.

In making the deposits of NHPI, VPLM, and ORFG stock, CSCT acted on behalf of three other FFIs: (i) Montage Securities ("Montage"), (ii) Titan International Securities ("Titan"), and (iii) Unicorn International Securities ("Unicorn"). Montage was located in Panama; Titan and Unicorn were in Belize. The FFIs, in turn, purported to act for the benefit of other entities, which were represented to be owned by individuals identified in documents as the beneficial owners of the shares.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

FINRA's Department of Enforcement ("Enforcement") filed the Complaint on May 15, 2015. After an extension of time, Respondents filed an Answer on June 26, 2015. On December 11, 2015, Respondents filed a motion for summary disposition that challenged FINRA's authority to bring a disciplinary action for misconduct associated with the sale of unregistered securities. Briefing on the motion was completed on January 29, 2016. The Hearing Officer issued an Order on February 26, 2016, denying the motion and finding that FINRA has authority to bring this proceeding.

The hearing ran a total of 12 days in two sessions. The first session in Los Angeles, California, was held June 13-24, 2016. The second session in Washington, D.C. was held July 11-12, 2016. Ten witnesses testified at the hearing, including two experts.² In addition, the full transcript of an on-the-record interview ("OTR") was admitted into evidence, along with more

² In addition to Hurry, DiBlasi, and Cruz, the following persons testified: Henry Diekmann, the Firm's current president; Jay Noiman, a former Scottsdale employee who served as CCO until DiBlasi took on that responsibility; David Byrne, a FINRA examiner who is a manager of the AML Investigative Unit; Craig D'Mura, a former Scottsdale employee who worked for a couple of months at CSCT; Christopher Frankel, the current CEO of Alpine; Marc Menchel, Respondents' expert; and Brian Underwood, Enforcement's rebuttal expert.

References to hearing testimony are in the following format: "Hearing Tr. (last name of witness), page of transcript." For example, Hurry's testimony is cited as "Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1542-43."

than 200 other exhibits.³ On September 9, 2016, Enforcement and Respondents each filed one post-hearing brief.⁴

III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Jurisdiction

FINRA has jurisdiction to bring this proceeding against Scottsdale, Hurry, and DiBlasi because they are currently registered, and the Complaint charges them with misconduct committed while they were registered. FINRA has jurisdiction as to Cruz although he is no longer registered, because the Complaint was filed within two years of the time he was registered and it charges him with misconduct committed while he was registered.⁵

B. Background

We provide substantial background regarding Respondents and others connected to the transactions at issue to provide the context needed to understand the transactions, the Firm's

³ Gregory V. Ruzicka, who worked at CSCT during the relevant period, gave an OTR on May 27, 2015. The OTR became an exhibit. Complainant's exhibits are referred to with the prefix "CX" and an identifying number. Respondents' exhibits are referred to with the prefix "RX" and an identifying number. Joint exhibits are referred to with the prefix "JX" and an identifying number. Ruzicka's OTR is CX-178.

⁴ References to the post-hearing briefs are as follows: Enf. PH Br. and Resp. PH Br. Respondents attached graphs and other materials to their post-hearing brief that were not offered or admitted into evidence. Respondents apparently created the graphs after the hearing based on exhibits that were admitted into the record. However, the graphs were not subject to any testimony explaining their creation or testing their accuracy. Respondents' post-hearing brief also contained references to website articles that were not admitted into the record. No copies of the articles were attached to the post-hearing brief. Respondents have not asked permission to reopen the record to admit any of these materials. Respondents simply refer and rely on the non-record materials. The Hearing Panel has not considered any of the following items (or assertions made in argument based on them) in formulating its decision:

- Huperzine A in Alzheimer's Disease—website article relating to NHPI (Resp. PH Br. 5, n.9);
- Same (Resp. PH Br. 7, n.20);
- OTCMarkets.com website on VPLM (Resp. PH Br. 7, n.22);
- The Markets OTCQB website article on VPLM (Resp. PH Br. 7, n.23);
- Historical price figures derived from data on OTCMarkets.com (Resp. PH Br. 12, n.58);
- A purported page from a FINRA Continuing Education Module (Resp. PH Br. 17, n.86; Appendix A);
- Graphs generated by Respondents purporting to use data in JX-264 and JX-268 (Resp. PH Br. 19, n.94; Appendix B);
- Graphs generated by Respondents purporting to use data in JX-279 and JX-281 (Resp. PH Br. 25, n.129; Appendix C);
- Graphs generated by Respondents purporting to use data in JX-308 and JX-310 (Resp. PH Br. 29, n.155; Appendix D); and
- Statement about trading volume attributable to CSCT's sales of ORFG (Resp. PH Br. 29, n.156; statement made without reference to source of information or record citation).

⁵ FINRA By-Laws, Art. IV, Section 6; Art. V, Section 4.

culture, and the Respondents' failure to take reasonable action in response to obvious red flags in connection with the transactions at issue. The background also provides information important in assessing the witnesses' credibility, and in evaluating the Respondents' likely future compliance with the laws and regulations governing Scottsdale's business.

1. Respondents

a. Scottsdale

i. The Firm's Focus On Rule 144 Business

Scottsdale, which is located in Scottsdale, Arizona, has been a FINRA member since 2002.⁶ During the relevant period, the Firm had approximately 14 to 20 employees.⁷

Scottsdale's principal business is the deposit and liquidation of penny stocks for its customers.⁸ Throughout the proceeding, the penny stocks sold by Scottsdale were also referred to as "microcap" securities.⁹ Scottsdale sells most of these securities without registration. The primary exemption that Scottsdale relies on is Rule 144, so it has a dedicated Rule 144 team to review deposits of stock certificates for resale, and its procedures are oriented to Rule 144.¹⁰ Scottsdale obtains customers by advertising in OTC Markets and through referrals.¹¹

ii. The Firm's Direct Business With FFIs

Prior to Hurry's creation of CSCT in 2013, Scottsdale did business with FFIs directly. Two of the FFIs involved in this case (Titan and Unicorn) had pre-existing direct relationships with Scottsdale before they started doing business through CSCT.¹²

⁶ CX-1, at 3-9.

⁷ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 116; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1496.

⁸ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1318; Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 83; Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1180. DiBlasi acknowledged that during the relevant period penny stock transactions accounted for most of the Firm's revenues, and that over 95% of the transactions that Scottsdale executed for its customers involved penny stocks, most of them unregistered. Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1923.

⁹ Microcap securities may be defined as low-priced stock issued by small companies with a market capitalization of \$300 million or less. Microcap securities are generally more volatile and less liquid than the stock of larger companies. Most important, because many microcap issuers do not file financial reports with the SEC, it may be difficult for investors to obtain information about the management, products, services, and finances of microcap issuers. <https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm>. The SEC has expressed concern that the lack of publicly available information about microcap issuers can enable the spread of false information that misleads investors. *Id.* Many microcap securities trade in the "over-the-counter" ("OTC") market instead of a national exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. *Id.*

¹⁰ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 577, 583; Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1952-54; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 818-19, 875-76, 884-86; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1600.

¹¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 116.

¹² Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 192; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 727, 817-18; Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1140-52.

iii. The Firm's Disciplinary History

Scottsdale has been disciplined previously for selling unregistered securities and having inadequate supervisory procedures and written supervisory procedures ("WSPs") to detect and prevent the sale of unregistered securities. In October 2011, the Firm settled these and other charges, agreeing to a censure and a total fine for all the charges of \$125,000 ("2011 Settlement").¹³

The Firm has also settled other types of disciplinary charges against it, which are relevant to the sanctions determinations. In 2009, it agreed to a censure and a \$7,500 fine to settle charges that it had bought bonds from customers at unfair prices ("2009 AWC").¹⁴ In August 2012, the Firm settled charges that it had failed to take appropriate action after being on notice that one of its representatives had been using his name and CRD number in stock promotion press releases. The Firm agreed to a censure and a \$7,500 fine ("2012 AWC").¹⁵ In 2015, the Firm agreed to a censure and a fine of \$10,000 to settle charges that it had submitted reports to FINRA for the Order Audit Trail System that were inaccurate, incomplete, or in the wrong format ("2015 AWC").¹⁶

iv. The Firm Had Notice That Sham Transactions And The Use Of Nominees Were A Risk In Its Rule 144 Business With FFIs

(a) Four Prior SEC Disciplinary Actions

We find that prior to the events at issue in this case, the Firm was on notice that its business was susceptible to sham transactions and the use of nominees to conceal the true beneficial owners of securities. In four disciplinary actions involving Scottsdale's own employees and customers, the SEC alleged that sham transactions and nominees were used in unlawful sales in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. Those unlawful sales in turn were used to facilitate fraud and manipulation.

In December 2011, two of Scottsdale's registered representatives were named in an SEC complaint ("*Ruettiger*") involving the supposed assignment of portions of a convertible note to satisfy the applicable Rule 144 holding period, the use of nominees to conceal the identity of the true beneficial owners, the use of a "pump-and-dump"¹⁷ scheme to manipulate the market for the stock, and an unlawful distribution of securities without registration. According to the complaint,

¹³ CX-12.

¹⁴ CX-11.

¹⁵ CX-13. ;

¹⁶ CX-14.

¹⁷ "Pump-and-dump" schemes involve the touting of a company's stock (typically small, so-called "microcap" companies) through false and misleading statements to the marketplace. <https://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm>.

Scottsdale's registered representatives handled some of the accounts involved in the scheme, and one of them had an interest in an entity that received and sold some of the securities. The complaint alleged that a single person had used 16 Panamanian corporations to conceal his identity and enable him to sell approximately \$6 million of stock without registration.¹⁸

In March 2013, the SEC filed a complaint ("*Gibraltar I*") against a number of people and entities alleging a market manipulation scheme that was facilitated by a Scottsdale customer, Gibraltar. That complaint alleged that individual defendants had secretly sold shares through Gibraltar while simultaneously promoting the stocks and encouraging others to buy. It also alleged that Gibraltar had provided false affidavits and misleading statements that allowed an individual defendant to secretly sell shares of companies he was promoting.¹⁹

In April 2013, the SEC filed a second complaint against Gibraltar and its owner ("*Gibraltar II*"), alleging that they had facilitated unlawful sales of securities without registration through the use of nominees. According to that complaint, Gibraltar liquidated low-price, thinly traded stocks on behalf of its clients, often during periods of suspicious promotion. Gibraltar assisted its clients to incorporate international business corporations ("IBCs") and encouraged them to use nominee officers and directors so that their identities would remain confidential. The SEC charged that two persons had opened "fake nominee accounts" at Scottsdale.²⁰

Gibraltar had been a direct customer of Scottsdale since before the spring of 2010, at least two years before the SEC filed charges against it.²¹ It shut down after the filing of the two *Gibraltar* complaints, and some of its customers transferred to Titan, one of the FFIs involved in this case.²²

In July 2013, the SEC filed an action against ten Argentinians, four of whom had opened accounts at Scottsdale ("*Tavella*"). That complaint alleged that the defendants had submitted false documentation to accompany their securities deposit checklist at Scottsdale, and sold millions of shares into the public markets without registration in violation of Section 5. The defendants claimed that they had purchased their shares from former shareholders, but the former shareholders had already sold their shares years before. Thus, the transactions in which the defendants claimed that they had acquired the shares were a sham.²³

¹⁸ *SEC v. Ruettiger*, No. 2:11-cv-2011 (D. Nev. filed Dec. 16, 2011), available at <https://www.SEC.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp22198.pdf>.

¹⁹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 195-99; *SEC v. Carrillo Huettel*, No. 13 Civ. 1735 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 2013), available at <https://www.SEC.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp-pr2013-39.pdf>.

²⁰ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 185-192; *SEC v. Gibraltar Global Sec., Inc.*, No. 13 Civ. 2575 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 18, 2013), available at <https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp22683.pdf>.

²¹ Hearing Tr. (Dickmann) 1912-13.

²² Hearing Tr. (Dickmann) 727.

²³ *SEC v. Tavella*, No. 13-cv-4609 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 3, 2013), available at <https://www.SEC.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp-pr2013-122.pdf>.

These regulatory actions should have caused the Firm to take special care when dealing with FFIs, and to revise its procedures to focus on potential sham transactions and the use of nominees. The Firm did not. Its main reaction to *Ruettiger* was to eliminate the branch office involved in the case. Cruz believed that the misconduct identified in the *Gibraltar* cases was “isolated.”²⁴ Scottsdale’s current president, Diekmann, who was the head of the Rule 144 team when the *Tavella* complaint was filed, testified that he could not remember if the Firm conducted any investigation of the four Argentinians named in the *Tavella* complaint who had Scottsdale accounts.²⁵ In Diekmann’s view it was “just impossible to know that there was somebody else behind this.”²⁶ Cruz similarly said, “[I]t’s almost impossible to detect these nominees, that they’re going to be ... misrepresenting the—you know, the true identity of these persons.”²⁷ Although the Firm changed some procedures as a result of *Tavella* (it would not accept more than 9.9% of a security at any one time from its customers and it instituted a stock watch list to monitor trading and promotions), Diekmann could not remember doing anything different to address the problem of nominees.²⁸

(b) Respondents’ Arguments Minimizing Significance Are Rejected

In their post-hearing brief, Respondents argue that the SEC complaints are not relevant because they were classic pump-and-dump cases, and no charge is made here that the transactions at issue were part of a pump-and-dump fraud. It is not necessary, however, to prove that fraud occurred in order to conclude that Respondents failed to perform their gatekeeping duty adequately. The focus here is on Respondents’ failure (i) to recognize as a threshold matter that the transactions lacked a legal underpinning, and (ii) to respond appropriately to an accumulation of red flags and suspicious circumstances, either conducting further investigation to make sure an exemption existed or declining to sell the securities.

Respondents also claim that references in the prior complaints to nominees were “peripheral.”²⁹ To the contrary, the use of nominees was critical to facilitating the fraud and manipulation charged in those cases. We reject Respondents’ attempt to brush aside the SEC complaints.

Cruz took a different approach at the hearing to minimizing the significance of the SEC complaints, which we also reject. He insisted on a benign definition of the term “nominee” to mean only someone designated to act on behalf of another. He declined to view the *Ruettiger* complaint as raising a concern about the use of nominees. He said, “I wasn’t sure if this is a

²⁴ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 219.

²⁵ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 732-33.

²⁶ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 732.

²⁷ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 213-14.

²⁸ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 733-34.

²⁹ Resp. PH Br. 36-37.

situation where the—the nominees here that are being listed were purposely hiding their identity. It could be, but ... that just was not my takeaway when I was looking at this ... Complaint.”³⁰ When asked whether the allegation of “fake nominee entities” gave him pause, Cruz responded, “I have no idea what fake – I mean, if it’s an entity – I mean, if it – I don’t know what they mean by ‘fake.’”³¹ Cruz refused to admit that the complaint in *Ruettiger* put him on notice of the possibility of nominees hiding the actual true beneficial owner of securities. He testified, “I would say this is probably not a case that gave me a great concern about the nominee issue, per se There might be a nominee issue in there. I guess I don’t know the context of that.”³²

We find Cruz’s refusal to acknowledge the plain import of the SEC’s allegations in *Ruettiger* and the other complaints disingenuous. Even Respondents’ expert agreed that Scottsdale was on notice that its customers could be nominees for beneficial owners as of the relevant period in this case.³³

(c) Later Actions Confirm Risk Of Sham Transactions And Nominees

The risky nature of Scottsdale’s Rule 144 business with FFIs became undeniable in the summer of 2014, when the SEC and criminal authorities initiated two new proceedings charging that certain Scottsdale customers and others had used sham transactions and nominees to sell penny stocks unlawfully without registration. These proceedings were brought based on extensive evidence gathered through the use of undercover agents, cooperating witnesses, and recorded conversations. The allegations appeared well founded, and they finally caused Scottsdale and CSCT to react.

The SEC filed a complaint on July 11, 2014 (“*Amogear*”), charging five individuals with using nominee accounts in FFI trading to conceal beneficial ownership and facilitate a pump-and-dump scheme. The SEC alleged that Titan had agreed to assist in the scheme and that Alpine, the clearing firm, was involved in readying shares for trading in connection with the scheme. In reaction to *Amogear*, Scottsdale froze its FFI trading for a couple of months.³⁴

On September 8, 2014, prosecutors filed an indictment in federal district court in New York (“*Bandfield*”) that charged Titan, Unicorn, and several individuals with whom Scottsdale and CSCT did business with securities fraud, tax fraud, and a money-laundering conspiracy. Those individuals included the following persons, who were also involved in the transactions at issue here: Cem (“Jimmy”) Can at Unicorn; Kelvin Leach and Rohn Knowles at Titan; and Robert Bandfield and Andrew Godfrey, who purported to represent customers of Montage,

³⁰ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 191.

³¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 192.

³² Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 184.

³³ Hearing Tr. (Menchel) 2488-89.

³⁴ Hearing Tr. (Dickmann) 705-12; Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 204-08; CX-250.

Unicorn, and Titan and appeared in connection with numerous sub-accounts and sub-sub-accounts at Scottsdale. According to the indictment, Robert Bandfield claimed in a recorded conversation that he had created Titan and more than 5000 sham companies. In that conversation, he explained how reporting requirements could be circumvented and beneficial ownership concealed by using nominees.³⁵ After the indictment was unsealed and became public, CSCT's business substantially diminished.³⁶

b. John Hurry

Indirectly, through a trust and a holding company, John Hurry and his wife, Justine Hurry, own Scottsdale.³⁷ From the Firm's inception in 2002 until December 2012, Respondent Hurry was a registered representative, among other roles.³⁸ John Hurry again registered with the Firm in October 2014, and remains registered today.³⁹ Hurry admitted in his Answer to the Complaint that he has been the Firm's director since 2002. However, at the hearing, he claimed that he first became a director of Scottsdale in January 2013. Justine Hurry became its second director in May 2013.⁴⁰

Scottsdale has been highly profitable for Hurry and his wife. According to the Annual Audited Report Form for Scottsdale during the year beginning July 1, 2013, and ending June 30, 2014, the Firm paid \$6,222,550 in directors' compensation. Since John and Justine Hurry were the Firm's only directors, this expense presumably was paid to them.⁴¹ The Firm paid other

³⁵ CX-244; CX-226; Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 224-30; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1725-26, 1781.

³⁶ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 237-38; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1529-30.

³⁷ CX-1, at 7-9; CX-5; Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 81-82.

³⁸ CX-15, at 11.

³⁹ CX-15, at 4-5.

⁴⁰ CX-1, at 3-9 (showing the Firm's direct owners and directors); CX-17, at 1. In his Answer, Hurry admitted that he had been a director of Scottsdale since 2002. Answer ¶ 16. At the hearing, however, Hurry denied that he had been a director of Scottsdale before January 2013. He did so despite the fact that his signature appeared over the designation "sole director" in a December 2012 document authorizing the creation of the Firm's Management Committee. At the hearing, he claimed that the designation as sole director was a typographical error and that he was acting president prior to January 2013, not sole director. CX-3; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1306-09. Cruz testified as to the December 2012 document that Hurry had established the Firm's Management Committee in his capacity as director of the Firm. Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 74-76.

The conflict between the Answer and Hurry's testimony is inexplicable. We find the conflict between Hurry's testimony and the Firm's record of the creation of the Management Committee disturbing, because it reflects a lack of transparency and accountability. We find the typographical error explanation with regard to something as important as corporate authority to designate the responsibilities of senior management—particularly in a simple one-page document—not credible. There is no explanation for the conflict between Hurry's testimony that he was not a director of the Firm in December 2012 and Cruz's testimony that he was. The conflict in the evidence on this point diminishes Hurry's credibility.

⁴¹ RX-42, at 7, 11. When Cruz officially became Scottsdale's president in March 2014, it was by unanimous consent of the Board of Directors, John and Justine Hurry. CX-4.

compensation of \$1,665,574 and professional and consulting fees of \$1,138,090. When these payments and other expenses were subtracted from the Firm's gross profit of \$11,569,817, the Firm reported net income of \$1,446,655. Because Scottsdale is an S corporation, this income flowed through to the shareholders. In the next year, ending June 30, 2015, although the Firm reported only \$589 in net income, the Firm paid directors' compensation of \$3,255,200.⁴²

During the relevant period, Respondent Hurry also was the indirect owner of Scottsdale's clearing firm, Alpine, which is located in Salt Lake City, Utah. Hurry has been its director since March 2011,⁴³ and has been registered with Alpine since May 15, 2015.⁴⁴

In 2013, Hurry established CSCT, the Cayman Islands broker-dealer through which the securities at issue were deposited at Scottsdale.⁴⁵ Hurry owns CSCT,⁴⁶ and, as more fully discussed below, he made decisions, both large and small, about how it conducted its business.⁴⁷ Despite the highly specialized nature of CSCT's business, Hurry hired Gregory Ruzicka—an out-of-work California real estate attorney who had no prior experience in the securities broker-dealer industry, much less in the specialized business of liquidating microcap securities—to run CSCT.⁴⁸ Ruzicka went down to the Cayman Islands in October 2013 to take on his CSCT duties.⁴⁹ Hurry then monitored Ruzicka's activities almost daily, right down to his cigarette breaks, and visited the Cayman Islands at least monthly.⁵⁰

Although Hurry attempted to conceal the extent of his involvement in CSCT's business, he admits that he spoke with the three CSCT customers involved in this case (Montage, Titan, and Unicorn), and that he personally visited two of them, Montage in Panama and Unicorn in Belize.⁵¹ He claims that he did not solicit business for CSCT, but, as discussed below, that claim is not credible.

⁴² RX-42, at 27. See also the Firm's FOCUS Reports for 2013-Q4, 2014-Q1, 2014-Q2, 2015-Q3, 2015-Q4, and 2016-Q1, and the summary of them created by Enforcement. CX-6 through CX-10.

⁴³ CX-15, at 3, 11; CX-18.

⁴⁴ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1307.

⁴⁵ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1329; Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1117-18; CX-29.

⁴⁶ CX-178, at 40-41.

⁴⁷ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1333-35.

⁴⁸ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1631; CX-178, at 13-24. Ruzicka had limited experience in the early 1980s with intrastate real estate limited partnership offerings. In that context, he handled post-foreclosure unlawful detainers, relief from automatic bankruptcy stays, and receiverships on commercial properties. CX-178, at 15-18.

⁴⁹ CX-178, at 20.

⁵⁰ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1437-40; CX-178, at 138-41, 151-52; CX-132; CX-133.

⁵¹ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1406-08, 1412-14, 1421-22.

That Hurry was in charge was obvious to his employees and to CSCT customers. Ruzicka referred to him as “the big boss.”⁵² As noted below, one of the persons at Scottsdale who approved CSCT to become a Scottsdale customer did not even consider rejecting CSCT’s application because he knew that Hurry had brought CSCT to the Firm.⁵³ Similarly, Ruzicka said that CSCT never considered using any broker-dealer except Scottsdale because of Hurry.⁵⁴ As Hurry acknowledged, customers also sought direct contact with him because he is “highest on the totem pole.”⁵⁵

Respondent Hurry thus owns and controls all three firms involved in the transactions at issue in this proceeding—Scottsdale, Alpine, and CSCT. In fact, the three firms were almost a self-contained system for processing and distributing microcap securities. CSCT did all its business through Scottsdale,⁵⁶ and Scottsdale in turn did all its business with Alpine.⁵⁷ Alpine’s current CEO described Alpine as a small “boutique” clearing firm with a focus on the kind of business brought to it by CSCT.⁵⁸ No independent third party was involved in preparing, approving, or clearing the deposits of stock certificates by CSCT at Scottsdale for resale.

c. Timothy DiBlasi

DiBlasi first entered the securities industry in 2002. From December 2002 through March 2012, he was a compliance analyst at First Investors Corporation in New Jersey. DiBlasi has been associated with Scottsdale since April 2012. In June 2012, he became the Firm’s anti-money laundering chief officer (“AMLCO”). In October 2013, shortly before the events at issue, DiBlasi became the Firm’s CCO, and he remains the Firm’s CCO today. Prior to joining the Firm, DiBlasi had limited experience in microcap securities, and he had not handled the type of restricted stock deposits that are the bulk of Scottsdale’s business.⁵⁹

⁵² CX-240; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1764-65.

⁵³ Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1079, 1103, 1105-06, 1117-18. See also CX-29, at 10, 25 (forms to establish CSCT as a Scottsdale customer listed Hurry as referral or source of the business).

⁵⁴ CX-178, at 108.

⁵⁵ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1432.

⁵⁶ Ruzicka testified that CSCT never considered using a firm other than Scottsdale because of Hurry. CX-178, at 108.

⁵⁷ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 143, 306, 382; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 759; Hearing Tr. (D’Mura) 2293. The person Hurry hired to run CSCT, Gregory Ruzicka, described CSCT as an “adjunct” of Hurry’s operations at Scottsdale. CX-178, at 34.

⁵⁸ Hearing Tr. (Frankel) 2342-43. Alpine did do business with other FFIs in addition to CSCT during the relevant period. Hearing Tr. (Frankel) 2343.

⁵⁹ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1919-21; Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 122; CX-19.

d. Michael Cruz

Cruz entered the securities business in 1994, when he began working at a San Francisco investment banking firm on underwritings, asset-backed securities, and private placements. After approximately six years, he joined FINRA's predecessor, NASD, starting in its San Francisco office as a cause examiner and then moving to New York as a cycle examiner. He then took a job with Citigroup Smith Barney in their central risk group, reporting to the General Counsel and CCO. Subsequently, he moved with his family to Arizona and passed the bar there. In Arizona, he first worked for Wells Fargo in its audit department and then took a similar position at Countrywide in its bank legal department. He left Countrywide when Bank of America acquired it, and he began working at Scottsdale in May 2008.⁶⁰

Cruz has held Series 7, 24, and 63 licenses. However, since January 29, 2015, he has not been registered through Scottsdale. He currently is the general counsel for the holding companies that own Scottsdale and its clearing firm, Alpine.⁶¹

At the beginning of the relevant period, Cruz was listed on the Firm's Form BD as legal counsel and member of the Management Committee.⁶² Cruz officially became the Firm's president by a board resolution dated March 17, 2014. He testified that, at least since December 1, 2013, he had been acting as *de facto* president.⁶³ The Firm amended its Form BD on March 31, 2014, to disclose that Cruz was the president, as well as legal counsel.⁶⁴

During the relevant period, Cruz approved Rule 144 deposits, including the transactions at issue.⁶⁵ Cruz signed the Deposited Securities Checklist ("Checklist") for the transactions at issue under the heading "144 Compliance Approval." Between that heading and his signature is the statement "[B]ased on the information received and reviewed as described in this Deposited Securities Checklist, SCA [Scottsdale] reasonably believes the subject securities are free trading."⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 72-73, 557-59, 661; CX-20.

⁶¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 72-73; CX-20.

⁶² CX-17, at 1.

⁶³ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 78-79; CX-4. Cruz said that the original plan had been for Justine Hurry to be president of the Firm. Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 79. Cruz's testimony that he was the acting president in December is inconsistent with Hurry's testimony that he was president at that time. This conflict concerning who was in charge illustrates the Firm's lack of appropriate supervisory procedures that clearly delegated authority and created accountability.

⁶⁴ CX-17, at 7.

⁶⁵ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 693-94.

⁶⁶ RX-1, at 2, 79, 159; RX-2, at 2, 107; RX-3, at 2.

Cruz acted as the conduit between senior management of the Firm and the board of directors, John and Justine Hurry.⁶⁷

2. Other Key Figures At Scottsdale

a. Henry Diekmann

After graduating from college with a degree in history, Diekmann spent approximately a year as a financial trainee with Morgan Stanley. He then was an insurance salesman for four months. After that, he was unemployed for about a year-and-a-half before he joined Scottsdale in March 2010 as an office assistant. In January 2011, he moved to the Firm's Rule 144 team, where he spent two years before being promoted to head the team. Although many members of the team were lawyers, Diekmann is not. He had no experience with low-priced securities or in clearing unregistered securities for trading before he joined Scottsdale. He was trained to review deposits by Cruz and another person who worked on the Rule 144 team.⁶⁸

During the relevant period, Diekmann focused solely on reviewing CSCT deposits. But he did not have authority to approve a deposit of certificates. Final approval authority rested with Cruz.⁶⁹

Since January 2015, Diekmann has been the Firm's president.⁷⁰ As the Firm's current president, Diekmann now has the authority that once belonged to Cruz.⁷¹

b. Eric Miller

Eric Miller was a Scottsdale salesman. He called potential customers and assisted in conducting due diligence on new accounts.⁷² Miller sometimes referred clients to Ruzicka at CSCT.⁷³

Although Miller did not testify at the hearing, there is substantial evidence that he was involved with Unicorn's deposits. Miller had a relationship with Unicorn because it had been Scottsdale's direct customer before moving its business to CSCT, and he continued to have contact with Unicorn even after it started doing business with Scottsdale through CSCT, as Diekmann admitted.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 80-82.

⁶⁸ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 686-90.

⁶⁹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 694, 886.

⁷⁰ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 685; Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1954.

⁷¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 129-30, 583-84; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 685-86, 694, 908-09.

⁷² Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 116-17; Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1075-76; CX-29, at 9.

⁷³ CX-178, at 167-68.

⁷⁴ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 858, 934-35.

The fact that Miller continued to have at least some direct contact with Unicorn is significant for the following four reasons:

First, the evidence regarding Miller casts doubt on the effectiveness of the Firm's compliance and supervisory efforts. Diekmann claimed that Miller's direct contact with Unicorn was prohibited and that Miller was "written up" a number of times for corresponding by email with Unicorn. Diekmann did not identify any written prohibition against direct contact with Unicorn, but he said that the prohibition was something that was a matter of business practice at the Firm.⁷⁵ The supposed prohibition is inconsistent with the record, which contains a number of emails to and from Unicorn that include Miller as a sender or recipient.⁷⁶ Moreover, in some Unicorn emails, Diekmann is a recipient along with Miller.⁷⁷ There is no evidence that Diekmann protested Miller's involvement or reprimanded him. If Miller was "written up" a number of times for contact with Unicorn, as Diekmann testified, it apparently had little effect. Diekmann's testimony regarding the supposed prohibition was not credible.

Second, the emails indicate that Miller was a "back door" for Scottsdale in dealing with Unicorn. Although the Unicorn deposits supposedly came through CSCT, Miller and others at Scottsdale corresponded directly with Unicorn personnel and directed Unicorn as to what needed to be done.

For example, Miller engaged in extensive email correspondence with Natalie Bannister at Unicorn in November 2013 about setting up its account with CSCT. Miller instructed her that the stock certificates to be deposited at Scottsdale had to be made out in CSCT's name and sent by CSCT to Scottsdale. Bannister indicated that she did not like transferring ownership to CSCT, "especially with it not in writing." Miller insisted, "These are important details." He said that the account at Scottsdale was in CSCT's name and the "cert[tificate deposit] NEEDS to be in [CSCT's] name, that is all there is to it."⁷⁸ Thus, it was Scottsdale—not CSCT—that was making the arrangements and instructing the customer on what had to be done.

Miller shepherded Unicorn's due diligence packages through CSCT. In March 2014, he instructed Unicorn staff and Ruzicka to get together on the telephone to discuss which documents were needed and could be provided for a deposit.⁷⁹ Similarly, in May 2014, Miller engaged in email correspondence directly with Unicorn's Back Office Manager, Chinique Lewis, asking her about ORFG, one of the stock deposits at issue in this case. He asked her—not Ruzicka—how the package was coming along. Then Lewis emailed Miller—not Ruzicka—to ask if there was "[a]nything on the [ORFG] as yet?" At that point, Miller emailed her back

⁷⁵ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1664-65.

⁷⁶ See CX-216.

⁷⁷ See CX-119.

⁷⁸ CX-270.

⁷⁹ CX-171.

directing her to call Ruzicka and have him call Miller.⁸⁰ Miller's last instruction in the correspondence appears to us to reflect an awareness that Scottsdale should be seen to be dealing only with and through CSCT, when, in fact, Scottsdale, through Miller, was continuing to guide the business with Unicorn.

In April 2014, when Diekmann was unable to obtain the information he needed on a deposit of stock certificates by Unicorn from Ruzicka at CSCT, he emailed Miller a copy of his request to Ruzicka, saying he had not received a response. And Miller, in turn, forwarded the email directly to two persons at Unicorn, Cem Can and Chinique Lewis, asking them to "please address this ASAP."⁸¹ Diekmann denied that he had asked Miller to obtain the information for him, but the correspondence has no other reasonable explanation. Diekmann's testimony in this regard was not credible.⁸²

In May 2014, Miller obtained information from Chinique Lewis at Unicorn about the purported beneficial owner of the entity that had deposited VPLM stock through Unicorn for sale by Scottsdale and forwarded that to Diekmann. The email correspondence was included in the VPLM due diligence package.⁸³

The degree to which Miller corresponded directly with Unicorn and managed the Unicorn deposits raises the question whether there was any need for CSCT at all. As discussed below in the credibility section, Hurry's decision to route Scottsdale's FFI business through CSCT had little discernible business rationale. His implementation of that decision and staffing of CSCT with Ruzicka, who was unqualified to run CSCT, coupled with the evidence of Miller's continuing role as a "back door" to Scottsdale, demonstrate that CSCT was a façade.

Third, we interpret certain email correspondence between Miller and a client as suggesting that the Firm assisted its clients "all the time" to conceal beneficial ownership of stock. Scottsdale supposedly had a policy not to accept business from Canadian citizens residing in Canada, but, when a client in the Bahamas asked on behalf of a friend whether a Canadian citizen residing in Canada could do business with Scottsdale, Miller suggested that the friend set up a corporation to do the business. Miller called it a "work around." The client responded, "If they get a corporation set up US, Panama, Belize or wherever won[']t your Compliance want to know who is beneficial owner?" Miller responded, "Yes they will but the account holder is the corporation. Trust me on this one, we do it all the time."⁸⁴

⁸⁰ CX-311, at 1.

⁸¹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1668-71; CX-221.

⁸² CX-221; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1665-71. In denying that he intended for Miller to obtain the information from Unicorn that Ruzicka had failed to supply, Diekmann testified that he had no interest whatever in whether he obtained the information. Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1665-71. That statement is not credible. If he had no interest, there would have been no reason to send the email to Miller.

⁸³ RX-3, at 17.

⁸⁴ CX-210; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1672-77.

We are unconvinced by Diekmann's benign reading of this correspondence. He testified that he thought that the client was asking something different, "Won't your compliance know that a Canadian resident owns the LLC and, therefore, won't they reject the deposit or account opening?"⁸⁵ Diekmann's interpretation is a rewriting of the client's words. It ignores that Miller's implicit point was that the corporation would be identified as the account holder, not the Canadian owner. That is why the Canadian's deposit would not be rejected. Furthermore, Diekmann's interpretation does not reflect the tone of Miller's comments. When Miller suggested that the shares could be put in the name of the corporation, he treated that as a magical solution to the problem, saying "and wa-la! We get it done that way."⁸⁶ Finally, if Diekmann's interpretation of the question were correct, then Miller never answered the question. Miller never explained why the Firm would not reject the deposit if it knew that a Canadian resident owned the LLC.

Fourth, according to Diekmann, after Miller left the Firm in April 2016, the Firm discovered that he had set up his work email to be forwarded to his personal email.⁸⁷ This means that Miller could have engaged in communications with FFIs like Unicorn "off the record," avoiding oversight. Although Diekmann testified that all of Scottsdale's emails remained on its system, and were not removed by Miller, Diekmann provided no basis for knowing whether that was true. Diekmann testified that the Firm had asked Miller to confirm he had not removed any emails from the Firm's system but that Miller had not responded.⁸⁸

The inquiry suggests that the Firm in fact does *not* know whether Miller removed emails from the Firm's system. There was no evidence that the Firm employed any technical analysis of its systems to find out if emails or other information had been deleted. There also was no evidence that the Firm made any effort to recover any email correspondence that Miller might have had with customers using only his personal email. Thus, it is undisputed that Miller communicated directly with Unicorn, and it is impossible to know the number or substance of all those communications.

Given the allegations against Unicorn and Cem Can in the *Bandfield* indictment, the inability to review Miller's communications with them is a serious concern. The Firm's reaction—simply to ask Miller to confirm he did not remove any emails from the Scottsdale's system—is an inadequate response. If Miller took emails from Scottsdale's system or deleted them, he would hardly be likely to confess to that wrongdoing. That is particularly so where the emails were with persons subject to a criminal indictment and might place Miller under suspicion. The request to a potential wrongdoer to confirm that he committed no wrongdoing is almost farcical. The inadequacy of the Firm's response mirrors the inadequacy of its checklist

⁸⁵ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1673.

⁸⁶ CX-210, at 5.

⁸⁷ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1662-63.

⁸⁸ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1663-64.

approach to Rule 144 due diligence and contributes to our conclusion that stringent sanctions are required here.

c. Jay Noiman

Jay Noiman joined Scottsdale in September 2011 and left at the end of December 2014.⁸⁹ Prior to October 2013, when DiBlasi became CCO, Noiman was the Firm's CCO.⁹⁰ He was on the Management Committee from approximately January 2013 through January 2014. He served as vice chairman of the Management Committee and second in command after Cruz. During the relevant period, Noiman was the trading manager and had responsibility for supervising the traders and sales staff. He identified DiBlasi as his supervisor.⁹¹

Noiman was responsible for reviewing the blotter for restricted stocks. He focused on FFI's,⁹² and he approved the account opening documents for CSCT, which was an FFI. Noiman never considered not approving the CSCT account. He knew at the time that it was a referral from Hurry.⁹³

Noiman also signed documents in the due diligence packages for the transactions in this case. His signature appears on the Checklist under the heading "Broker Approval." Between the heading and Noiman's signature was the statement that he had carefully reviewed the Checklist and the supporting documents and that to the best of his knowledge "any resale will be made in compliance with firm policy and all applicable laws."⁹⁴ By that language, the Checklist makes it appear that Noiman was certifying that he believed that the transaction would comply with the law.

Noiman testified, however, that his signature signified only that all the necessary forms were in the file—a check-the-box function.⁹⁵ The parties stipulated that Noiman's signatures on the documents in the three due diligence packages meant the same thing: he checked that the documents were filled out but did not substantively approve or review them.⁹⁶ Thus, Noiman's signature on the Checklist created only a façade of compliance and accountability.

⁸⁹ Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1041-42.

⁹⁰ Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1043.

⁹¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 81, 564; Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1043-44.

⁹² Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1045-46, 1049-51.

⁹³ Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1139-40.

⁹⁴ RX-1, at 2; RX-2, at 2; RX-3, at 2.

⁹⁵ Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1156-68, 1171-73.

⁹⁶ Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1172-73.

During the relevant period, Noiman, like Miller, had contact with one of the FFIs involved in this case, Titan.⁹⁷ Noiman talked with Rohn Knowles of Titan at least monthly and sometimes weekly and engaged in email correspondence with Knowles.⁹⁸ Both Titan and Knowles were defendants in the *Bandfield* indictment. As discussed below, Noiman obtained information directly from Knowles, which he forwarded to Cruz, to resolve a serious potential problem with a CSCT deposit of VPLM stock. CSCT's staff was not involved.⁹⁹ Thus, Noiman was another "back door" to a CSCT customer, raising once again the question why CSCT even existed.

3. CSCT And Its Key Figures

a. Gregory V. Ruzicka

Prior to joining CSCT, Gregory Ruzicka was a real estate attorney in Newport Beach, California. He began his legal career advising exclusively on real estate issues and continued in the real estate field. He did not advise on the federal securities laws.¹⁰⁰ Before beginning work at CSCT, Ruzicka had no experience with Rule 144 or any of the other exemptions from registration under the federal securities laws.¹⁰¹ Nor did Ruzicka have any prior experience with Cayman Islands law, the Bank Secrecy Act, or anti-money laundering rules and regulations.¹⁰²

Ruzicka met John Hurry in 2002 when Hurry hired him to do some work on a commercial real estate issue. From time to time after that, Ruzicka did work for Hurry, but none of that work involved the securities laws or Hurry's broker-dealer business.¹⁰³

Later, Ruzicka suffered a substantial financial setback that left him out of work and adrift.¹⁰⁴ At this point, Ruzicka asked Hurry to give him a job at a bicycle shop that Hurry owned. Hurry admitted that he was "kind of taken back a little bit."¹⁰⁵ Hurry proposed instead

⁹⁷ Prior to the events at issue, Noiman was involved in the customer due diligence on Titan when it was a direct customer of Scottsdale. On January 18, 2012, Noiman signed a due diligence form as a principal of the Firm representing that to the best of his knowledge the information provided by Titan was true and correct. Noiman also signed the form as the person giving compliance approval. CX-242, at 48.

⁹⁸ Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1185-87. Ruzicka was under the impression that Titan "had a special pipeline to Scottsdale." CX-178, at 110. He spoke of a young woman as being the "private liaison for Titan." CX-178, at 110.

⁹⁹ CX-296; CX-294; Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1187-98. *See infra* at ____.

¹⁰⁰ CX-178, at 12-20.

¹⁰¹ CX-178, at 22-23.

¹⁰² CX-178, at 18-19, 22-24.

¹⁰³ CX-178, at 25-29.

¹⁰⁴ CX-178, at 14-15, 19-20, 30, 38, 54.

¹⁰⁵ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1631, 1635-36. Hurry told D'Mura that Ruzicka had asked, "Would you be able to help me out? Is there any position or something? Could I work at your bike shop or your ice cream shop? You know, you don't have to pay me a lot, but at this point, I don't have anything. I have \$50 in my pocket." Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2262.

that Ruzicka go to the Cayman Islands to run Hurry's operation there. According to Ruzicka, Hurry told him that Ruzicka would be running the business and acting as Hurry's lawyer.¹⁰⁶ Ruzicka had been to the Cayman Islands once before to go scuba diving, but he was willing to relocate because he had been through such a hard time and wanted a "change of scenery."¹⁰⁷ Hurry told Ruzicka that he had 30 days to read about Rule 144,¹⁰⁸ so Ruzicka read Rule 144, the Securities Act of 1933, and what he could find on the internet about the Rule 144 exemption.¹⁰⁹

In mid-October 2013, Hurry flew with Ruzicka in Hurry's private plane to the Cayman Islands so that Ruzicka could begin work.¹¹⁰ Ruzicka remained with CSCT until mid-October 2014.¹¹¹

Diekmann testified that if CSCT had been his business, Ruzicka would not have been his choice to run the Cayman Islands broker-dealer. Ruzicka lacked securities experience, and he seemed disorganized, sending materials to Scottsdale piecemeal and failing to follow instructions.¹¹²

Ruzicka never had a securities license or registered with FINRA. Consequently, FINRA had no jurisdiction to compel him to testify. Ruzicka testified voluntarily at an OTR, and he considered testifying voluntarily at the hearing. However, after being contacted by counsel for Respondents, as discussed below in the credibility section, Ruzicka declined to testify. Consequently, Ruzicka's entire OTR was admitted into evidence.

b. Craig D'Mura

Craig D'Mura graduated from Arizona State University in May 2006 and shortly afterward began work at Vanguard Group in the retirement participant services department. After a year and a half, he went to law school at Syracuse University. Although he finished law school, he never took the bar examination and did not become licensed as an attorney. He returned to Phoenix and started a broker training program in 2010. However, he did not feel that being a broker was his "calling."¹¹³

D'Mura was unemployed in summer of 2011. He responded to an advertisement on Craigslist for an operations position at Scottsdale. In July or August 2011, after an interview with

¹⁰⁶ CX-178, at 38-40.

¹⁰⁷ CX-178, at 54.

¹⁰⁸ CX-178, at 40.

¹⁰⁹ CX-178, at 22, 62-63.

¹¹⁰ CX-178, at 37.

¹¹¹ CX-178, at 231.

¹¹² Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 759-61, 765.

¹¹³ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2246-47.

Justine Hurry, Scottsdale hired him. Prior to his work at Scottsdale, D'Mura was not even aware of the microcap securities industry.¹¹⁴

After two or three weeks in the operations position, D'Mura joined the Rule 144 team. His training was ongoing. By summer of 2013, he was handling more complicated deposits and was able to review files as a principal. However, he did not review deposits by FFIs.¹¹⁵

In summer of 2013, Hurry began discussing with Scottsdale staff his plan to open a broker-dealer in the Cayman Islands, and Cruz asked D'Mura if he might be interested in working there. D'Mura began filling out the paperwork necessary if he took the position in the Cayman Islands, and in January 2014, he flew with Hurry in Hurry's private airplane to the Cayman Islands to visit and consider a position with CSCT.¹¹⁶ D'Mura decided to take the position, returned to Phoenix for a few days, and then went back to the Cayman Islands on January 28, 2014. He stayed with CSCT only about six weeks. After concluding that the situation was intolerable and would never improve, he left on March 14, 2014.¹¹⁷

c. CSCT

i. Hurry Set Up CSCT

In early 2013, Hurry set up CSCT in the Cayman Islands.¹¹⁸ He became its director and intended to have overall management supervision of it and its business.¹¹⁹ Through a chain of entities, a Hurry family trust owns CSCT, and Hurry and his wife serve as co-trustees of the trust.¹²⁰

Hurry claimed that he set up CSCT because Alpine, his U.S. clearing firm, wanted to be relieved of IRS tax withholding obligations. According to Hurry, Alpine wanted to do business only with FFIs that had agreed with the IRS to take on tax withholding obligations, thereby becoming what is known as a qualified intermediary ("QI").¹²¹ Hurry testified that withholding obligations are complicated and burdensome.¹²² He also testified that there are risks in getting

¹¹⁴ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2247-48.

¹¹⁵ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2248-51.

¹¹⁶ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2252-58.

¹¹⁷ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2266, 2306-09.

¹¹⁸ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1329, 1333-34.

¹¹⁹ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1394-95; CX-160, at 3.³

¹²⁰ CX-21, at 2.

¹²¹ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1373-74, 1552-61; Hearing Tr. (Frankel) 2345-46, 2349-51. Resp. PH Br. 8.

¹²² Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1554-57.

the paperwork wrong and incurring penalties, and that there were tax advantages to generating and retaining funds offshore.¹²³

Hurry's testimony was at a high level of generality, and there was no corroborating evidence to show the analysis. There was no evidence regarding how Alpine made the decision that it would only do business with QIs, or who made the decision. There was no evidence other than Hurry's testimony to demonstrate that CSCT made business sense. It is unclear how the expense of establishing and staffing a separate offshore office was less burdensome than Alpine's withholding obligations, or why the same goal of eliminating Alpine's withholding obligation could not have been achieved less expensively by requiring the Firm's FFI customers to obtain QI certification in order to do business with Scottsdale and Alpine. Moreover, since Hurry ultimately bore the costs regardless of which entity had the obligation, Alpine or CSCT, we are not persuaded that the claimed reason for creating CSCT made sense.¹²⁴

Nor did the creation of CSCT make sense from the perspective of achieving regulatory compliance. As Cruz agreed, it is easier to spot problems with direct accounts than through an FFI like CSCT that operated as an intermediary for sub-accounts and sub-sub-accounts.¹²⁵

Hurry's intense involvement in CSCT's operations did not abate after he hired Ruzicka in October 2013 to run CSCT's day-to-day operations. Hurry located and rented office space for CSCT before Ruzicka began work and then continued to closely oversee the details of establishing and opening the office after Ruzicka arrived. Hurry obtained a floor plan from Ruzicka, told Ruzicka it was not correct, and asked Ruzicka to take measurements and create a revision.¹²⁶ Hurry provided Ruzicka with contact information for shippers to ship furniture Hurry had found for the office.¹²⁷ Hurry reviewed the proposed CSCT website design and asked about the costs.¹²⁸ Hurry made the final decision on hiring a bookkeeper¹²⁹ and all the decisions on entering contracts.¹³⁰

¹²³ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1554-57.

¹²⁴ Hurry testified that he had allocated between \$4 and \$5 million for the project and had invested well over seven figures in CSCT. Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1552. When asked what he had taken out of CSCT, he said "Zero." Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1553.

¹²⁵ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 220.

¹²⁶ CX-48; CX-50; CX-52; CX-55; CX-75.

¹²⁷ CX-52; CX-53.

¹²⁸ CX-49; CX-84.

¹²⁹ CX-178, at 43-44.

¹³⁰ CX-178, at 46.

Hurry instructed Ruzicka on fundamental business operations, as well. For example, he explained to Ruzicka that he should open a separate bank account for customer funds to keep their funds separate from CSCT's funds.¹³¹

Hurry decided that CSCT should be in the Special Economic Zone within the Cayman Islands, and that it should apply to be exempt from regulation by the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority ("CIMA"). In addition, Hurry instructed Ruzicka to apply to the IRS for QI status.¹³² Although Ruzicka expressed concerns about the obligations and representations associated with QI status and was reluctant to make the required representations without further study, Hurry insisted that Ruzicka do it.¹³³

Hurry determined the fees and commissions CSCT clients would pay. He instructed Ruzicka to take whatever Scottsdale charged CSCT and tack on 200 basis points.¹³⁴ Hurry in turn obtained a discount from Scottsdale on its charges to CSCT.¹³⁵ By this means, he kept the cost of doing business through CSCT roughly the same as doing business directly with Scottsdale. Otherwise, the rerouting of the FFI business through CSCT would have made no economic sense for the customers. However, there was no evidence that it made economic sense for Hurry to keep customer expenses roughly the same as they would have been working directly with Scottsdale when he was incurring substantial extra expenses setting up and staffing the extra office in the Cayman Islands.¹³⁶

Hurry was intimately involved in setting up CSCT's technical systems. Hurry made the arrangements for computer software for CSCT and instructed Ruzicka to download Office 2010 for two users.¹³⁷ Similarly, Hurry selected computer equipment for CSCT and brought it down to the Cayman Islands in mid-January 2014 at the same time that he brought D'Mura to look at joining CSCT. D'Mura testified that Hurry set up the office network for CSCT.¹³⁸ When Ruzicka showed Hurry the information he planned to send to clients, Hurry told him he should make it look better and instructed him on how to do that. Hurry told Ruzicka to print to PDF and get a clean file to email customers. He advised Ruzicka that he could do that on his computer.¹³⁹

¹³¹ CX-83.

¹³² CX-178, at 48-53.

¹³³ CX-105; CX-107; CX-178, at 50-53.

¹³⁴ CX-178, at 106-09.

¹³⁵ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 141-43; Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2294-95.

¹³⁶ Hurry and Diekmann testified that routing the FFI business through CSCT was actually a little less expensive for customers than dealing with Scottsdale directly. Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1642-44; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1652-53. If true, that testimony further undercuts the business justification for CSCT.

¹³⁷ CX-94; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1461.

¹³⁸ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2263, 2266-68.

¹³⁹ CX-77; CX-78.

Ruzicka, by contrast, was fairly unsophisticated about technology. He was vague on even identifying the programs that he used at CSCT.¹⁴⁰

ii. Hurry Micro-Managed CSCT's Business

Although Hurry portrayed Ruzicka as being in charge of CSCT,¹⁴¹ the evidence is otherwise. Hurry micro-managed CSCT, and he bullied Ruzicka and D'Mura to get them to do what he wanted them to do. Hurry also closely tracked CSCT's business with Scottsdale and with its FFI customers.

Ruzicka considered himself to be only an intermediary.¹⁴² Hurry dictated what should be done, and Ruzicka complied. Ruzicka said with respect to Hurry, "You don't discuss; you do as you are ordered."¹⁴³ For example, when Ruzicka protested that he was not comfortable with signing off on the QI application, Hurry responded, "Stupid, just do it." Ruzicka said that he "kind of dropped the subject at that point."¹⁴⁴ Ruzicka signed off, despite his discomfort, because he knew if he did not "there is a ticket back to LA coming tomorrow."¹⁴⁵

Similarly, although Ruzicka thought that Unicorn engaged in some suspicious trading and constant pressure from Cem Can at Unicorn gave him the "creeps," Ruzicka did not think he had authority to terminate the relationship with Unicorn. If he had done so without clear authority from Hurry, he thought that would have been his last day at CSCT.¹⁴⁶ D'Mura confirmed that neither he nor Ruzicka could terminate a client relationship, and, although they hated dealing with Cem Can at Unicorn, they did not consider it an option to turn away the business.¹⁴⁷

Some of the initial customers of CSCT were pre-existing customers of Scottsdale. When Ruzicka asked the commonsense question why the pre-existing business was going to flow through the new entity, Hurry told him to shut up. After that, Ruzicka just did as he was told.¹⁴⁸

Ruzicka testified in his OTR, and D'Mura testified at the hearing, that Hurry barraged them with telephone calls while they were working at CSCT. Hurry called Ruzicka almost every day, sometimes multiple times. He called D'Mura less often, probably a couple of times a week.

¹⁴⁰ CX-77; CX-178, at 24-25.

¹⁴¹ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1433, 1436, 1549-50. Hurry claimed that he hired Ruzicka to fulfill an "executive role." Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1648.

¹⁴² CX-178, at 46.

¹⁴³ CX-178, at 51.

¹⁴⁴ CX-178, at 51-52.

¹⁴⁵ CX-22; CX-178, at 52-53.

¹⁴⁶ CX-178, at 177-80, 188-89.

¹⁴⁷ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2283-86.

¹⁴⁸ CX-178, at 79-80.

The calls could come at all hours as well.¹⁴⁹ Often the calls were followed by demanding, abrupt, and increasingly impatient emails saying “call me.”¹⁵⁰ In one email, Hurry wrote “Your phone is not working TURN IT ON. I need a call.”¹⁵¹ In another he wrote, “Call me in 60 minutes. DO YOU NOT UNDERSTAND THAT?”¹⁵² In another the subject line was “pick up your phone!!!!!!!!!!”¹⁵³

Hurry developed an Excel spreadsheet to track various aspects of CSCT’s business. Although Hurry characterized it in his testimony as an “empowerment tool” that enabled his people to track their work for themselves without his having to keep track of their progress,¹⁵⁴ that characterization is not consistent with the evidence.

The spreadsheet tracked daily gross production, number of trades placed, certificate deposits approved, new certificate deposits received, and number of new accounts. It also tracked Ruzicka’s start and finish times.¹⁵⁵ Ruzicka said that in telephone calls Hurry would even ask about how many cigarettes he had smoked during the day.¹⁵⁶ An email from Hurry corroborated Ruzicka’s testimony. In the email, Hurry told Ruzicka “Need all the below,” including start time, finish time, and “number of cig breaks.”¹⁵⁷ Hurry acknowledged that the email included an inquiry about cigarette breaks, but he claimed that he was trying to help Ruzicka get himself organized. He claimed to know that Ruzicka was only in the office for ten minutes in an hour, which meant things were not getting done.¹⁵⁸

Hurry wanted the numbers prepared every day, even if he did not ask for the information every day. Ruzicka and D’Mura prepared themselves for Hurry’s frequent telephone calls and tried to have talking points and updated information ready to go if Hurry should call.¹⁵⁹

Hurry tracked Ruzicka’s and D’Mura’s contacts with CSCT customers, including the FFIs involved in the transactions at issue. Ruzicka testified that in their frequent telephone calls Hurry would ask him about whether he had talked to Rohn Knowles at Titan or Cem Can at

¹⁴⁹ Hearing Tr. (D’Mura) 2301-02; CX-178, at 67-73.

¹⁵⁰ CX-63; CX-68; CX-71; CX-74; CX-118; CX-121; CX-126; CX-127.

¹⁵¹ CX-121.

¹⁵² CX-127.

¹⁵³ CX-118.

¹⁵⁴ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1433-39.

¹⁵⁵ CX-131; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1433-34.

¹⁵⁶ CX-178, at 140-41.

¹⁵⁷ CX-133; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1438-39.

¹⁵⁸ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1438-40.

¹⁵⁹ CX-178, at 140-41; Hearing Tr. (D’Mura) 2301-04; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1436-40.

Unicorn or other particular people from the Bahamas, Panama, or Belize.¹⁶⁰ D'Mura testified that Hurry would ask about customers, not particular deposits, but he and Ruzicka did discuss with Hurry how they were doing on specific deposits.¹⁶¹ For example, in email correspondence and telephone conversations, Ruzicka discussed with Hurry the amount of trading in at least two of the symbols at issue here, NHPI and VPLM.¹⁶²

D'Mura decided to leave CSCT and the Cayman Islands, in part, as a result of Hurry's constant demands. Hurry had called on a day that Ruzicka was attending a wedding as best man and D'Mura was working at his rented condominium instead of the office. Hurry expressed aggravation that neither of them was in the office and spoke of "having a come to Jesus moment" when he arrived in the Cayman Islands in a few days.¹⁶³ D'Mura then packed his bag and said good-bye to Ruzicka, who expressed the wish that he could leave, too. However, Ruzicka said he had nowhere to go and no alternative. D'Mura left before Hurry arrived; Ruzicka stayed.¹⁶⁴

Eventually, in October 2014, Ruzicka also left CSCT. Its business had dwindled in reaction to the SEC complaint in *Amogear* and the *Bandfield* indictment.¹⁶⁵ According to Ruzicka, in October 2014 Hurry offered him other positions back in the United States, but Ruzicka concluded that he "did not want to work any long[er] for that man," referring to Hurry. Ruzicka said, "I don't care what he offered, you know. Incremental value of that last dollar just was not worth it."¹⁶⁶

iii. Hurry Prospected For CSCT Customers

CSCT did not advertise¹⁶⁷ or engage in cold-calling to try to generate business.¹⁶⁸ Hurry's business plan was for CSCT to develop clients through contacts and referrals,¹⁶⁹ but Ruzicka, who had no prior industry experience, had no network he could cultivate for potential customers.

¹⁶⁰ CX-178, at 74-77, 84-85.

¹⁶¹ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2304-05.

¹⁶² CX-132.

¹⁶³ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2308-09. Hurry confirmed that he was frustrated that Ruzicka and D'Mura were not in the office. Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1602-03. When people called CSCT and did not get an answer, they called Alpine trying to find Hurry. Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1622-23.

¹⁶⁴ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2306-10.

¹⁶⁵ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 237-38.

¹⁶⁶ CX-178, at 232.

¹⁶⁷ CX-178, at 218. In contrast, even though Scottsdale had been in business for ten years, it advertised for business. Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 116.

¹⁶⁸ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2279-80.

¹⁶⁹ CX-160, at 3; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1393.

Customers simply appeared seeking to establish a business relationship with CSCT. They were referred to CSCT by Hurry or by someone at Scottsdale or Alpine.¹⁷⁰ Ruzicka testified at his OTR that he had an “express representation” that two of the FFIs involved in this case, Titan and Unicorn, were referred by Hurry.¹⁷¹ Ruzicka did not know how Montage “found” CSCT.¹⁷²

At the hearing, Hurry flatly contradicted Ruzicka’s testimony that Hurry had referred Titan and Unicorn to CSCT.¹⁷³ We do not credit Hurry’s testimony because he gave the testimony only after he knew that Ruzicka would not appear at the hearing to dispute Hurry’s statement. To the extent that Hurry means that the referral came from someone at Scottsdale, we do not regard that as proving that Hurry was not the ultimate source of the referral, even if he made the link to CSCT through Scottsdale. Hurry had a pre-existing relationship with Titan while it was a direct customer of Scottsdale,¹⁷⁴ and he admitted talking to existing Scottsdale customers about his plan to establish CSCT.¹⁷⁵ He also admitted, as discussed below, to talking directly to Titan and other customers even after they became CSCT customers.

Hurry admits that he had at least one face-to-face meeting with Montage in Panama¹⁷⁶ and another face-to-face meeting with Unicorn in Belize.¹⁷⁷ He flew to Central America in January 2014 for these meetings, after dropping off D’Mura on his initial visit to CSCT. He did not take Ruzicka with him.¹⁷⁸

At the hearing, Hurry claimed not to recall discussing business with either Montage or Unicorn during these visits.¹⁷⁹ Hurry claimed that he went to Montage because Ruzicka had asked him to evaluate a back-office system Montage was using to see if it would be suitable for CSCT. Hurry did not identify the nature of the system. He said that in the end they determined that it was not suitable for CSCT. He did not explain why it was unsuitable.¹⁸⁰

We do not find Hurry’s testimony with respect to his visit with Montage credible. Ruzicka was not technologically sophisticated and was too subordinate to suggest such a thing to

¹⁷⁰ CX-178, at 104, 167-68.

¹⁷¹ CX-178, at 203-04.

¹⁷² CX-178, at 203.

¹⁷³ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1410, 1416.

¹⁷⁴ Hurry was listed as the registered representative and financial consultant for Titan when it was a direct customer of Scottsdale. Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1413-14, 1610-12; CX-242, at 44, 48.

¹⁷⁵ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1401-06.

¹⁷⁶ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1412-13, 1612-13.

¹⁷⁷ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1406, 1422, 1613-14.

¹⁷⁸ Hearing Tr. (D’Mura) 2300-01; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1617-19.

¹⁷⁹ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1406, 1618-19.

¹⁸⁰ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1612-13, 1617-19.

Hurry. Furthermore, D'Mura testified that he remembered no discussion of evaluating a back office system.¹⁸¹ Hurry's testimony was vague and lacked specificity, and, again, Hurry gave his testimony only after it was clear that Ruzicka would not appear at the hearing. Hurry knew he would not be contradicted.

Hurry counseled Ruzicka to do business with Montage and, in particular, to do business with a person who was not identified in Montage documents as being connected with it. Ruzicka testified in his OTR that he was unclear about the role of a Montage contact with whom Hurry spoke from time to time. When Ruzicka asked Hurry about the contact, Hurry said to him "Hey, that's fine, you can interface with that guy. He's part of the operation."¹⁸² This evidence shows that Hurry knew more about Montage than Ruzicka did, and that Hurry was instructing Ruzicka with regard to customer dealings.

Hurry claimed at the hearing that he only went to Belize to meet with Cem Can at Unicorn (both named defendants in the *Bandfield* indictment) because Ruzicka asked him to do so. According to Hurry, Ruzicka was trying to open the account and Can had requested a meeting with Hurry. Hurry said it is not uncommon for people to want to meet the owner of a business.¹⁸³ However, in somewhat inconsistent testimony, Hurry testified that he did not recall discussing business during his visit with Unicorn.¹⁸⁴

Hurry's hearing testimony was impeached by his OTR. In his OTR, Hurry testified that Cem Can had asked him whether it would be better to do business with Scottsdale or CSCT. Hurry told him that it might be quicker to go directly to Scottsdale, but there could be "holdups" because of potential withholding there. On the other hand, because CSCT was a QI, Hurry told Can the "holdup" would be eliminated.¹⁸⁵

There was additional evidence that Hurry discussed business with Unicorn. In late January 2014, Chinique Lewis of Unicorn sent an email to Eric Miller, Diekmann, and Ruzicka asking for Hurry to join a call on the processes and procedures to be used in connection with Unicorn's business with CSCT and Scottsdale. She said from "our personal face to face conversation with Mr. Hurry, I am certain he will not mind getting on a call."¹⁸⁶

With respect to the request to involve him on a call with Unicorn, Hurry testified that it was no more than the common desire to deal with the person at the head of an organization.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸¹ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2300-01.

¹⁸² CX-178, at 123-24.

¹⁸³ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1613-14.

¹⁸⁴ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1406.

¹⁸⁵ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1407-10, 1421-22.

¹⁸⁶ CX-119.

¹⁸⁷ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1432

We find his explanation unconvincing. He traveled to a potential CSCT client without taking Ruzicka, the designated head of CSCT, discussed that client doing business with CSCT, and was viewed by the client as an important participant in the client's business dealings with CSCT.

Although he denied it, Hurry provided other leads and referrals to Ruzicka, too. In an email dated November 17, 2013, for example, Hurry wrote to Ruzicka, "Referrals and Leads call me on them." In the email, Hurry provided a couple of names and telephone numbers. One of those named was an "Andrew Farmer."¹⁸⁸ On November 20, 2013, Ruzicka wrote Hurry that he had tried to call "Andy" at the number Hurry had given him but the call did not go through. That same day Hurry provided another telephone number.¹⁸⁹ Hurry maintained he had identified the people in the email to Ruzicka not as prospects or potential customers but because they knew FFIs.¹⁹⁰

Hurry revealed that, in fact, he was guiding Ruzicka's customer dealings, when he volunteered that Ruzicka did not in the end talk to the people Hurry had identified in the email. Hurry said that he had afterward found out that they had some "issues" and had told Ruzicka, "Don't bother."¹⁹¹

D'Mura testified that while he was at CSCT Hurry and Ruzicka met with another potential customer, Caledonian Securities. CSCT received over 50 Caledonian deposits afterward.¹⁹²

Despite this evidence that Hurry was critical to developing CSCT's business, Hurry portrayed himself as offering only slight help to Ruzicka. He claimed that all he did was to recommend to Ruzicka that he get a book of international financial institutions and prospect for customers using that.¹⁹³ This testimony is not credible. Since Ruzicka and D'Mura engaged in no cold calling, they had no use for a book to help them prospect for customers.¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, such an approach to business promotion—cold calling people out of a book—was not likely to be successful. Hurry would certainly have known that, and he would not have been satisfied with

¹⁸⁸ CX-51.

¹⁸⁹ CX-62.

¹⁹⁰ Hearing Tr. 1401-04; CX-51.

¹⁹¹ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1404.

¹⁹² Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2295-97. D'Mura testified that he received the initial documents from Caledonian in the last week before he left Scottsdale and laid them out on a table to review, so he was well aware of the volume submitted to CSCT. The Caledonian-related deposits were not passed on to Scottsdale before he left CSCT. Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2317.

¹⁹³ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1403-04.

¹⁹⁴ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2279.

that approach to marketing CSCT. He wanted CSCT to be successful and worked hard to make it so.¹⁹⁵

iv. Hurry Tried To Conceal His Involvement With CSCT

Both Ruzicka and D'Mura had the impression that secrecy was important to Hurry. Ruzicka said that Hurry "flat told me, 'I'm going to Caymans, because that way I don't have to give anything to anybody.'"¹⁹⁶ D'Mura testified that when he first flew down to the Caymans with Hurry, Hurry spent time discussing with him the privacy laws of the Cayman Islands. Hurry noted that some of them were criminal, not just civil.¹⁹⁷ In so doing, Hurry stressed the serious consequences if a person failed to comply.

Hurry denied any particular interest in secrecy.¹⁹⁸ Hurry's denial is not credible. We find that he was intensely concerned with secrecy and concealing his involvement with CSCT's customers and business. His concern was manifested in the following ways.

(a) Use Of Email Address That Hid His Identity

Hurry used an email address that hid his identity. When Ruzicka started working at CSCT, he used as his work email address gr@csct.ky. The address identified him by his initials, the firm by its initials, and the Cayman Islands location by the last two letters. Ruzicka set up a similar email address for Hurry, using Hurry's first initial and last name: jhurry@csct.ky.¹⁹⁹

Hurry had an extreme reaction to his email address. Ruzicka said that Hurry "just crucified me." Hurry told Ruzicka that the address was too long, and instructed Ruzicka to change the individual identifier to x.²⁰⁰ Thus, during the relevant period Hurry's email address at CSCT was x@csct.ky, which did not identify Hurry.

At the hearing, Hurry repeated the same explanation for changing his email address. He testified that he wanted an address that was short.²⁰¹

We find Hurry's explanation to be false. He volunteered elsewhere in his testimony that his main email address is JHurry@hurry.com.²⁰² Thus, Hurry's main email address is constructed in the same way that Ruzicka initially constructed Hurry's address at CSCT. If that construction

¹⁹⁵ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1417-18; CX-178, at 74-75, 135-42.

¹⁹⁶ CX-178, at 36.

¹⁹⁷ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2259.

¹⁹⁸ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1361-62, 1364-65.

¹⁹⁹ CX-178, at 146-47.

²⁰⁰ CX-178, at 146-47.

²⁰¹ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1459.

²⁰² Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1426.

was not too long for Hurry's main email address, then it was not too long for his CSCT address. Furthermore, we find that the choice of x instead of an identifier such as JH was designed to conceal Hurry's involvement in CSCT business and perhaps give him the possibility of denying that it was his address. Finally, the extreme nature of his reaction to the initial email address—making Ruzicka feel almost “crucified”—strongly suggests that Hurry was concerned with something more important than having a short email address.

(b) Assertion Of Attorney-Client Privilege

Hurry insisted on asserting the attorney-client privilege even where it was not appropriate. Hurry almost always marked his emails with Ruzicka as attorney-client privileged. He did so even when his emails simply asked Ruzicka to call him and when his emails concerned only floor plans and office furniture and the like, which emails neither sought nor received nor reflected any legal advice.²⁰³ In contrast, Ruzicka rarely marked his emails to Hurry as privileged,²⁰⁴ even though Hurry instructed Ruzicka that he should mark all his email correspondence with Hurry as attorney-client privileged.²⁰⁵

Hurry claimed at the hearing that he marked his emails privileged because Ruzicka advised him to use the privilege designation.²⁰⁶ That claim is not credible in light of Ruzicka's practice of not marking his emails with Hurry as privileged. Nor is Hurry's claim consistent with the written record that it was Hurry who instructed Ruzicka to use the privilege designation, not the other way around. We find that Hurry wanted all his correspondence with Ruzicka marked privileged because he believed that he might be able to shield that correspondence from future regulatory scrutiny or litigation discovery. Similarly, in his hearing testimony, Hurry sometimes used the phrase “on advice of counsel” in his answer, as though it were a talisman against more probing inquiry or criticism.²⁰⁷

(c) Avoiding Written Record

Hurry tried to avoid creating a written record. Ruzicka wrote in an email to Diekmann that Hurry had directed him to take a particular deposit, specifying the symbol, SVLE. Diekmann forwarded the email to Hurry and DiBlasi. When Hurry saw the email, he “tore” into Ruzicka

²⁰³ CX-48; CX-49; CX-50; CX-51; CX-52; CX-55; CX-58; CX-62; CX-63; CX-71; CX-75; CX-77; CX-78; CX-79; CX-83; CX-84; CX-92; CX-94; CX-107; CX-129; CX-151.

²⁰⁴ CX-53; CX-62; CX-75; CX-77; CX-79; CX-84; CX-151.

²⁰⁵ CX-53 and CX-84.

²⁰⁶ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1485.

²⁰⁷ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1333-35.

“like you wouldn’t believe.”²⁰⁸ Hurry told Ruzicka something to the effect of “Never put in writing that I am directly involved in business decisions.”²⁰⁹

Ruzicka said that Hurry did not want any permanent record of his communications.²¹⁰ For that reason he communicated with Ruzicka primarily through FaceTime, the iPhone tool for video communications. Hurry called Ruzicka frequently, sometimes as many as four times in a day. He called early in the morning and as late as 9:30 p.m.; he called on weekends as well as business days. Ruzicka viewed the video calls as invasive, but Hurry told him that he used FaceTime because it was free.²¹¹ Notably, emails are similarly “free” communications once you have paid the internet provider, and Hurry would have incurred no additional expense if he had communicated with Ruzicka by email.

Hurry disputed Ruzicka’s testimony that he did not want a written record of his communications with CSCT.²¹² However, D’Mura confirmed that Hurry did not want a written record of his involvement in CSCT business. D’Mura testified that Hurry expressed to him and Ruzicka both specifically and generally not to send him documents.²¹³

(d) Use Of FaceTime To Conceal Contacts With Customers

Hurry also communicated with CSCT customers (including all three FFIs involved in this case) using FaceTime, thereby concealing his contacts with them. Hurry would call Ruzicka at CSCT and ask Ruzicka to call a customer on CSCT’s landline. Then Ruzicka would hold his iPhone next to the landline telephone so that Hurry and the customer could talk. Ruzicka did not participate in the calls, although he had to be present to hold the telephones together. This manner of conducting the telephone conversation would avoid a record that Hurry had talked to the customer. To the extent there was any record, it would appear that Hurry had only called CSCT. Ruzicka testified at his OTR that this happened roughly a dozen times and that Hurry had conversations in this manner with Rohn Knowles and Kelvin Leach at Titan, Cem Can at Unicorn, and an individual at Montage.²¹⁴

In hearing testimony, D’Mura similarly described a FaceTime conference call with Caledonian. Caledonian was on the speaker phone in the CSCT office and Hurry was on the iPhone. Ruzicka would hold the telephones next to each other. D’Mura remembered at least one

²⁰⁸ CX-178, at 155-61.

²⁰⁹ CX-178, at 161.

²¹⁰ CX-178, at 70.

²¹¹ CX-178, at 67-71.

²¹² Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1540.

²¹³ Hearing Tr. (D’Mura) 2300.

²¹⁴ CX-178, at 118-27.

other time that such a FaceTime conference happened.²¹⁵ D'Mura believed that it was Hurry's idea to conduct the calls this way.²¹⁶

Hurry does not deny that he conducted telephone calls with CSCT customers in this manner. However, he gives the practice an innocent explanation. He claims that he used the iPhone app because it cost less and because he found it difficult to do a conference call on his cell phone. He claimed that Ruzicka was a participant in the call, disputing Ruzicka's OTR testimony after he knew that Ruzicka would not appear at the hearing.²¹⁷

We find Hurry's explanation not credible. Hurry generally did not conduct his business in such a frugal manner. He flew back and forth to the Cayman Islands in his own private airplane, and flew to Panama and Belize from there to meet with Montage and Unicorn.²¹⁸ He funded expensive offices for CSCT²¹⁹ and provided Ruzicka and D'Mura with housing when they worked there.²²⁰ He instructed Ruzicka to buy Hurry a seven-seat vehicle to use while he was in the Cayman Islands.²²¹ He liked to tell people how rich he is.²²² It is unlikely that the costs associated with a dozen international telephone calls would trouble him much.

We also find Hurry's assertion that he used FaceTime because he was too technologically challenged to figure out how to do a conference call on his cell phone not credible. Hurry was technologically sophisticated enough to set up CSCT's computer network.²²³ He instructed Ruzicka on how to use PDFs and other software, and he created an elaborate Excel spreadsheet.²²⁴ When he was asked whether he was aware that his use of FaceTime to speak with customers would conceal his involvement in a conversation with the customers, Hurry answered evasively, avoiding a direct yes or no.²²⁵

Hurry testified that he started using FaceTime in February 2014.²²⁶ Coincidentally, his email traffic with Ruzicka and D'Mura at CSCT dropped to nearly nothing.²²⁷ We find a

²¹⁵ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2297-98.

²¹⁶ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2302-03.

²¹⁷ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1540-42.

²¹⁸ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2252-58, 2300-01; Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1412-13, 1613-14, 1617-19.

²¹⁹ CX-178, at 35.

²²⁰ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1447, 1649-51; Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2265, 2316-17.

²²¹ CX-58.

²²² CX-178, at 26, 70.

²²³ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1461; Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2263, 2266-68; CX-94.

²²⁴ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1433-34; CX-178, at 24-25; CX-77; CX-131.

²²⁵ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1541.

²²⁶ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1540.

²²⁷ Resp. PH Br. 45.

significant connection between the two events. Hurry's purposeful use of FaceTime enabled him to stop creating a trail of emails.

C. The Firm's General Practice For Reviewing Deposits

Everything that Scottsdale knew about a deposit when the Firm concluded that it could sell the deposited securities pursuant to the Rule 144 exemption is contained in a due diligence package for the deposit.²²⁸ Generally, at the top of the package is a two-page Deposited Securities Checklist ("Checklist"). That is followed by various other documents, including a Beneficial Ownership Declaration signed by the purported beneficial owner of the shares deposited for resale by Scottsdale.²²⁹

Scottsdale's general process for reviewing and approving a deposit of stock certificates was for a person on the Rule 144 team to assemble the due diligence package, working from the Checklist. Then, the person who had put together the file (sometimes referred to as the first reviewer) would go to Cruz and talk with him about it. Depending on the complexity of the deposit, the talk could take 15 minutes to an hour. Cruz did not review every page in the file. He would read through the Checklist and ask questions. He might ask to see particular documents and conduct Google searches while sitting together with the initial reviewer.²³⁰

The Firm heavily depended upon the representations made in the Beneficial Ownership Declaration for its conclusion that the purported beneficial owner was not an affiliate of the issuer and was the person who had the economic interest in the shares on deposit. Diekmann initially denied that the persons signing as beneficial owners could be lying. He testified that he saw no reason for them to lie, and he emphasized that the document is very clear about the information it requests. Only upon being pressed did he eventually agree that if someone were acting as a nominee for a secret beneficial owner one would expect them to lie.²³¹ We find his testimony on this subject evasive.

Cruz similarly focused on the fact that the Beneficial Ownership Declaration was the tool that the Firm used to find out who owned the shares.²³² He stressed that the Declaration was "unequivocal," and that the parties to the transactions understood the Firm's expectations when they made parallel representations regarding the person identified as the beneficial owner.²³³ When asked whether language on Unicorn's website offering to appoint nominee officers and directors would be a red flag to him, Cruz responded that it "could have been." He suggested that the way he would deal with that red flag would not be to seek independent verification. Rather,

²²⁸ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1916-17.

²²⁹ RX-1, at 1-2, 11-12, 78-79, 88-89, 158-59, 169-70; RX-2, at 1-2, 12-13, 106-07, 117-18; RX-3, at 1-2, 11-12.

²³⁰ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 694-96; Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 278.

²³¹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1895-96.

²³² Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 201-03.

²³³ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 202.

he would simply emphasize to the interested persons the importance of disclosure. He said that the Firm would “reiterate and make sure they understand the purpose of our forms and ... that they need to – to disclose the underlying beneficial owner.”²³⁴

Cruz testified that during the relevant period, from December 2013 through June 30, 2014, the Firm did not conduct a specific search for nominees.²³⁵ Diekmann testified that he thought the Firm’s general practice would pick up a problem with nominees, but he could not cite any particular procedures that were geared to do that. He said the “procedures in sum” would address the nominee problem.²³⁶ Cruz confirmed, however, that the term “nominee” appears nowhere in the Firm’s policies and procedures.²³⁷

Given the complexity of the analysis required, and the high potential for interested parties to obfuscate and make misrepresentations, we find the Firm’s general process for final approval inadequate. A conversation that may last fifteen minutes and not involve review of all the documents in the file is not enough to analyze the content of the representations and understand whether the business transactions made sense. We also find that the Firm’s reliance on the honesty of the interested parties filling out the forms was unreasonable in light of the high potential for the use of nominees.

We are concerned that the Firm’s general process for review and approval was so poor when the processing of microcap stock certificates for resale to the public was its primary business. We are further concerned because the transactions at issue here were typical of Scottsdale’s business. Cruz testified that the Firm’s customers typically were persons who made loans to issuers and then sold the loans to others who then attempted to profit by exchanging them for shares. Thus, the Firm’s lack of a good process for review and approval was not a minor aspect of the Firm’s business.²³⁸

D. Transactions

The Firm followed a check-the-box approach to its Rule 144 reviews, without evaluating and independently verifying the information it gathered. This approach is apparent from the following in-depth analysis of the three NHPI deposits. The Firm followed the same approach with the VPLM and ORFG deposits, which we discuss in less detail.

²³⁴ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 307-08.

²³⁵ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 199-202, 211-13; Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 908-10.

²³⁶ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 922.

²³⁷ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 666-67.

²³⁸ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 352-53.

1. NHPI (Three Unicorn deposits derived from Collins promissory note)

a. Due Diligence Package

i. Purported Beneficial Owners

CSCT made three NHPI deposits. They all came from Unicorn, which, in turn, purported to act on behalf of other supposedly independent entities: Sky Walker, Inc. (“Sky Walker”), Swiss National Securities (“Swiss National”), and Ireland Offshore Securities (“Ireland Offshore”). The beneficial owner of Sky Walker is identified on the Checklist as Patrick Gentle; the beneficial owner of Swiss National is identified on a separate Checklist as Talal Fanni (apparently a misspelling, since the person signed documents as Talal Fouani); and the beneficial owner of Ireland Offshore is identified on the third Checklist as Jeff Cox.²³⁹

Each purported beneficial owner signed a Beneficial Ownership Declaration representing that he was not an affiliate of the issuer, that the issuer was not to his knowledge a shell, and that the securities were free trading, without resale restrictions under Rule 144. The documents were not witnessed or notarized. No address, telephone number or other contact information was given for the purported beneficial owner.²⁴⁰

Scottsdale did nothing to identify the purported beneficial owners more specifically. While it did a Google search combining the name of the beneficial owner with the words “securities fraud” and put the first page of the initial index of results in the due diligence package, it did not search for the person’s name alone, or the person’s name in combination with the name of the entity through which he acquired the shares, or the person’s name along with the names of the issuer and issuer’s principals.²⁴¹

The purpose of the Google search using the name of the purported beneficial owner with the words securities fraud is unclear in light of the fact that Diekmann testified that a “hit” on such a search indicating that a person was engaged in some sort of securities fraud would be unrelated to beneficial ownership.²⁴² That testimony demonstrates the check-the-box attitude of the Firm. Diekmann was insensitive to the possibility that if a person was engaged in securities fraud, then the representations made by that person and others connected to a deposit could be false.

As discussed below, the three deposits shared the same origin.

²³⁹ RX-1, at 1-2, 11-12, 78-79, 88-89, 158-59, 169-70.

²⁴⁰ RX-1, at 11-12, 88-89, 169-70.

²⁴¹ RX-1, at 67, 152, 223. The Firm misspelled Fouani’s name when it did the Google search, illustrating its careless approach to conducting due diligence. RX-1, at 67.

²⁴² Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 927.

ii. Prior Holder Transaction

The Checklists for the Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore deposits state that the issuer, NHPI, gave a \$10,000 promissory note dated May 1, 2012, to someone named Thomas Collins. Each NHPI depositor purports to tack back its holding period to that date and that note.²⁴³

A copy of the May 2012 promissory note is included with the Sky Walker and Ireland Offshore deposits. The note was due and payable no later than July 1, 2012. It provided that if NHPI did not pay the note by the due date, Collins would have the right to convert the debt into common shares. No address or contact information is given for the company or for Collins. Although the note provided that Collins would have a right of conversion upon the company's default, it contained no provision for either party to give notice to the other in the event of a default. The signatures for NHPI and Collins were not witnessed or notarized.²⁴⁴

According to the attorney opinion in the due diligence package, the May 2012 note was the company's promise to pay Collins a fee for services.²⁴⁵ The unaudited financial statements in the due diligence package similarly indicated that the note was for consulting services.²⁴⁶

With respect to Collins' identity and possible connection to the issuer, the due diligence package contains a statement signed by Collins declaring that he had never been an affiliate of the issuer. Again, the statement is not witnessed or notarized, and no contact information is provided.²⁴⁷

The issuer did provide the stock transfer agent with an address for Collins when it instructed the transfer agent to issue new unrestricted shares to him, as reflected in the instructions to the transfer agent, which are in the due diligence package. Collins had a Texas address.²⁴⁸ Also in the due diligence package is the transfer agent's list of shareholders, which showed that all active shareholders of NHPI had U.S. addresses.²⁴⁹

Scottsdale did not run a Google search on Collins using the address contained in the due diligence package. Nor did it search to see whether Collins had any links to the other persons on the NHPI shareholder list. Rather, it ran a Google search linking Collins' name to the words "securities fraud." Apparently, a person named Thomas Collins had been involved in a securities fraud, but the Firm obtained an SEC litigation release indicating that that person had died prior to

²⁴³ RX-1, at 1, 78, 158.

²⁴⁴ RX-1, at 106, 183.

²⁴⁵ RX-1, at 22, 101, 178.

²⁴⁶ RX-1, at 40, 122, 198.

²⁴⁷ RX-1, at 25.

²⁴⁸ RX-1, at 31.

²⁴⁹ RX-1, at 37.

1997. The Firm never determined the identity of the particular Thomas Collins involved in the NHPI deposits.²⁵⁰

iii. Acquisition Of Shares By Depositors

Collins gave Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore each a separate \$50,000 note dated September 1, 2013. The notes were to be paid in full by November 7, 2013. The notes specified that in the event of a default the entire sum would become due.²⁵¹ Each note was ostensibly secured by a Stock Pledge Agreement pledging 20 million shares of NHPI,²⁵² which, at the time, Collins did not own. These notes, like the note between Collins and NHPI, contain no address or contact information for any party and no provision for either party to give notice to the other in the event of a default. They are neither witnessed nor notarized.²⁵³

The next items in the chronology are three Note Satisfaction Agreements dated September 16, 2013. These three identical Agreements indicate that Collins had already defaulted on the \$50,000 note, although the due date was not until November 7, 2013. Each depositor declared a desire to take title to the NHPI shares described in the pledge agreement.²⁵⁴ The Securities Deposit Pre-Review Request Unicorn submitted for Swiss National likewise gives September 16, 2013, as the date of acquisition, referring to the Note Satisfaction Agreement,²⁵⁵ as does the Deposited Securities Request Form submitted for Ireland Offshore.²⁵⁶

On November 15, 2013, more than a year after the due date for the May 2012 note, the issuer and Collins purportedly entered into a note conversion agreement whereby Collins agreed to forgive 90% of the note in return for 90 million shares of NHPI.²⁵⁷ The Note Conversion Agreement included in the due diligence package, like the May 2012 promissory note, contains no address or contact information for the company or for Collins and is not witnessed or notarized. The Note Conversion Agreement does not explain why the conversion occurred so

²⁵⁰ RX-1, at 57-58.

²⁵¹ RX-1, at 32, 112, 190.

²⁵² RX-1, at 113-16, 191-94.

²⁵³ RX-1, at 32, 112, 190.

²⁵⁴ RX-1, at 33, 117, 195.

²⁵⁵ RX-1, at 13.

²⁵⁶ RX-1, at 161. Other documents give conflicting, later dates as the acquisition date. Some documents represent that the three depositors acquired the securities on November 25, 2013, pursuant to a Stock Purchase Agreement. RX-1, at 11, 19, 88, 98, 169. However, the due diligence package for NHPI contains no Stock Purchase Agreement. Another document says that the acquisition date was November 15, 2013, the same date that Collins entered into the Note Conversion Agreement and the shares were issued to him. RX-1, at 81. The Firm did not resolve the discrepancy between the September acquisition date and the November acquisition dates before selling the securities.

²⁵⁷ RX-1, at 1, 78, 158.

long after the default or how the remaining unpaid 10% of the May 2012 promissory note was to be treated.²⁵⁸

NHPI issued the 90 million shares to Collins on November 15, 2013, the same day as the note conversion agreement.²⁵⁹

Although the exact date that Collins assigned the shares to the three beneficial owners is not clear, it was at most a few days after NHPI issued the shares to Collins. Thus, the transaction between the issuer and Collins, the issuance of the stock, and the transactions between Collins and the three purported beneficial owner entities all happened almost simultaneously.

Although the transactions happened almost simultaneously, the value given to the shares differed substantially. There is no evidence of a corporate event or other explanation for the variance. In return for forgiving a debt of \$9,000, Collins obtained 90 million shares, but each beneficial owner entity forgave a debt of \$50,000 for its 20 million shares. No money actually changed hands in these transactions.

iv. Issuer Filings

Although NHPI had once been a reporting company with the SEC, it stopped being a reporting company in 2009. After that it made less frequent and less regular filings on OTC Markets.²⁶⁰ On November 20, 2013, a few days after the NHPI shares were issued and around the time that Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore acquired the shares, the issuer filed an annual report for the year ending December 31, 2012.²⁶¹ In the November 20, 2013 report, NHPI mainly discussed its pharmaceutical business and then stated in a single sentence that it had entered into the oil and gas business. It declared that further disclosure related to the oil and gas business was in an Interim Information and Disclosure Statement for the period ended November 20, 2013.²⁶²

In the annual report filed on November 20, 2013, notes to unaudited financial statements declared that NHPI had given Collins a promissory note for unspecified consulting services.²⁶³ Scottsdale relied upon this disclosure to verify the existence of the May 1, 2012 promissory note, which was critical to the ability of the beneficial owners to sell the securities without registration.

²⁵⁸ RX-1, at 26-28, 106-09, 184-86.

²⁵⁹ RX-1, at 29.

²⁶⁰ Hearing Tr. (Byrne) 2069-75; CX-255; CX-256; CX-260; CX-261; RX-1, at 130.

²⁶¹ CX-256. Diekmann testified that it appeared that the company had had a gap in its reporting prior to its November 2013 filing. Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 939. However, he did not believe that such a gap would be suspicious, even if it were as long as two-and-a-half years. Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1011-13.

²⁶² CX-256, at 4. One page from the Interim Information and Disclosure Statement was in the due diligence package for the NHPI deposits. But that page did not contain the disclosure relating to the oil and gas business. RX-1 at 39.

²⁶³ RX-1, at 40.

The only evidence that the note existed, however, was created about the same time as the transactions leading up to the sale of securities into the public markets.

In order to determine that NHPI was not a shell, Scottsdale relied on the representation by the president of NHPI that it was not a shell.²⁶⁴ It also relied on descriptions of the company's assets and liabilities in unaudited financial statements contained in the annual report filed in November 2013 and in a quarterly report filed about the same time to cover the period ending June 30, 2012. However, those descriptions were vague; they showed mostly unspecific cash assets, not physical assets. In the annual report, for example, the company reported that it had less than \$28,000 in a checking account, accounts receivable over \$600,000, unspecified inventory over \$70,000, and investment assets over \$750,000. The financial statements also show that the issuer had incurred some expenses. The financial statements do not provide, however, any indication of the nature of the expenses or the business activities that supposedly gave rise to them. The issuer disclosed no verifiable facts.²⁶⁵

The company's public filings created a significant discrepancy between the disclosure in those filings and the NHPI deposits. The interim financial report for the period ending November 20, 2013, states that 981,408,909 shares were outstanding, of which 970,326,182 were restricted.²⁶⁶ That means that only around 11 million shares were free-trading shares. But the three depositors deposited 60 million for resale to the public. There is no evidence that the Firm investigated this discrepancy.

v. Attorney Opinion Letter

The Firm relied upon an attorney opinion letter stating that the shares could be issued as free trading shares and sold pursuant to Rule 144. However, that opinion made plain that the attorney relied on certifications by the principal officers of NHPI. The attorney assumed that all signatures were genuine and the facts set forth in the certificates were correct.²⁶⁷ The attorney relied on the company's filings for his conclusion that the company was actively marketing its pharmaceutical products and exploring one or more strategic alliances and licensing arrangements.²⁶⁸ Similarly, the attorney relied on company filings as showing that NHPI was actively pursuing the acquisition of mineral rights leases.²⁶⁹ The attorney did not independently verify the facts in his opinion letter.

²⁶⁴ RX-1, at 24.

²⁶⁵ RX-1, at 38-40.

²⁶⁶ RX-1, at 43.

²⁶⁷ RX-1, at 20.

²⁶⁸ RX-1, at 21.

²⁶⁹ RX-1, at 21.

vi. Scottsdale Approval And Sales

During the first week of February 2014, Noiman and Cruz approved the first NHPI deposit, Sky Walker, for resale by Scottsdale. At the time, the 20 million shares were given an estimated value of \$268,000.²⁷⁰ Noiman and Cruz approved the Swiss National NHPI deposit on April 9, 2014, which was given a value of \$98,000.²⁷¹ They approved the Ireland Offshore NHPI deposit at the end of April 2014 with a given value of \$82,000.²⁷²

Sales of NHPI shares began on February 26, 2014, and continued through May 7, 2014. Periodically, Scottsdale would wire out the proceeds of the sales of NHPI and other securities in the CSCT account.²⁷³ As with all transactions conducted with CSCT and its customers, after Scottsdale wired the proceeds of the sales to CSCT's bank account, Scottsdale did not know where the funds flowed after that.²⁷⁴ Thus, it did not know who received the economic benefit.

vii. Promotional Activity

In December 2013, not long after the series of transactions by which the purported beneficial owners acquired their shares of NHPI, there was promotional activity regarding NHPI, as reflected in the due diligence file for the NHPI deposits. Diekmann testified that he would have looked at the promotional activity but he did not recall doing so. He asserted that promotional activity was not necessarily a red flag, but that he might try to see if there was a link to the customer. He acknowledged, however, that it would be difficult to know if a customer was behind the promotion if a nominee were being used.²⁷⁵

In February and March 2014, there also was promotional activity regarding NHPI.²⁷⁶ In a February 19, 2014 email, Ruzicka wrote to Diekmann that Unicorn was particularly eager to trade NHPI. Diekmann did not remember the email, and did not think it particularly remarkable. He said that no customer wants "to miss an opportunity to trade."²⁷⁷ Scottsdale sold NHPI shares deposited by CSCT during February and March 2014, when the promotional activity was ongoing.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁰ RX-1, at 78-79 (Sky Walker).

²⁷¹ RX-1, at 1-2.

²⁷² RX-1, at 158-59.

²⁷³ JX-268.

²⁷⁴ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 661-62.

²⁷⁵ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1014-16; RX-1, at 132-33; CX-262, at 6.

²⁷⁶ CX-262, at 2-5; CX-263.

²⁷⁷ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1016-18.

²⁷⁸ JX-268.

b. Red Flags Signifying A Scheme To Evade The Securities Laws

Even aside from the fact that the May 2012 promissory note was not a security, as discussed below, the circumstances of the three NHPI deposits raised a number of red flags signaling that the transactions were likely sham transactions using nominees to conceal the identity of the persons actually benefiting from the sale of securities. Some, but not all, of the red flags are listed below.

First, Collins and NHPI entered the agreement to convert the note he held from the company to shares—and NHPI issued the shares—almost simultaneously with his execution of three separate agreements to transfer a portion of those shares to Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore. The almost simultaneous transactions are compelling evidence that the parties were not truly independent. The suspect nature of the transactions is heightened by the identical terms of the notes to Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore.

Respondents attempted to rebut any suspicion arising from the timing and identical terms of the Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore transactions. Diekmann testified that he assumed that one person had put together the loan transactions for Collins, and that was why the three entities had agreed with Collins to the same loan terms. He acknowledged that he did not know who that person might be, but he did not think it was a red flag that Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore agreed to the same terms or that the same documents were used for the three loan transactions.²⁷⁹ We find that Diekmann's unverified hypothesis did not excuse the failure to investigate this red flag.

Second, Collins entered into the agreement with the three depositors, along with the agreement pledging NHPI shares as security, before he actually had any shares. However, he represented in the pledge agreement that he held title to them already. It should have been a concern that Collins apparently misrepresented his ownership. It also is suspicious that the depositors would loan him \$50,000 each without verifying that he owned the shares. It is even more suspicious that Collins would take on a \$150,000 obligation without knowing whether he could obtain the shares. The facts support the conclusion that Collins entered into the agreement with the depositors because he (or whoever was pretending to be Collins) was affiliated with the issuer and knew that the shares could be obtained. Further investigation was required before proceeding to sell the securities.

Third, the documents relating to the NHPI transactions in 2012 lack important elements that would permit verification. For example, the 2012 Collins-NHPI promissory note bears no physical address, telephone number, or other contact information for Collins or NHPI. Similarly, the documents relating to the loan notes Collins gave the three depositors do not include any contact information for Collins or for the depositors. The lack of contact information is odd because there is no provision for where and how payment should be made. It is almost as though there is no expectation of payment.

²⁷⁹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1699-1700.

Fourth, the obviously impossible September date declaring Collins in default on the notes held by the depositors—even before the notes became due on November 7, 2013—should have been investigated. The fact that the identical mistake was made in three separate documents supposedly involving independent parties is suspicious. If the parties were independent, one would have expected someone to notice the mistake. That is particularly so where the error was not a transposition of numbers but, rather, an incorrect month. The error would have been easier to spot.

Diekmann testified that the September 16, 2013 date on the note satisfaction agreement had to be a typographical error. “In all likelihood,” he said, “that’s supposed to read November 16, 2013.”²⁸⁰ When asked about the fact that the same error appears in all three note satisfaction agreements signed by Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore, Diekmann said that was not surprising. He noted that the agreements were all executed the same day, and hypothesized that someone must have done a search and replace function to change the words without noticing the mistake.²⁸¹ Cruz similarly explained the date as a typographical error. He testified that even though the same mistake occurred in connection with the documentation for three purportedly separate transactions it gave him no pause.²⁸²

Between hearing days, Respondents obtained a copy of the relevant stock certificate, which was then introduced into evidence. It showed a transfer date of November 21, 2013. They argue that this proves that the September date was a typographical error.²⁸³

Respondents miss the point. Nothing in the due diligence package shows that the Firm noticed or investigated the discrepancy before selling the securities. Furthermore, if the September date was a typographical error generated by a search and replace function in documents governing supposedly independent transactions, that only increases the appearance of coordination among the parties to those transactions.

Fifth, Diekmann admitted that there was no evidence contemporaneous with the May 2012 note to show that the note existed.²⁸⁴ The only evidence that the 2012 promissory note from NHPI to Collins existed was created after Collins purported to convert the note to NHPI shares. Rather than confirming the existence of the note, the timing of the late filing suggests the fabrication of false evidence to support the tacking period necessary for the exemption.

Sixth, it is peculiar that Collins did not enforce his right to conversion of the shares at the time if NHPI defaulted in July 2012 on the \$10,000 promissory note. There is no explanation why he would have waited more than a year—until November 2013—to do so.

²⁸⁰ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 949, 1835-37.

²⁸¹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 949-52, 956.

²⁸² Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 365-66, 390-98.

²⁸³ RX-115; Resp. PH Br. 15.

²⁸⁴ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 939.

Seventh, there were signs that NHPI was a shell. The change from being in the pharmaceutical business to entering the oil and gas business, without any explanation for why, when, and how it had done so, was not consistent with a real business plan. The Firm collected no information regarding the change in business, and the attorney opinion letter, which relied on representations by the interested parties and assumed the asserted facts to be true, was not a sufficient basis for concluding that NHPI was not a shell.

Respondents maintained that the oil and gas business was added to NHPI's pharmaceutical business as a "supplement" to its business line.²⁸⁵ We reject this characterization. These were radically different businesses that involved different expertise and different business models.

Eighth, the transactions have an air of fantasy. Collins supposedly took the \$10,000 note in exchange for unspecified consulting services—no money changed hands. And then he took shares in return for forgiving the note—no money changed hands. When Collins supposedly borrowed \$50,000 each from Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore, nothing in the documents provided how, when, or where he would receive the money. There is no evidence that any money changed hands then either. Collins merely entered into a promissory note with each purported lender in which he pledged to give them stock if he defaulted; and then he defaulted. No money changed hands when Sky Walker, Swiss National, and Ireland Offshore took the pledged shares.²⁸⁶

Ninth, there is little evidence to support the value given to the NHPI securities. Within the span of a few months the value of NHPI shares varied substantially without any explanation. In November 2013, Collins received 90 million shares in return for forgiving \$9,000 of his loan to NHPI. Simultaneously, he realized \$150,000 for 60 million of those shares. By early February 2014, the 20 million shares in the Sky Walker deposit were estimated to have a value of \$268,000. There is no evidence of a basis for the increase in value. Then, in April 2014 the value of the shares held by Swiss National and Ireland Offshore declined to less than \$100,000—again, without explanation. This is particularly suspicious in light of the promotional activity that occurred in February and March 2014.

²⁸⁵ Resp. PH Br. 16 and n.80.

²⁸⁶ Diekmann testified that the only evidence the Firm had that the September 1, 2013 notes between Collins and the three depositors existed was the notes themselves. He never asked for documentation showing that \$50,000 actually was transferred from Sky Walker to Collins. He was satisfied that the document looked like a loan to an individual and not an effort by a small company to raise capital. Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 943-45.

2. VPLM (Montage deposit derived from Kipping oral line of credit)

a. Due Diligence Package

i. Purported Beneficial Owner

There was evidence in the record about two VPLM deposits by CSCT. The one included in the allegations of the Complaint was through Montage for the further benefit of VHB International. The Checklist identifies Victor Bretel as the president of VHB International. The deposit was for 9.3 million shares.²⁸⁷

ii. Prior Holder Transaction

In the Montage deposit, the prior holder in the VPLM chain was an entity called Locksmith Financial. The Checklist noted that Locksmith Financial was affiliated with Richard Kipping, who was the former president of VPLM. The Checklist stated, however, that Kipping was no longer an affiliate of the issuer because he had resigned more than two years earlier.²⁸⁸

In concluding that Kipping was not an affiliate, the Checklist relied on an attorney opinion dated September 6, 2013, stating that Kipping had resigned more than two years before.²⁸⁹ As discussed below, that attorney opinion was insufficient to support the conclusion that Kipping was no longer an affiliate of VPLM. Cruz testified at the hearing that the Firm also relied on a December 16, 2013 letter signed by VPLM's Chairman, Thomas Sawyer, which made a representation that Locksmith was not an affiliate of the issuer.²⁹⁰ The Sawyer letter declared that the parties to the sale of securities from Locksmith to VHB International (discussed below) were not affiliates of the issuer.²⁹¹

The Checklist for the VPLM deposit indicated that the depositor had satisfied the Rule 144 holding period by tacking back to a "verbal [oral] line of credit" whereby the prior holder, Locksmith, had loaned the issuer, VPLM, \$58,636.24. The Checklist stated that the last advance on the line of credit was made July 6, 2012.²⁹²

An August 15, 2013 written agreement purported to document and formalize the oral line of credit. According to the 2013 document, Locksmith agreed in 2012 to advance funds as loans

²⁸⁷ RX-2, at 1.

²⁸⁸ RX-2, at 1, 268.

²⁸⁹ RX-2, at 1, 19-21.

²⁹⁰ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 441.

²⁹¹ RX-2, at 23-24.

²⁹² RX-2, at 1.

against a revolving line of credit and had received the right to demand payment in full or in part at any time.²⁹³

On the same day, August 15, 2013, a debt settlement agreement was executed between the issuer and Locksmith. In that document, the issuer indicated that it wanted to settle the amount it owed Locksmith by giving stock to Locksmith. The parties agreed to settle the company's \$58,636.24 debt as of July 31, 2012.²⁹⁴

Although VPLM did not issue the shares to Locksmith until September 2013,²⁹⁵ the Beneficial Ownership Declaration later signed by Bretel treated the date on which Locksmith acquired the shares as August 1, 2012.²⁹⁶ The depositor thus relied on tacking his holding period to Locksmith's oral line of credit.

iii. Acquisition Of Shares By Depositor

On August 23, 2013, Locksmith entered into a stock purchase agreement with VHB International. It was roughly a week after Locksmith had memorialized the purported oral line of credit and before the shares were actually issued. The aggregate purchase price for the stock was \$240,000.²⁹⁷ There is no evidence explaining why Locksmith was able to sell the shares for more than four times the value placed on the shares when Locksmith and the issuer entered into the debt settlement agreement only days before.²⁹⁸ The buyer, VHB International, purported to acquire the shares for investment and not with a view to resale or distribution.²⁹⁹

Although Victor Bretel was identified as the beneficial owner of VHB International, Andrew Godfrey signed the Stock Purchase Agreement.³⁰⁰ The Firm made an inquiry, and Montage responded that Godfrey "handles day to day operations due to Mr. Victor Bretel's travel schedule." Montage represented that Bretel remained the beneficial owner of VHB International.³⁰¹ Diekmann testified that the response was, as far as he was concerned, sufficient.³⁰²

²⁹³ RX-2, at 26-27.

²⁹⁴ RX-2, at 28.

²⁹⁵ RX-2, at 12.

²⁹⁶ RX-2, at 13.

²⁹⁷ RX-2, at 33.

²⁹⁸ RX-2, at 32.

²⁹⁹ RX-2, at 35.

³⁰⁰ RX-2, at 37.

³⁰¹ RX-2, at 38.

³⁰² Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1744-45.

iv. Issuer Filings

The Firm relied on public filings for proof of the existence of the oral line of credit. The Firm characterized the oral line of credit as “generally disclosed” in the issuer’s annual report for September 30, 2012.³⁰³ The annual report for the period ending September 30, 2013, which was only published on November 6, 2013—*after* the oral line of credit had been memorialized in writing—attached a grid showing that the issuer had settled many of its debts and payments for professional services by issuing VPLM stock. According to the grid, on August 15, 2013, VPLM issued a little over 29.3 million shares to Locksmith Financial as a debt settlement.³⁰⁴

The grid actually raised more red flags. It showed that the company regularly followed a practice of compensating affiliates and others with stock. During the period from October 12, 2011, through August 15, 2013, VPLM issued shares to Locksmith three times and shares to Locksmith’s owner, the former president of VPLM, Richard Kipping twice. Thus, during the two-year period, Kipping received, either directly or through Locksmith, roughly 80 million shares of VPLM. In fact, according to the grid, during the same period the company issued more than 185 million shares to various persons and entities, including Dennis Chang, the issuer’s president, Thomas Sawyer, its Chairman and CEO, and Carl Mattera, an authorized signatory for the issuer.³⁰⁵

Curiously, in May 2013 VHB International received directly from the issuer approximately 2.4 million shares of VPLM. This was only a few months before it received the 29 million shares from Locksmith Financial.³⁰⁶ That VHB had already received shares directly from the issuer raised a red flag that it might be an affiliate or might be coordinating its acquisition and resales of shares with others who were affiliates. There is no evidence that Scottsdale took note of that red flag.

v. Scottsdale Approval And Sales

On February 10, 2014, Noiman and Cruz approved the VPLM shares deposited by VHB International for sale to the public.³⁰⁷ Sales began on February 20, 2014, and continued through June 5, 2014. Periodically, Scottsdale wired out the proceeds from those and other sales for the account of CSCT.³⁰⁸

³⁰³ RX-2, at 1.

³⁰⁴ RX-2, at 40.

³⁰⁵ RX-2, at 40 (excluding an additional 265 million shares issued to consummate an acquisition of another company).

³⁰⁶ RX-2, at 40.

³⁰⁷ RX-2, at 2.

³⁰⁸ JX-281.

b. Red Flags Signifying A Scheme To Evade The Securities Laws

A number of red flags were raised by this VPLM deposit. Here we discuss two that required the Firm to conduct further inquiry to establish that an exemption existed.

First, the Firm knew that Kipping had been an affiliate of the issuer at some point. This red flag required heightened scrutiny of the transaction. The Firm failed, however, to gather sufficient evidence to conclude that Kipping was no longer an affiliate.

There is no copy of a resignation letter in the due diligence package. Scottsdale did not even have a specific resignation date. It had a vague statement in a legal opinion that Kipping had resigned from the issuer over two years before. The attorney declared that she had reviewed documents filed with the SEC and had determined that Locksmith was not an affiliate or control person of the issuer, but she did not specify the documents she reviewed or explain how she arrived at her conclusion. She did not say she had seen the resignation letter. The attorney further stated that Locksmith and Kipping had represented to her that they were not controlled by any of the officers or directors of the issuer. In making that statement, the attorney was little more than a conduit for representations by the interested parties.³⁰⁹ Diekmann was unaware of anything that anyone at Scottsdale did to confirm that Kipping no longer had any duties as president of the issuer.³¹⁰

Cruz vaguely testified that he thought the Firm had some sort of resignation or acknowledgement of Kipping's resignation in the file.³¹¹ Cruz may have been referring to the December 16, 2013 letter from VPLM's Chairman, which represented that none of the parties to the sale of the securities to VHB International had been an affiliate of the company within 90 days of the sale.³¹² That bare representation provides no detail whatever. It does not indicate when Kipping might have resigned as an officer of VPLM or provide any other verifiable fact. For purposes of ensuring that an issuer is not behind a chain of transactions designed to effect a public distribution without registration, a representation by a principal of the issuer must be viewed more skeptically.

Even more important, from the outset, Scottsdale had affirmative evidence in its due diligence package indicating that Kipping might be affiliated with the issuer regardless of whether he had resigned as president. Under Rule 144, if Locksmith and Kipping held 10% or more of the issuer, they would be affiliates for purposes of the exemption. The grid showed that Kipping, either directly or through Locksmith, had received 80,318,000 shares of VPLM between October 2011 and August 2013.³¹³ The total outstanding shares of the company at the

³⁰⁹ RX-2, at 19-21.

³¹⁰ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1719-20.

³¹¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 440-41.

³¹² RX-2, at 23-24.

³¹³ RX-2, at 40.

time that Scottsdale evaluated the deposit were 730,460,237.³¹⁴ Thus, Kipping and Locksmith received at least a 10.996% ownership interest in VPLM and Kipping could have been an affiliate regardless of whether he was still an officer of the company.

There were other signs that Kipping could have been an affiliate. In the due diligence file is the first page of results from a Google search for “Richard Kipping + securities fraud.” One of the results dated May 15, 2013, contains a fragment of content apparently referring to VPLM. That fragment says, “So Richard Kipping still has personal interest in this penny scam.”³¹⁵ Another entry dated May 7, 2013, also refers to VPLM and says, “The next few days will show if the stock can keep its unprecedented ... in fraud look at the shareholders Richard Kipping pretty much owns the ...”³¹⁶ The Google search page was filed in the package, apparently without anyone looking at the full stories concerning Kipping or following up on his ownership of VPLM shares.

If Scottsdale had conducted further due diligence, it might have discovered that Kipping was indeed an affiliate of VPLM. During the relevant period, the Board of Directors of VPLM ordered a review of Kipping and Locksmith’s debt conversions to VPLM stock. The resulting “forensic audit” dated June 5, 2014, described Kipping as a director and shareholder of VPLM. It indicated that, at the time of the August 15, 2013 stock conversion that was the basis for tacking VHB International’s holding period, Kipping had executive responsibilities at both VPLM and Locksmith, including check signing privileges at VPLM.

The accountant who performed the forensic audit opined that many aspects of the August 15, 2013 agreement purporting to memorialize the earlier oral line of credit were problematic. Many of the items that appeared to him to indicate that the arrangement was not a true arms-length transaction were facts known to Scottsdale at the time it approved the sale of VHB International’s shares based on tacking to the oral line of credit. Among other things, the accountant noted that the written memorialization was a year after the purported oral line of credit. He also noted that the stock for debt agreement did not specify any particular terms for the conversion, and he viewed Locksmith’s right to demand payment in full or part at any time as onerous.³¹⁷

The forensic audit illustrates that an objective analysis of the facts known to Scottsdale would raise strong doubt that Kipping was independent of VPLM at the time of the August 15, 2013 agreement and stock conversion.

Second, the grid attached to the November 2013 public filing shows that the issuer had a pattern of paying for services and its business expenses with stock. It issued much of this stock to

³¹⁴ RX-2, at 1.

³¹⁵ RX-2, at 95.

³¹⁶ RX-2, at 95.

³¹⁷ RX-292, at 6-7.

company insiders.³¹⁸ The pattern suggests that the issuer may have substituted the issuance of stock for compensation to insiders and business partners, leaving them to realize any monetary benefit by selling the stock to others. The constant flow of new issuer stock looks like a two-step process for unlawfully distributing securities into the public marketplace without registration.

This pattern is particularly troubling because all three parties in the chain of holders for the deposit—Kipping, Locksmith, and VHB International—were on the list of persons and entities that had converted debt to shares.³¹⁹ This was a red flag that they and the issuer could be coordinating. The Firm should have further investigated before concluding that the transaction was exempt under Rule 144.

3. VPLM (Titan deposit derived from Kipping and Locksmith through the Lees)

a. Due Diligence Package

i. Purported Beneficial Owner

CSCT deposited another 13 million shares of VPLM for the benefit of Titan and for the further benefit of Cumbre Company. The Checklist identified Patrick Gentle as the ultimate beneficial owner of Cumbre and the VPLM stock.³²⁰

We discuss the evidence regarding this transaction as evidence of other similar conduct for purposes of sanctions and as additional evidence that CSCT was no more than a façade. Scottsdale continued to deal directly with the FFI and to ignore CSCT.

ii. Prior Holder Transactions

This is the one transaction that was not derived from the conversion of a debt liability into shares. However, it also traces back to Kipping and Locksmith in a chain of holders.

The Checklist identified two prior holders, Jung Ju Lee and Soon Deuk (Kang) Lee.³²¹ Jung Ju Lee acquired 1.5 million shares by a Stock Purchase Agreement dated June 12, 2012, from Richard Kipping. In that Stock Purchase Agreement, Kipping represented that he was not an affiliate of the issuer and had not been an affiliate at least for the previous 90 days. An attachment to the Stock Purchase Agreement indicated that Lee paid Kipping \$13,000 for the shares. A copy of a check written to Locksmith for \$13,000 was attached. It appears to be written by Brooks K-9 Services Ltd., but it bears a notation saying “re VPLM certs.”³²² Nothing in the

³¹⁸ RX-2, at 40.

³¹⁹ RX-2, at 40.

³²⁰ RX-2, at 106.

³²¹ RX-2, at 106.

³²² RX-2, at 126-29.

due diligence package explains the connection between Brooks K-9 Services and Lee or the nature of Brooks K-9 Services.

Jung Ju Lee acquired another 500,000 shares for \$5,000 from Locksmith Financial pursuant to a Stock Purchase Agreement dated October 19, 2012. Locksmith made the same representation that it was not an affiliate of the issuer. Kipping signed on behalf of Locksmith. Another check from Brooks K-9 Services Ltd. was attached.³²³

Soon Deuk (Kang) Lee acquired three million shares of VPLM from Locksmith by a Stock Purchase Agreement dated August 1, 2012, for \$20,000. Locksmith represented that it was not an affiliate of the issuer. Kipping signed on behalf of Locksmith.³²⁴

iii. Acquisition Of Shares By Depositor

Cumbre acquired five million shares of VPLM from Soon Deuk (Kang) Lee on January 10, 2014.³²⁵ In a separate document written to Cumbre, Lee confirmed receipt of \$60,000 for the shares.³²⁶ On January 13, 2014, in a separate document, Jung Ju Lee similarly confirmed receipt of \$20,000 for 500,000 shares of VPLM.³²⁷

iv. Scottsdale Approval

On May 29, 2014, Noiman and Cruz signed the Checklist approving the shares of VPLM for sale.³²⁸

v. Blackout Period On Trading VPLM Shares

On June 5, 2014, Thomas Sawyer, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of VPLM, sent Titan by email a signed declaration notifying it of a blackout period starting June 6, 2014, on trading VPLM stock by certain “covered persons.” Covered persons were defined to include directors, officers, and holders of 10% or more of the company’s outstanding shares, among others. Richard Kipping (and his assigns) and Locksmith were on the list of covered persons. So was VHB International. The list also included FFIs and broker-dealers. Montage, Titan, Alpine, and Scottsdale were all on the list.³²⁹ Noiman discussed the blackout notice with Titan and requested a copy.³³⁰

³²³ RX-2, at 136-39.

³²⁴ RX-2, at 147-49.

³²⁵ RX-2, at 160.

³²⁶ RX-2, at 155.

³²⁷ RX-2, at 145.

³²⁸ RX-2, at 107.

³²⁹ CX-294.

³³⁰ RX-104.

On June 6, 2014, a lawyer named David Wise, who had often done work for Scottsdale, wrote an email to Sawyer claiming to represent unnamed clients on the covered-person list and threatening to sue Sawyer and others for “slow[ing] down or prevent[ing] the transfer of shares by my clients.” Wise called the blackout notice an attempt to prevent sales of VPLM stock in order to conduct a promotional campaign to raise the share price. He characterized Sawyer’s actions as “clearly illegal” and said he would be calling the SEC.³³¹

On June 6, 2014, Wise sent a copy of his email to Sawyer to Kelvin Leach at Titan and to both Noiman and Diekmann at Scottsdale. His cover note to them was breezy: “Hi Guys, See below. David.” The tenor of the cover note indicates that Scottsdale and Titan were working closely together to address the problem of the blackout notice.

On June 9, 2014, Titan forwarded the blackout notice to Noiman, and Noiman immediately forwarded it to Cruz.³³² That same day, Noiman also forwarded the Wise email to Cruz.³³³ The Firm stopped selling VPLM shares held by VHB International in order to investigate.³³⁴

On June 11, 2014, Titan received what appears to be an unsigned clarifying memorandum from Sawyer stating that the broker-dealers and FFIs such as Scottsdale and Titan were only on the list because they had been known to trade VPLM stock for covered persons. The memorandum declared that the broker-dealers and FFIs were still free to trade on behalf of *non*-covered persons. Titan forwarded the clarification that same day to Noiman and Diekmann,³³⁵ and Noiman forwarded it to Cruz.³³⁶ The clarifying memorandum did not take Kipping (and his assigns), Locksmith, or VHB International off the list of covered persons. Nor did it explain why they were listed as covered persons. When Noiman forwarded the clarification to Cruz on June 11, 2014, he wrote that “Titan received the attached after David Wise’s VPLM notice.”³³⁷

On June 24, 2014, a lawyer claiming to represent VPLM wrote to Noiman as Scottsdale’s “Compliance Officer.” Scottsdale had requested the transfer of two stock certificates, and the lawyer stated that the stock certificates appeared to be owned by covered persons. Kipping (and his assigns), Locksmith, and VHB International were on the attached list of covered persons. One of the two stock certificates identified, 2985, related to the VPLM deposit by Titan on

³³¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 578-79. Wise provided an attorney opinion letter on which the Firm relied in connection with the ORFG stock deposit. RX-3, at 70. Wise also went to the Cayman Islands to assist Ruzicka for a couple of weeks after D’Mura left. Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1603-04.

³³² CX-294.

³³³ Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1265-67; RX-104.

³³⁴ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 442-43; JX-281.

³³⁵ CX-295.

³³⁶ CX-296.

³³⁷ CX-296.

behalf of Cumbre.³³⁸ The other, 2228, may relate to a VPLM deposit not part of the record in this case. The certificate number for the deposit by VHB International is 2525.³³⁹

Notably, although the Titan deposit on behalf of the Lees nominally came through CSCT, Ruzicka was not included on any of the correspondence about the blackout period.³⁴⁰ The correspondence reveals that Scottsdale, through Noiman, was continuing to manage FFI deposits without regard to CSCT. CSCT was performing no real function in connection with the VPLM deposit.³⁴¹

b. Red Flags Signifying A Scheme To Evade The Securities Laws

Given what Scottsdale already had in its file on VPLM, it should not have approved the VPLM shares deposited by Cumbre for resale without obtaining better evidence that Kipping was not an affiliate of the issuer. The Lee transactions closely followed the VHB International transaction and revealed a pattern—Kipping was continually acquiring and selling large blocks of VPLM shares. When coupled with the information from the grid showing that VPLM followed a practice of issuing stock to insiders in settlement of its debts, the circumstances raised a strong suspicion that the issuer or an affiliate was unlawfully distributing securities without registration in a two-step process designed to obscure what was actually happening and who was benefiting from the sales of stock.

4. ORFG (Unicorn deposit derived from Forward line of credit)

a. Due Diligence Package

i. Purported Beneficial Owner

In connection with the deposit of approximately 13.2 million shares of ORFG, CSCT acted for Unicorn, and Unicorn acted for an entity called Media Central, which named Geovanni Moh as the beneficial owner.³⁴² Media Central was identified as a Belize corporation, and Moh

³³⁸ RX-2, at 106-09.

³³⁹ RX-2, at 3.

³⁴⁰ When Ruzicka was shown the blackout notice at his OTR, he expressed shock. He testified that he had never seen it, and that if he had he would not have processed the VPLM deposit for resale. He would have expected Scottsdale to treat it as a problem or red flag. CX-178 at 257-60.

³⁴¹ In the middle of explaining what he did in connection with investigating the VPLM blackout, Cruz made a half-hearted assertion that CSCT was involved, saying, "I asked or I briefed with CSCT to—to get an explanation if they—if they could." Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 442-43. We do not find that testimony credible. There is no corroborating evidence of any kind, and his testimony about CSCT, in contrast to his detailed testimony about Wise, was vague. Cruz did not say he had a conversation with Ruzicka—who was the only person at CSCT. Rather Cruz referred to CSCT in the abstract. Nor did Cruz say anything about the content of what he "asked" or "briefed" when he supposedly had contact with CSCT.

³⁴² RX-3, at 1.

was identified as a citizen of Belize.³⁴³ Media Central was originally incorporated on February 14, 2014, under the name Lock Investments Ltd. Only two weeks later, on February 27, 2014, the name was changed to Media Central.³⁴⁴ Nothing in the due diligence package explains the reason for the name change or whether there was any change in the identity of the principals of the company.

ii. Prior Holder Transaction

Media Central claimed that it had satisfied the holding period for a non-affiliate by tacking to a prior holder's note as of September 1, 2012.³⁴⁵ The prior holder was a person named Casey Forward. He purportedly took the issuer's note in return for an open-ended line of credit up to the maximum amount of \$600,000. The note provided that the issuer would pay on "loans, advances and debt as of August 31, 2011 ... with interest on the principal balance outstanding from time to time" up to a principal amount of \$600,000.³⁴⁶ The note provided Forward with a right to convert any portion of the unpaid principal amount of note to restricted common stock. This right was open-ended and did not specify a particular amount that could be converted or a particular date when the conversion could take place.³⁴⁷ Furthermore, the note provided that the holder could transfer in whole or in part any portion of the note without the prior consent of the company. Any such transfer was at the discretion of the holder.³⁴⁸

Forward subsequently assigned a \$50,000 portion of the note to an entity called Anything Media in exchange for shares of Anything Media. As described on the first page of the Deposited Securities List, that transaction was reflected in an Assignment and Modification Agreement dated January 18, 2014, by which ORFG agreed to modify the terms of the original note.³⁴⁹

iii. Acquisition Of Shares By Depositor

On April 16, 2014, Anything Media sold 15 million shares of ORFG to Media Central for \$75,000 pursuant to a stock purchase agreement. However, at that time, Anything Media did not own the shares. It acquired shares of ORFG only a few days afterward, on April 22, 2014, when it converted a \$9,000 portion of the note into 15 million shares of ORFG.³⁵⁰ There is nothing in the due diligence package to explain why Anything Media sold ORFG shares before it actually owned them. Nor is there anything to explain why the shares could be sold for \$75,000 when

³⁴³ RX-3, at 9, 13.

³⁴⁴ RX-3, at 15-16.

³⁴⁵ RX-3, at 36-41.

³⁴⁶ RX-3, at 36.

³⁴⁷ RX-3, at 38.

³⁴⁸ RX-3, at 40.

³⁴⁹ RX-3, at 1, 42-45.

³⁵⁰ RX-3, at 1.

they only had a value of \$9,000 when they were converted a few days later. Cruz testified that he did not consider these matters red flags that required further inquiry and that the Firm did not conduct further inquiry based on these matters.³⁵¹

iv. Scottsdale Approval And Sales

On June 5, 2014, Noiman and Cruz signed the Checklist for ORFG approving the sale of securities.³⁵² Sales began June 11, 2014, and continued through the end of the relevant period on June 30, 2014. Periodically, Scottsdale would wire out the proceeds along with the proceeds from the sales of other securities out of CSCT's account.³⁵³

v. Promotional Activity

From early May through early July, ORFG was the subject of multiple promotions.³⁵⁴ Cruz testified that the promotions were consistent with the reviewer's findings on the Checklist. He said he probably would have looked at a couple of pages of printouts showing the existence of promotions. The Firm typically would look to see whether the customer had any involvement and whether the promotions were having any effect on the trading done in the security.³⁵⁵

b. Red Flag Signifying A Scheme To Evade The Securities Laws

We discuss here only one of the red flags in the ORFG deposit. The initial transaction underlying the deposit made no business sense. With respect to the original line of credit, no reasonable company would agree to borrow money on a line of credit that permitted the lender to convert the debt to stock at any time in any amount at the holder's discretion. Certainly a company would not agree that the open-ended conversion option could be assigned to an unknown third party without the issuer's prior consent. Under such an agreement the company would not know whether it was going to be required to pay back some or all of the money it borrowed on the line of credit or whether it would be required to issue shares. Nor could it know to whom the conversion option might be assigned. It could not manage its finances or be certain of its shareholder dynamics and corporate control.

As the forensic audit of the Kipping-Locksmith loan found with respect to the open-ended line of credit in that transaction, the onerous terms from the issuer's perspective were a sign that the loan was not an arms-length transaction. Unless the Firm investigated and discovered some sensible explanation, it could not lawfully sell the securities.

³⁵¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 533-34.

³⁵² RX-3, at 2.

³⁵³ JX-310.

³⁵⁴ CX-303, at 17-25.

³⁵⁵ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 537-38.

E. Credibility

1. Ruzicka

As noted above, Ruzicka was never registered with FINRA and was never subject to its jurisdiction. He voluntarily testified at an OTR, and considered testifying voluntarily at the hearing. Throughout the first week of the hearing, Enforcement reported at the end of each day on the likelihood of Ruzicka appearing.³⁵⁶ On Friday of the first week, Enforcement announced that Ruzicka had agreed to appear the following Monday.³⁵⁷

However, Ruzicka changed his mind over the weekend and never appeared. He apparently changed his mind because of a text that Respondents' counsel sent to him on the Saturday after the first week of hearing. That text, although portrayed by counsel afterward as nothing more than a request to talk, appears to us to have been an attempt to sow distrust between Ruzicka and Enforcement counsel. It made Ruzicka angry at the way he thought he was being portrayed by Enforcement at the hearing and unwilling to be "put through hell" by appearing.³⁵⁸

Respondents' counsel telephoned Ruzicka on Saturday but only received an automated instruction to leave a message or text. Respondents' counsel then left him a text saying the following, which included quotations from Enforcement's opening statement:

You may want to know how FINRA has been characterizing you during the first week of the hearing. For example, you were "hapless," "malleable," and "bereft of other options." You may want to know the other side of what FINRA is telling you. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss.³⁵⁹

After receiving the text from Respondent's counsel, Ruzicka texted Enforcement counsel saying, in part, "If even veracity, I am done."³⁶⁰ We interpret Ruzicka's response to mean he was offended at the portrayal of him as desperate and easily manipulated, and to mean that he would not appear at the hearing if that was an accurate picture of Enforcement's comments about him.

Enforcement reported at the hearing that it had neither confirmed nor denied to Ruzicka what Respondents' counsel told him in the text. Enforcement took the position that it could not reveal what was said in the proceeding because it was confidential.³⁶¹

³⁵⁶ Initially, the discussions of Ruzicka's likely participation were off the record. Later, they were on the record. Hearing Tr. (remarks of counsel) 748, 840-41, 1032, 1275, 1277.

³⁵⁷ Hearing Tr. (remarks of counsel) 1275, 1277.

³⁵⁸ Hearing Tr. (counsel reading text into record) 1288.

³⁵⁹ Hearing Tr. (counsel reading text into record) 1288.

³⁶⁰ Hearing Tr. (counsel reading text into record) 1287.

³⁶¹ Hearing Tr. (remarks of counsel) 1299.

Enforcement argued that Respondents' counsel had violated at least the spirit of the sequestration order in the case; Respondents' counsel asserted that the sequestration order was about witness testimony and that counsel's quotations from Enforcement's opening statement did not violate the order. The Hearing Officer declined to rule on the charge of misconduct.³⁶²

Based on legal analysis separate from the alleged misconduct of Respondents' counsel, as laid out at the hearing on the record, the Hearing Officer admitted the entire transcript of Ruzicka's OTR. The Hearing Officer declared that the Hearing Panel would determine the probative value and weight to give the OTR after it had reviewed the OTR in the context of the evidence at the hearing, taking into account the circumstances that led to the admission of the OTR in lieu of live testimony from Ruzicka.³⁶³

The Hearing Panel now specifically finds that Ruzicka's testimony at his OTR was credible. It was consistent with other evidence in the record and corroborated by D'Mura's testimony. Wherever Ruzicka's testimony is cited here, it is cited because we credit it.

We reject Respondents' arguments for discounting Ruzicka's testimony.

First, Respondents assert that it is unfair to rely upon Ruzicka's testimony because they did not have an opportunity to cross-examine him.³⁶⁴ The short answer to that argument is that Respondents' counsel was responsible for that lack of opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Respondents cannot complain about it now.

Second, Respondents argue that Ruzicka was angry and biased against Hurry, so his OTR should not be viewed as reliable.³⁶⁵ After review of the transcript, we conclude that, although Ruzicka evidently did not like the way Hurry treated him, Ruzicka was truthful as to the facts and as to Hurry's intimidating and controlling manner.

Third, Respondents claim that Ruzicka gave inconsistent information in a prior telephone call with FINRA staff.³⁶⁶ However, the inconsistency was explained by the fact that Ruzicka still felt " beholden " to Hurry at the time of the telephone call. By the time of the OTR he did not feel that way.³⁶⁷

³⁶² Hearing Tr. (remarks of Hearing Officer) 1302.

³⁶³ Hearing Tr. (remarks of Hearing Officer) 1302-05. There had always been uncertainty about whether Ruzicka would give testimony at the hearing. In light of that uncertainty, the parties had earlier briefed the issue of whether the OTR should be admitted. The Hearing Officer's ruling was informed by that earlier briefing.

³⁶⁴ Resp. PH Br. 44 and n.253.

³⁶⁵ Resp. PH Br. 44 and n.253.

³⁶⁶ Hearing Tr. (remarks of counsel) 1296.

³⁶⁷ Hearing Tr. (remarks of counsel) 1298.

Fourth, Respondents claim that Ruzicka gave an affidavit inconsistent with his OTR. They assert that Ruzicka swore that Montage, Titan, and Unicorn came to CSCT through a referral from Scottsdale. However, Ruzicka signed that affidavit at Hurry's request while still working for Hurry.³⁶⁸ By the time of his OTR, Ruzicka no longer worked for Hurry. For that reason, we credit his OTR testimony that he was told that Titan and Unicorn came to CSCT through Hurry. Moreover, the affidavit saying that the three FFIs were referred by Scottsdale is not inconsistent with Ruzicka's understanding that ultimately Hurry was behind the referral. Even if Hurry persuaded the FFIs to do business with Scottsdale through CSCT, it would be consistent with his desire for secrecy for him to arrange for someone at Scottsdale to make the necessary introductions.

Finally, we observe that although Ruzicka's OTR testimony is valuable, his absence from the hearing deprived the Extended Hearing Panel of what would have been helpful live testimony and the opportunity for the Panel to ask him questions. Ruzicka's absence also encouraged Hurry to dispute the OTR testimony without fear of being contradicted, as discussed below. The distrust sown by Respondents' counsel impeded our adjudicatory process.

2. Hurry

As indicated above in connection with specific testimony, we repeatedly found that Hurry was not credible. Many of Hurry's self-serving explanations were not convincing on their face. His testimony was often inconsistent with other reliable evidence. Much of what he said also conflicted with Ruzicka's OTR testimony, which we find more credible than Hurry's uncorroborated assertions.

Hurry's ostensible purpose for setting up CSCT—to relieve Alpine of IRS withholding obligations—was not supported by any evidence that it made business sense. Rather, we conclude from Cruz's and Diekmann's testimony regarding heightened regulatory scrutiny in the period leading up to the establishment of CSCT, and the filing of the four prior SEC complaints against Scottsdale customers and employees, that Hurry sought to insulate his business from regulatory oversight by moving Scottsdale's FFI business offshore. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Scottsdale personnel continued to manage the FFI business with entities such as Unicorn and Titan (through Miller and Noiman). They needed to do that because Ruzicka was not qualified to run a broker-dealer, particularly one in the highly specialized business of liquidating microcap stock pursuant to Rule 144. Moreover, CSCT got its business through Hurry and Scottsdale. CSCT did not, and indeed could not, operate as an independent entity. CSCT served no function that Scottsdale could not have performed without it.

³⁶⁸ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1565-69, 1638-39; RX-110.

Hurry disputed that Ruzicka was not qualified to run CSCT and emphasized how accomplished Ruzicka was.³⁶⁹ His testimony in this regard was not credible. It is plain from Ruzicka's inquiry about working in Hurry's bike shop that Ruzicka had no relevant experience and was desperate.³⁷⁰ D'Mura described trying to educate Ruzicka about the securities industry and the elements for free-trading securities. D'Mura said it was "rough going" and that Ruzicka "wasn't picking it up."³⁷¹ D'Mura said that Ruzicka was anxious, stressed, and not capable of handling due diligence on microcap deposits by himself.³⁷² Even more important for our purposes here, D'Mura testified that he had conversations with Hurry about Ruzicka's difficulties and how Ruzicka was not "getting it."³⁷³ Thus, contrary to his hearing testimony, Hurry knew that Ruzicka was not capable of running CSCT.

Hurry's assertion that he had little to do with CSCT was disproved. D'Mura testified that Hurry frequently bombarded him and Ruzicka with telephone calls about CSCT business and that he and Ruzicka tried to prepare for those calls with updated information about deposits. D'Mura portrayed Hurry as an intense and constant presence in their lives while they worked at CSCT, and emails corroborate that testimony. Emails show that Hurry oversaw every detail of CSCT's business, and Hurry admitted that he traveled to the Cayman Islands at least once a month. He so closely oversaw the CSCT operation that he claimed to know that Ruzicka was in the office only ten minutes out of every hour.

To the extent that Cruz, Diekmann, D'Mura, and Ruzicka all testified that Ruzicka, not Hurry, ran the daily operations of CSCT, as Respondents assert in their post-hearing brief,³⁷⁴ we do not view that testimony as contradicting the evidence that Hurry was deeply involved in

³⁶⁹ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1574-77. When asked why he did not hire someone who had broker-dealer experience and who knew about FFI's to run CSCT, Hurry said that he hired Ruzicka to play an "executive role," someone who was "an all-around person, somebody who had some entrepreneurial skills, some management skills, proven to be able to do that." Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1648.

³⁷⁰ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1631, 1635-36.

³⁷¹ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2273-77.

³⁷² Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2277-78.

³⁷³ Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2274-77. D'Mura may not have been emphatic about Ruzicka's difficulties—he testified that it was against his self-interest to cause Hurry to fire Ruzicka—but D'Mura did raise concerns with Hurry. Hearing Tr. (D'Mura) 2314-15.

Email correspondence corroborates D'Mura's judgment that Ruzicka did not understand the business. For example, in May 2014, Ruzicka sought Diekmann's approval to consider a deposit of 11 million shares with an ostensible value of two million dollars. Diekmann wrote back that the issuer's shares traded in so little volume—roughly 3,500 per day—that it would take a "bazillion" years to sell the entire deposit. Diekmann said it was inappropriate to set the value that high and the transaction was the kind that should be avoided. CX-241.

This email correspondence also illustrates that CSCT served no real function independent of Scottsdale. Ruzicka sought Diekmann's guidance before even considering the deposit. Ruzicka was not independently vetting deposits before presenting them to Scottsdale. CX-241, at 2.

³⁷⁴ Resp. PH Br. 45.

CSCT's business. Ruzicka was responsible for the day-to-day processing of paper, but Hurry was responsible for bringing in business, cultivating the clients, and making all important decisions. Ruzicka, an out-of-work real estate attorney, did not have the background to do more than process the paper as directed. For Hurry to maintain that he left Ruzicka on his own to prospect for customers and manage client relationships defies belief.

Based on D'Mura's testimony and various emails, Hurry's contention that he was not concerned with secrecy was false. D'Mura testified that Hurry emphasized to him the privacy laws of the Cayman Islands, and D'Mura thought Hurry was very concerned about secrecy. Hurry's concern with secrecy was manifested in multiple ways, from his admitted use of FaceTime to confer with Montage, Titan, Unicorn, and other customers, to his obsession with labeling every email to and from Ruzicka as privileged, to his use of an email address that did not reveal its connection to him, to his refusal to use emails to discuss business and insistence on using telephone calls to do that.

Ruzicka's testimony only confirms D'Mura's. Ruzicka testified that Hurry told him that he was moving the FFI business to the Caymans precisely because he would not have to "give anything" to anyone. According to Ruzicka, Hurry was fanatical about not creating a record of his involvement with CSCT.

As for Hurry's efforts to develop business for CSCT, Hurry admitted having telephone calls with principals of Montage, Titan, and Unicorn, and he admitted personally visiting Montage in Panama and Unicorn in Belize. Although he claimed that he discussed a back-office system with Montage at Ruzicka's request, his testimony was vague and unspecific. There was no corroboration for Hurry's assertion, and he only made it when he knew that Ruzicka would not appear at the hearing to contradict him. Similarly, as to Hurry's initial assertion that he did not discuss business with Unicorn when he went to Belize, Hurry was impeached by his own OTR testimony. In his OTR he testified that he discussed pros and cons of doing business with Scottsdale directly or going through CSCT. Emails showed that Hurry provided other leads and referrals to Ruzicka, and D'Mura testified that Hurry was involved in developing Caledonian as a CSCT customer.

We further find Hurry not credible when he testified that he could not remember anything about his meetings with Montage in Panama and Unicorn in Belize. Hurry appeared to have excellent recall of other information and events. He testified in detail about the intricacies of taxation in the Cayman Islands and how it differed for Canadians and U.S. citizens, as well as the way the special economic zone in the Caymans operates.³⁷⁵ He also testified about the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority, CIMA, and its information sharing agreement with the SEC, noting

³⁷⁵ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1554-65, 1647-48.

that the original agreement was in 2005 and that it was updated in 2012.³⁷⁶ He insisted that he knew the exact days on which Ruzicka and D'Mura began at CSCT.³⁷⁷

We observe that Hurry appeared to be a canny, sophisticated, controlling, and hard-driving businessman. Hurry's attempt to portray himself as a distant figure, far removed from CSCT's business was not credible. Although he claimed that he likes to empower his people to run their businesses on their own,³⁷⁸ that is demonstrably untrue.

3. DiBlasi

We find DiBlasi's testimony that he was the CCO—but not in connection with the Firm's Rule 144 business—astonishing.³⁷⁹ Almost all of the Firm's business involved Rule 144 sales. As explained below in discussing DiBlasi's violation, DiBlasi was responsible for the WSPs, and nothing in the WSPs clearly allocated Rule 144 compliance to Cruz. Indeed, during much of the relevant period, the WSPs assigned the CCO specific responsibilities in connection with Rule 144.³⁸⁰ DiBlasi's testimony may accurately reflect what he believes his job responsibilities to be, but, if so, his designation as CCO was misleading.

4. Cruz

Cruz's testimony was vague and unreliable. He often said he could not recall whether he had looked at various materials in conducting his due diligence reviews but that he "could" have done so.³⁸¹ Cruz also changed his testimony or made it vaguer as he was testifying if he became uncomfortable with his original statement. For example, he said that the change in NHPI's business from pharmaceuticals to oil and gas was not so important because the company's "management team had been stable. It's not the situation where we had a roaming management team."³⁸² But when asked how he knew that the management team was stable, he could point to nothing in the due diligence package or elsewhere. He ended by denying that he had said that the management team had been stable, saying, "I didn't see any change of – evidence of a change of management. I didn't use 'stable.'"³⁸³ When pressed whether certain items were red flags calling for a searching inquiry about the issuer, Cruz resorted to general statements such as it "depends

³⁷⁶ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1630.

³⁷⁷ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1620, 1624.

³⁷⁸ Hearing Tr. (Hurry) 1550.

³⁷⁹ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1921-23, 1946-47, 1952-53, 1965-66.

³⁸⁰ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1967-73.

³⁸¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 279, 284, 292-96, 301-03, 308.

³⁸² Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 288.

³⁸³ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 288-91.

on the facts and the circumstances.”³⁸⁴ He never explained any basis for determining which facts and circumstances would trigger the duty to conduct a searching inquiry.

5. Diekmann

We find Diekmann’s testimony vague, evasive, and unreliable. He characterized documents in ways that on their face the documents did not support, such as the Miller email indicating that a Canadian citizen could conceal himself by using a corporate entity as the owner of his Scottsdale account. Diekmann asserted that the Firm’s procedures would root out a nominee problem but could point to nothing in the procedures that was designed to do that.³⁸⁵ He was insensitive to suspicious circumstances such as a Google search that turned up information suggesting that a person was engaged in securities fraud,³⁸⁶ or the identical terms and circumstances of the three supposedly independent NHPI deposits.³⁸⁷ He contradicted his own OTR testimony.³⁸⁸ He repeatedly resisted admitting that inconsistencies and suspicious circumstances could signify that a transaction was a sham until he had to admit what was obvious.³⁸⁹

Given Diekmann’s position as the Firm’s current president, we are concerned about his ability to ensure that the Firm responds appropriately in the future to obvious red flags and suspicious circumstances. This concern bears on the need for stringent sanctions, as discussed below.

Illustrative of the issue is Diekmann’s testimony regarding information on Unicorn’s website. Unicorn advertised the use of nominees to give customers an “extra level of confidentiality” because the customer’s “name will not show up.”³⁹⁰ At his OTR, Diekmann testified that he had not seen this page of the Unicorn website before his OTR, but if he had it would have caused him concern whether the true beneficial owner was being disclosed.³⁹¹ At the hearing he testified differently. He said that he would not be concerned about the information on Unicorn’s website because he had seen nothing on the website that suggested that Unicorn was offering to affirmatively lie about beneficial ownership.³⁹² When asked whether Unicorn would

³⁸⁴ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 293.

³⁸⁵ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 737-38.

³⁸⁶ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 927.

³⁸⁷ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1853-54, 1901-04.

³⁸⁸ Diekmann testified at his OTR that a print-out from the Unicorn website caused him concern about whether Patrick Gentle was the true beneficial owner of stock deposited at Scottsdale in his name. At the hearing, however, he denied that the information on the Unicorn site was a concern. Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 925-30.

³⁸⁹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1881-84, 1886-87.

³⁹⁰ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1818-19.

³⁹¹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1875-78.

³⁹² Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1819.

have had to offer to lie about the beneficial owner before the website language would concern him, Diekmann answered "Yes."³⁹³ That is not consistent with his and the Firm's gatekeeping function.

A second example of Diekmann's insensitivity to suspicious circumstances is his response to questions concerning an email exchange between one of the Rule 144 staff members and Titan. The staff member sent an email to Ryan Mendez at Titan saying that Scottsdale had multiple subaccounts at Scottsdale with Andrew Godfrey as the authorized signer. She requested a statement from Godfrey that explained the purpose for the multiple entities and provided an explanation of "any distinguishing features among the separate entities." She then named the eight entities.³⁹⁴

Godfrey provided an astoundingly broad and vague response:

[The eight companies] are holding company's [sic] that are used to invest in development and exploration stage companies that engage in local, regional, multinational, global, sporting, manufacturing, wholesale, transportation, technology and eco friendly companies, etc., etc. Each investment is placed into a holding company based on investment criteria such as location, industry, long or short-term investment etc., etc.

Godfrey made no distinction among the companies. He provided no facts that could be verified. The response was undated and addressed "To Whom It May Concern." Godfrey provided no address, telephone number, or other contact information for himself or any of the companies. The response was forwarded by email from Titan to Scottsdale.³⁹⁵

Diekmann characterized Godfrey's response as reasonable.³⁹⁶ We do not find it so. It lacks specificity and has no indicia of reliability or authenticity.

Finally, Diekmann displayed a lack of the skepticism, analytic acuity, and ingenuity that are required to perform the broker-dealer's gatekeeping function in the Rule 144 context. He testified that the identical documentation for the NHPI transactions did not trouble him because some unidentified person could have put Collins together with the three parties seeking to sell the NHPI shares they acquired from him. When asked whether that unidentified person could be the secret beneficial owner of the three sub-sub-accounts, he said that there was nothing in the documentation indicating that was so. He further declared that he did not know how you would

³⁹³ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1875.

³⁹⁴ CX-247.

³⁹⁵ CX-248.

³⁹⁶ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 891.

investigate whether it was so. He seemed content not to know who the unidentified person was and to assume that it was a person who had put the three depositors in touch with Collins.³⁹⁷

Diekmann said that “there’s always a risk that there could be some puppet master pulling the s[t]rings.”³⁹⁸ But he expressed frustration at the thought that the Firm could and should have done more to ascertain whether a puppet master was at work. As he remarked regarding the Argentinian nominees in the *Tavella* case, “It’s just impossible to know that there was somebody else behind this.”³⁹⁹

For purposes of assessing the Firm’s ability to avoid violations in the future and crafting remedial sanctions, his remarks cause us concern. Diekmann said that what happened with NHPI happens all the time.⁴⁰⁰

6. Experts

a. Marc Menchel

We give little weight to the testimony of Respondents’ expert, Marc Menchel. Although he opined that Scottsdale’s procedures were reasonable and consistent with industry custom and practice, his experience related to Rule 144 was both a long time ago and in a much different context than Scottsdale’s business. Menchel ran a Rule 144 desk at a large broker-dealer more than 30 years ago. That desk did not concentrate the way Scottsdale does on large blocks (100,000 shares or more) of microcap stocks.⁴⁰¹

Furthermore, Menchel did not opine on the sufficiency of Scottsdale’s due diligence in the context of the specific transactions at issue. He did not review the exhibits or the investigative testimony. While he did look at all the relevant due diligence packages, he did not review them with the idea of “second guessing” the Firm’s handling of the deposits. He merely looked to see whether the due diligence packages contained the sorts of items that one would expect them to contain.⁴⁰² Essentially, Respondents’ expert, like Respondents, took a check-the-box look at the due diligence packages.

Finally, Menchel’s opinion seemed influenced by his admittedly idiosyncratic view that Regulatory Notice 09-05 goes beyond Rule 144, and his claim that many of the red flags listed in the Regulatory Notice are not really red flags for purposes of Rule 144.⁴⁰³ Menchel’s opinion

³⁹⁷ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1901-03.

³⁹⁸ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 720.

³⁹⁹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 732.

⁴⁰⁰ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1901, 1903.

⁴⁰¹ Hearing Tr. (Menchel) 2459-61.

⁴⁰² Hearing Tr. (Menchel) 2478-80, 2496-98, 2529-33, 2554-65, 2572-73, 2575.

⁴⁰³ Hearing Tr. (Menchel) 2503-07, 2515-24.

similarly seemed influenced by his view that FINRA has no authority to charge a broker-dealer firm with a Rule 2010 violation for a Securities Act violation, a view that he admits has no decisional support.⁴⁰⁴ Menchel's opinion regarding FINRA's authority is contrary to the Hearing Officer's prior determination in the Order dated February 26, 2016, that FINRA has jurisdiction to bring this case. We decline to accept Menchel's view for the reasons stated in that Order, which we do not repeat here.⁴⁰⁵

b. Brian Underwood

We find the opinion of Enforcement's expert, Brian Underwood, more reliable, more persuasive, and entitled to greater weight than Menchel's. His experience with Rule 144 was more extensive and more recent. Until retiring in 2008, Underwood served as the Chief Compliance Officer of two major broker-dealers for a combined period of almost 20 years. The broker-dealers traded microcap securities on a fairly frequent basis and their Rule 144 desks reported to Underwood through one of his direct reports.⁴⁰⁶ He also served on two NASD working groups in the 1990s that reviewed roughly 300 sets of policies and procedures as part of an effort to develop a model set of procedures.⁴⁰⁷ Underwood has maintained a consulting practice since he retired, and in that capacity he has more recently seen between 20 and 25 entire policies and procedures of different firms.⁴⁰⁸

Underwood also reviewed more of the materials relating to the particulars of this case, including the pleadings, the parties' memoranda, the exhibits, and the OTRs conducted in connection with the investigation.⁴⁰⁹ He, unlike Menchel, evaluated the substance of Scottsdale's due diligence and whether it was consistent with industry custom and practice.⁴¹⁰

Underwood expressed the following opinions, among others, which we find consistent with our own views and supportive of our conclusions:

- (i) In its WSPs, the Firm did not adequately address the risk of nominees being used to conceal the identity of the beneficial owners of the shares—it did not even mention the risk.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁴ Hearing Tr. (Menchel) 2593-99.

⁴⁰⁵ See also *KCD Financial Inc.*, Exchange Act Release No. 80340, slip op. at 5-6 & nn.8-13 (SEC Mar. 29, 2017).

⁴⁰⁶ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2609, 2615-21.

⁴⁰⁷ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2711-12.

⁴⁰⁸ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2712-13.

⁴⁰⁹ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2619-20.

⁴¹⁰ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2651-57, 2665-67, 2669-71, 2673-78, 2685-89, 2691-94.

⁴¹¹ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2682-83.

- (ii) The Firm's practice of placing all FFIs on its red flag list was counterproductive because it did nothing to narrow the focus to the kinds of anomalies that required a searching inquiry.⁴¹²
- (iii) The Firm's general practice of accepting the registered agent's address without requiring the physical address of the entities and persons purporting to own the shares was inconsistent with industry custom and practice.⁴¹³
- (iv) Even though the Firm gathered large volumes of paper in connection with the transactions, it failed to analyze the information, did not identify issues raised by the files, and did not conduct the type of searching inquiry necessary to resolve those issues.⁴¹⁴ As Underwood testified, a searching inquiry "means asking questions. It means not just assuming an answer that is possible to explain the transaction when there are other answers that might not properly explain or satisfy the question. It means asking and inquiring and doing it independently"⁴¹⁵
- (v) Underwood made plain that a broker-dealer cannot go forward with a Rule 144 transaction simply because it finds it too difficult to determine the identity of the beneficial owner. The broker-dealer must have reliable evidence of the identity of the purported beneficial owner. Otherwise it cannot proceed with the transaction.⁴¹⁶

Underwood also explained that it would be typical in the industry to use other resources in addition to the internet to verify representations by the interested parties and make sure that those parties were not actually participating in an unregistered distribution of securities. With respect to whether the issuer is a shell, for example, it is not enough to obtain a representation from the issuer's principal as to its non-shell status. Underwood said that it would be common in the industry to obtain what is known as a "Bradstreet report." That report "can be quite enlightening in terms both of [the issuer's] operations, revenues, assets, who the key officers and directors are, shareholders—a great deal of information that is not necessarily available simply by going on the internet."⁴¹⁷

Underwood concluded that a firm engaged in Rule 144 sales would also have more detailed written procedures that "would describe who did what, when, and how."⁴¹⁸ He said that

⁴¹² Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2685-86, 2752-55.

⁴¹³ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2679-80.

⁴¹⁴ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2689.

⁴¹⁵ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2694.

⁴¹⁶ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2734.

⁴¹⁷ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2661.

⁴¹⁸ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2677-78.

a firm would “anticipate questions that would be investigated with respect to issuers, with respect to sellers, with respect to the transfers of securities.”⁴¹⁹ Furthermore, they would analyze the information collected and would “independently satisfy themselves to clear any red flags that arose. And that did not happen in any of these instances in my opinion.”⁴²⁰ He declared that the Firm did not meet the industry custom and practice for the conduct of this type of business.⁴²¹

F. Law And Regulations Relating to Section 5

1. It Is Unlawful To Sell Securities Without Registration, Unless An Exemption Exists

It is unlawful for a firm to sell securities without an effective registration statement in place unless an exemption applies. Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act prohibit the “sale” and “offer for sale” of securities in interstate commerce unless a registration statement has been filed or is in effect, or an exemption from registration applies.⁴²² The prohibition applies to “any person,”⁴²³ and the Securities Act defines “person” broadly to include both individuals and entities such as corporations and partnerships.⁴²⁴ The prohibition also applies to any person who “directly or indirectly” sells or offers to sell securities.⁴²⁵ Thus, Section 5 may be violated by a person who does not pass title to the securities but who is involved in the process of offering the securities for sale.⁴²⁶

The registration requirements are not merely technical—they are the “heart” of the Securities Act.⁴²⁷ They serve to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions.⁴²⁸ As the preamble to the Securities Act

⁴¹⁹ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2678.

⁴²⁰ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2678.

⁴²¹ Hearing Tr. (Underwood) 2689.

⁴²² 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), § 77e(c). See also *Ronald S. Bloomfield*, Exchange Act Release No. 71632, 2014 SEC LEXIS 698, at *20-21 (Feb. 27, 2014). A violation of Securities Act Section 5 also is a violation of FINRA Rule 2010, which requires members and associated persons to conduct their business consistent with high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade. *Midas Sec.*, Exchange Act Release No. 66200, 2012 SEC LEXIS 199, at *46 n.63 (Jan. 20, 2012); *Dep’t of Enforcement v. Padilla*, No. 2006005786501, 2012 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 46, at *1 n.2 (NAC Aug. 1, 2012).

⁴²³ 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), § 77e(c).

⁴²⁴ 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2).

⁴²⁵ 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), § 77e(c).

⁴²⁶ *Pinter v. Dahl*, 486 U.S. 622, 642-47 (1988).

⁴²⁷ *ACAP Fin. Inc.*, Exchange Act Release No. 70046, 2013 SEC LEXIS 2156, at *28 (July 26, 2013) (quoting *Pinter v. Dahl*, 486 U.S. at 638), *aff’d*, 783 F.3d 763 (10th Cir. 2015).

⁴²⁸ *SEC v. Elliott*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82992, at *1 (June 12, 2012); *Bloomfield*, 2014 SEC LEXIS 698, at *21; *ACAP*, 2013 SEC LEXIS 2156, at *28 (quoting *Pinter*, 486 U.S. at 638); *Dep’t of Enforcement v. KCD Fin., Inc.*, No. 2011025851501, 2016 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 38, at *49 (NAC Aug. 3, 2016), *aff’d*, *KCD Fin. Inc.*, Exchange Act Release No. 80340, slip op. at 5-6 & nn.8-13 (SEC Mar. 29, 2017).

states, the purpose of the Act is “[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities ... and to prevent frauds.”⁴²⁹

2. Sales Are Not Exempt If They Involve A Distribution By An “Underwriter”

A sale of securities is not exempt from registration if it involves a distribution of securities to the public. The Securities Act distinguishes between a distribution—which requires registration—and ordinary trading, which does not. In general, a distribution involves the sale of a substantial block of securities that is accompanied by sales solicitations, recommendations and other promotional activities that may induce investors to make investment decisions without the benefit of accurate information concerning the issuer, its management, and its plans and prospects. That is the reason registration is required. In contrast, ordinary trading by an individual investor who has little or no influence over the issuer is not accompanied by the same promotional pressures, and, consequently, the same protections are less necessary.⁴³⁰

The distinction between a distribution and ordinary trading is reflected in Section 4(a)(1) of the Securities Act, which exempts a securities transaction from registration if it does not involve “an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.”⁴³¹ In this case, the term “underwriter” is critical. The term is not limited to financial industry professionals. It encompasses individual investors “if they act as links in a chain of transactions through which securities move from an issuer to the public.”⁴³² Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act broadly defines the term to include “any person” who has purchased from an issuer “with a view to ... the distribution of any security.”⁴³³

Because it is difficult to know whether a person acquired securities “with a view to” distributing them to the public, the surrounding circumstances and the investor’s actions after acquiring the securities must be analyzed. For example, when a person acquires securities from the issuer in a non-public transaction and shortly thereafter resells, the circumstances suggest that the person acquired the securities with a view to distribution, which would make that person an underwriter. The transactions function like a two-step indirect distribution and may be a public offering in disguise.⁴³⁴

⁴²⁹ Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, § 1, 48 Stat. 74, ch. 38.

⁴³⁰ See the Preliminary Note to Rule 144 (“If any person sells a non-exempt security to any other person, the sale must be registered unless an exemption can be found for the transaction.”).

⁴³¹ See generally Hicks, *Resales of Restricted Securities* at § 2.4, 12-13, § 2:10, 22-23, § 2.11, 23-24 (2015 ed.). See the Preliminary Note to Rule 144 (“Section 4(1) of the Securities Act provides one such exemption for a transaction ‘by a person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.’”).

⁴³² Preliminary Note to Rule 144.

⁴³³ 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11). See also *SEC v. McNamee*, 481 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2007).

⁴³⁴ See generally Hicks, *Resales of Restricted Securities* at § 4:101, 250 (2015 ed.). See the Preliminary Note to Rule 144.

3. Broker-Dealer Has The Burden Of Showing A Reasonable Basis For An Exemption

Once a *prima facie* case is made out, as it was here,⁴³⁵ a broker-dealer has the burden of showing that it had a reasonable basis at the time it sold the securities for concluding that an exemption from registration existed.⁴³⁶ Exemptions from the registration requirements are affirmative defenses that must be established by the person claiming the exemption.⁴³⁷ The Securities Act requires a broker-dealer and its associated persons to act as gatekeepers to prevent unlawful distributions, and the responsibility rests on them to take all steps reasonable in the circumstances to assure themselves that an exemption applies before they sell securities without registration.⁴³⁸

A broker-dealer's duty to investigate is not satisfied by simply checking boxes on a checklist. Rather, a firm must examine the information it receives with a skeptical eye because the interested parties have an incentive to mislead and deceive a firm in order to facilitate their sale of securities. A broker-dealer must independently investigate suspicious facts to satisfy itself that an exemption exists. As the SEC has explained,

A dealer who offers to sell, or is asked to sell a substantial amount of securities must take whatever steps are necessary to be sure that this is a transaction not involving an issuer, person in a control relationship with an issuer[,] or an underwriter. For this purpose, it is not sufficient for him merely to accept "self-serving statements of his sellers and their counsel without reasonably exploring the possibility of contrary facts."⁴³⁹

Exemptions from registration requirements are construed narrowly.⁴⁴⁰ Accordingly, evidence in support of an exemption must be "explicit, exact, and not built on mere conclusory statements."⁴⁴¹

It is important to bear in mind that there are two distinct burdens in this case. While it was Enforcement's burden to prove the elements of its claims, it was the Firm's burden before

⁴³⁵ See *infra* p. 80.

⁴³⁶ *Bloomfield*, 2014 SEC LEXIS 698, at *23; *ACAP*, 2013 SEC LEXIS 2156, at *29 (citations omitted); *Dep't of Enforcement v. Midas Sec., LLC*, No. 2005000075703, 2011 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 62, at *11 & n.8 (NAC Mar. 3, 2011), *aff'd*, 2012 SEC LEXIS 199, at *28 & n.36.

⁴³⁷ *Midas Sec.*, 2011 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 62, at *28 & n.36, *38.

⁴³⁸ *Padilla*, 2012 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 46, at *29.

⁴³⁹ *Laser Arms Corp.*, 50 S.E.C. 489, 503 (Feb. 14, 1991) (quoting *Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities*, Exchange Act Release No. 4445, 1962 SEC LEXIS 74 (Feb. 2, 1962)).

⁴⁴⁰ *Midas Sec.*, 2011 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at *11-12 (quoting *SEC v. Blazon*, 609 F. 2d 960, 968 (9th Cir 1979)).

⁴⁴¹ *Midas Sec.*, 2011 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at *12 (quoting *Robert G. Weeks*, Exchange Act Release No. 48684, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2572, at *42 n.34 (Oct. 23, 2003)).

selling the securities to establish a reasonable basis for the existence of an exemption from registration.

4. Respondents Claim Two Exemptions

With respect to the transactions at issue, Respondents claim that Rule 144 applied to the transactions, or, failing that, the so-called “broker’s exemption” in Section 4(a)(4) of the Securities Act for ordinary unsolicited trading.⁴⁴²

a. Securities Act Rule 144

The SEC adopted Rule 144 both to provide a “safe harbor” for certain transactions and to protect against transactions by non-professionals as a means of circumventing the registration requirements. Among other things, Rule 144 restricts the resale of securities acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer or an affiliate in a transaction not involving a public offering. The SEC defines such securities as “restricted securities,” and requires an owner of restricted securities to hold them for a length of time before reselling them in another transaction without registration. The holding period and other conditions for resale differ if the holder of the restricted securities is an affiliate or non-affiliate.⁴⁴³ Thus, the identity of the person selling the securities and the nature of any relationship that person might have to the issuer become important to the exemption analysis.

Rule 144 defines an affiliate of an issuer as a person who directly or indirectly controls or is controlled by or is under common control with the issuer. Although Rule 144 does not define control, it is commonly understood that the definition in SEC Rule 405 of Regulation C applies. It defines control as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” Control depends on the totality of the circumstances and does not turn simply on whether a person is an officer of a company or the holder of a certain amount of stock.⁴⁴⁴

The identity of the issuer is important, too. The Rule 144 safe harbor is not available for shell companies. A shell company is defined as an issuer “with no or nominal operations and no or nominal non-cash assets.”⁴⁴⁵

A person who satisfies the applicable conditions of Rule 144 is deemed not to be engaged in a distribution of the securities and therefore not to be an underwriter for purposes of the

⁴⁴² Resp. PH Br. at 2-5.

⁴⁴³ 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. *See generally* Hicks, *Resales of Restricted Securities* at § 2.4, 12-13, § 2:10, 22-23, § 2.11, 23-24 (2015 ed.).

⁴⁴⁴ *SEC v. Zenergy Int’l, Inc.*, 141 F. Supp. 3d 846, 853-54 (N.D. Ill. 2015).

⁴⁴⁵ *Id.* at 853.

Securities Act.⁴⁴⁶ The burden is on the person claiming an exemption under Rule 144 to prove that all the applicable conditions have been met.⁴⁴⁷

The provisions of Rule 144(d)(3) relating to tacking are important here because tacking was the only way that the sellers in the transactions at issue could satisfy the required holding period. There are two categories of tacking. One category applies where a person who acquires restricted securities cannot personally meet the applicable holding requirement, but he is able to tack the holding period of another person to his. The other category applies where a person seeks to tack the period of time he has held restricted securities to the time he held other securities of the same issuer.⁴⁴⁸

Both categories are relevant in this case. *First*, to establish the requisite holding period, the purported beneficial owners needed to tack their holding period to that of the prior holders. Their ability to tack depended on the prior holders not being affiliates of the issuer. *Second*, in connection with the transactions charged in the Complaint, the prior holders needed to tack their acquisition of the securities to the earlier inception of the debt obligation exchanged for the securities. In order to do that, the debt obligation had to be a security. Rule 144 permits tacking based on the exchange of a security for another security of the same issuer (as long as no additional consideration is involved).⁴⁴⁹

In this case, Respondents claim that they had sufficient evidence that the sellers of the securities at issue were not affiliates of the issuers, the issuers were not shell companies, and the sellers had met the applicable holding period for the securities. We conclude that they did not.

b. Broker's Exemption Under Section 4(4)

Respondents argue they were entitled to the so-called broker's exemption under Section 4(4) of the Securities Act even if the transactions at issue were not exempt under Rule 144.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁶ See generally Hicks, *Resales of Restricted Securities* at § 4:1, 86 (2015 ed.).

⁴⁴⁷ See Rule 144(b).

⁴⁴⁸ See generally Hicks, *Resales of Restricted Securities* at § 4:139, 318 (2015 ed.).

⁴⁴⁹ See generally Hicks, *Resales of Restricted Securities* at § 4:139, 318-19 (2015 ed.). Rule 144(d)(3) contains the provisions governing tacking. Two provisions are relevant here. Rule 144(d)(3)(iv) provides that securities that are acquired as a result of a default on a bona fide pledge of the securities shall be deemed to have been acquired when they were acquired by the pledger. However, if the securities were pledged without recourse they shall be deemed to have been acquired by the pledgee at the time of the pledge. Rule 144(d)(3)(ii) permits a person to tack the period of time he has held certain restricted securities to the period of time he has held related securities of the same issuer. It provides for tacking where the securities to be sold were acquired from the issuer solely in exchange for other securities of the same issuer.

⁴⁵⁰ Resp. PH Br. 4-5.

Section 4(4) is intended to exempt ordinary trading transactions that a broker may be asked to execute.⁴⁵¹

As discussed above, a person can be an underwriter within the meaning of the Securities Act if he acquires the securities from an issuer or affiliate of the issuer with a view to distribution. In order to ensure that the person offering restricted securities for resale is not acting as an underwriter, it is necessary for a broker to evaluate the circumstances in which that person acquired restricted securities and offers them for resale. A broker cannot be a mere order taker. It must make whatever inquiries are necessary under the circumstances to ensure that its customer is not an underwriter.⁴⁵²

This exemption is not available when the broker “knows or has reasonable ground[s] to believe” that his customer is an underwriter, since in that event the broker would also violate Section 5 by participating in a non-exempt transaction.⁴⁵³ As FINRA has stated, “[T]his exemption is available only if a broker is not aware, after a reasonable inquiry, of circumstances indicating that the selling customer is participating in a distribution of securities.”⁴⁵⁴

Contrary to Respondents’ arguments, we conclude that Respondents were confronted by abundant evidence that they were likely participating in unlawful distributions of securities. They cannot claim that they were unaware of facts signifying that possibility or the need to conduct further inquiry.

5. Both Exemptions Required A “Searching Inquiry” To Ensure That No Underwriter Was Involved

Neither the Rule 144 exemption nor the broker’s exemption is available if the person selling the securities is an underwriter within the meaning of the Securities Act. Accordingly, where there are red flags indicating the possibility that a person may be acting as an underwriter, both exemptions require that a broker make a “searching inquiry” to satisfy itself that an exemption applies. Only then can a broker ensure that it does not participate in an unlawful distribution of unregistered securities.⁴⁵⁵

The SEC observed over half a century ago, “[W]here the surrounding circumstances raise a question as to whether or not the ostensible sellers may be merely intermediaries for controlling persons or statutory underwriters, then searching inquiry is called for.”⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵¹ *World Trade Fin. Corp.*, Exchange Act Release No. 66114, 2012 SEC LEXIS 56, at *26 (Jan. 6, 2012).

⁴⁵² *Bloomfield*, 2014 SEC LEXIS 698, at *24-25 & nn.35-36.

⁴⁵³ *Bloomfield*, 2014 SEC LEXIS 698, at *24; *World Trade Financial Corp.*, 2012 SEC LEXIS 56, at *26 & n.31.

⁴⁵⁴ CX-197 at 2 (emphasis supplied).

⁴⁵⁵ CX-197.

⁴⁵⁶ *Bloomfield*, 2014 SEC LEXIS 698, at *26-27.

6. FINRA Guidance On Red Flags Signaling That Underwriter May Be Involved

In Regulatory Notice 09-05, FINRA published guidance on the specific kinds of facts that give rise to the duty of conducting a searching inquiry.⁴⁵⁷ In that guidance, FINRA made plain that “[a]ll firms must have procedures reasonably designed to avoid becoming participants in the potential unregistered distribution of securities.”⁴⁵⁸ It further explained, “Before selling securities in reliance on an exemption, a firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that the transaction qualifies for the exemption”⁴⁵⁹

Regulatory Notice 09-05 identifies a non-exhaustive list of red flags that signal the “possibility of an illegal, unregistered distribution.”⁴⁶⁰ These red flags are by no means comprehensive. They are merely illustrative. The generally recognized red flags in the Notice include the following:⁴⁶¹

1. A customer opens a new account and delivers physical certificates that represent a large block of thinly traded or low-priced securities.
2. A customer has a pattern of depositing physical share certificates, immediately selling the shares, and then wiring out the proceeds of the resale.
3. A customer deposits share certificates that are recently issued or represent a large percentage of the float for the security.
4. Share certificates reference a company or customer name that has been changed or that does not match the name on the account.
5. The lack of a restrictive legend on deposited shares seems inconsistent with the date the customer acquired them or the nature of the transaction in which they were acquired.
6. There is a sudden spike in investor demand for a thinly traded or low-priced security, coupled with a rising price.
7. The company was a shell company when it issued the shares.
8. A customer with little or no assets at the firm receives an electronic transfer or journal transactions of large amounts of low-priced unlisted securities.

⁴⁵⁷ CX-197.

⁴⁵⁸ CX-197, at 2.

⁴⁵⁹ CX-197, at 2.

⁴⁶⁰ CX-197, at 1.

⁴⁶¹ CX-197, at 3-4.

9. The issuer has been through several recent name changes, business combinations or recapitalizations, or the company's officers are also officers of numerous similar companies.
10. The issuer's SEC filings are not current, are incomplete, or are nonexistent.

G. Ethical Violations (First Cause Of Action—Scottsdale And Hurry)

The First Cause of Action charges that Scottsdale and Hurry violated FINRA Rule 2010 by acting in contravention of Section 5 of the Securities Act. It alleges that during the relevant period, Scottsdale sold millions of shares of securities without registration and without an exemption. It further alleges that Hurry was a necessary participant and substantial factor in the unlawful transactions through his close management and control of all the entities involved in the process of depositing, approving, and reselling the securities, and through his prospecting for CSCT customers. The Complaint alleges that Hurry took actions to evade regulatory scrutiny and enable the Firm to make the unlawful sales.

1. Rule 2010

FINRA Rule 2010 requires FINRA members and their associated persons to “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade” in the conduct of their business. The Rule requires members of the securities industry not merely to conform to legal and regulatory requirements, but to conduct themselves with integrity, fairness, and honesty.⁴⁶²

Scienter is not required for a Rule 2010 violation. Rather, the SEC has established a disjunctive test for a Rule 2010 violation that applies either (i) to intentional or conscious bad conduct or (ii) to a failure to meet ethical norms, regardless of intention. The SEC has held that Rule 2010 may be violated if the respondent has acted either in bad faith or unethically.⁴⁶³ In the context of a Rule 2010 violation, the SEC has defined bad faith as a dishonest belief or purpose,

⁴⁶² *Robert Marcus Lane*, Exchange Act Release No. 74269, 2015 SEC LEXIS 558, at *22 n.20 (Feb. 13, 2015) (discussing NASD predecessor to FINRA Rule 2010: “[T]his general ethical standard . . . is broader and provides more flexibility than prescriptive regulations and legal requirements. [FINRA Rule 2010] protects investors and the securities industry from dishonest practices that are unfair to investors or hinder the functioning of a free and open market, even though those practices may not be illegal or violate a specific rule or regulation.”) (internal quotations omitted).

⁴⁶³ *Blair Alexander West*, Exchange Act Release No. 74030, 2015 SEC LEXIS 102, at *20 (Jan. 9, 2015); *Thomas W. Heath, III*, Exchange Act Release No. 59223, 2009 SEC LEXIS 14, at *13-17 & nn.9-16 (Jan. 9, 2009), *aff’d*, 586 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2009), *cert denied*, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3029 (Apr. 5, 2010) (discussing NYSE predecessor of Rule 2010); *Dep’t of Enforcement v. Shvarts*, No. CAF980029, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 6, at *11-18 (NAC June 2, 2000).

and unethical conduct as conduct inconsistent with the moral norms or standards of professional conduct.⁴⁶⁴

Because the securities industry is built on trust, any ethical failure damages the industry generally by casting doubt on the integrity of its participants. An ethical failure also casts doubt on the ability of the particular miscreant to conform to ethical norms in the future. Enforcement of FINRA Rule 2010 is therefore fundamental to FINRA's regulatory mission, which, as expressed in FINRA's Sanction Guidelines, "is the building of public confidence in the financial markets."⁴⁶⁵

2. Enforcement Established A *Prima Facie* Case Of A Section 5 Violation

The elements of a *prima facie* case for violation of Section 5 are the following: (i) respondents sold or offered to sell securities; (ii) through use of interstate facilities or the mails (the jurisdictional means); and (iii) when no registration statement was filed or in effect as to those securities. *Scienter* is not an element.⁴⁶⁶ A Section 5 violation does not require a showing that the sale actually facilitated a fraud. A sale without registration and without an exemption is an unlawful distribution of securities regardless of whether it is proven to be connected to a fraud.

Enforcement established a *prima facie* case. It proved that from December 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014, Scottsdale sold shares of three issuers, NHPI, VPLM, and ORFG, using the jurisdictional means and without registration.⁴⁶⁷

Respondents do not dispute these facts. They argue only that the transactions were exempt from registration.⁴⁶⁸

3. The Firm Lacked A Reasonable Basis For An Exemption

Scottsdale failed to have a reasonable basis for an exemption at the time that it sold the securities in the transactions at issue.

⁴⁶⁴ *Edward S. Brokaw*, Exchange Act Release No. 70883, 2013 SEC LEXIS 3583, at *33 (Nov. 15, 2013). *See also Simpson v. Bear, Stearns & Co.*, No. C07950030, 1997 NASD Discip. LEXIS 13, at *27 n.9 (NAC Jan. 29, 1997) ("Term 'bad faith' is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity....").

⁴⁶⁵ FINRA Sanction Guidelines at 1 (2016) (Overview), <https://www.finra.org/industry/sanction-guidelines>.

⁴⁶⁶ *Bloomfield*, 2014 SEC LEXIS 698, at *22 & n.29. *See also SEC v. Cavanagh*, 445 F.3d 105, 111 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006); *SEC v. Calvo*, 378 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 2004).

⁴⁶⁷ RX-1; RX-2; RX-3; JX-268; JX-281; JX-310.

⁴⁶⁸ Resp. PH Br. 2-5.

First, in its due diligence the Firm did not even address the question whether the debt obligation was a security, despite having lawyers on its Rule 144 review team and despite Respondent Cruz being a lawyer with significant experience in the securities laws. It had no foundation for the tacking necessary to achieve the required holding period because the promissory notes and lines of credit on which the tacking was based were not securities.

Second, the documentation to support the Rule 144 exemption was rife with discrepancies and suspicious circumstances—all of which raised red flags strongly suggesting that the chain of transactions leading to deposits at Scottsdale were sham transactions using false documents and nominees to conceal the identity of the beneficial owners.

Although the Firm compiled thick due diligence packages for the transactions, it did so with a “check-the-box” attitude. It did not appropriately evaluate the information in the due diligence packages, did not investigate the many red flags, and did not independently verify the information received from the interested parties. The due diligence packages created only the false appearance of due diligence.

The Firm’s conduct was unethical and did not meet the industry norms. The persons involved in the Rule 144 review did not obtain any meaningful information about the individuals and entities involved in the transactions. Diekmann confessed that he knew nothing about the purported beneficial owner of one of the deposits other than that the person was a client of CSCT’s client. Scottsdale knew little more about any of them. It failed to perform its gatekeeping function. The testimony of Enforcement’s expert only confirms our conclusion that the Firm failed to conduct itself in a manner consistent with industry norms.

a. The Prior Holders’ Debt Obligations Were Not Securities Available For Tacking

i. *Reves* Governs Whether Note Is A Security

Not every note or debt obligation is a security.⁴⁶⁹ The Supreme Court’s decision in *Reves* governs the analysis.⁴⁷⁰ Any note with a term of more than nine months is presumed to be a security unless it resembles one of the judicially enumerated instruments that are not securities, such as a note delivered in connection with consumer finance or a mortgage. In *Reves*, the Court set the analytic framework for determining whether a note bears a resemblance to one of the enumerated instruments or should be held to be a security. Four factors may be considered in deciding whether a note is a security:

- (i) whether the seller’s purpose is to raise money for general use of business or to finance substantial investments, and the buyer is motivated by the profit to be

⁴⁶⁹ *Reves v. Ernst & Young*, 494 U.S. 56, 65-67 (1990).

⁴⁷⁰ *Id.*

generated, in contrast to a note to facilitate a minor purchase or sale or to correct for cash-flow difficulties;

- (ii) whether the note involves an individual transaction or common trading for speculation or investment;
- (iii) whether there is a reasonable public expectation that the note would be viewed as security; and
- (iv) whether another regulatory scheme applies that would reduce risk of the instrument.⁴⁷¹

In another case, the Court later summed up the distinguishing characteristic of a security as “any instrument that might be sold as an investment.”⁴⁷²

As we explain below, we conclude that none of the debt obligations held by the prior holders were securities. That includes the NHPI note in payment for consulting services, the oral line of credit to VPLM, and the outstanding balance on the ORFG line of credit. As a result, when the prior holder accepted stock in satisfaction of the debt, it was not an exchange of securities that would support tacking.

ii. NHPI

It is plain that the note written by NHPI to Collins, the prior holder in the chain of holders, was not a security. We observe at the outset that the note’s term was much shorter than the nine months required to presume a note to be a security—roughly two months. But it also fails the test set forth in *Reves*. NHPI did not enter into the note agreement in order to finance its general business or to make a substantial investment. Nor was Collins motivated by some profit to be generated from the note. According to documents in the due diligence package, the note was no more than a promise to pay Collins \$10,000 for consulting services. Furthermore, the note was issued in a single transaction. A note that “merely reflects a single transaction” and is “not offered to the public” is not a security.⁴⁷³ Nor could there be any public expectation that an individual note promising to pay for services was a security. The fourth factor, whether another regulatory scheme applied and diminished the need for treating the instrument as a security, is inapplicable where no other factor supports labeling the note a security.

⁴⁷¹ *Id.* at 65-67. See also *Bass v. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc.*, 210 F.3d 577, 583-86 (6th Cir. 2000).

⁴⁷² *SEC v. Edwards*, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004). See also *Frankfurt v. Mega Entertainment Group II*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73613, at *11 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2016) (stating that “only those notes that were issued in an investment context” are securities).

⁴⁷³ *New Earthshell Corp. v. Jobookit Holdings Ltd.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27141, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2015).

As another similar note was aptly described by a federal district court, the note held by Collins was “akin to an ‘IOU’ for services rendered.”⁴⁷⁴

iii. VPLM

With respect to the issue of whether the oral line of credit extended by Locksmith to VPLM was a security, the focus at the hearing was on whether there is any distinction between an oral agreement and a written agreement. Diekmann maintained that there is no difference between an oral line of credit and a written line of credit for purposes of Rule 144 and tacking. He understood that in either case the successor holder could tack back to an advance on the line of credit. He based his understanding on his experience with the treatment of written lines of credit and discussions with legal counsel—who exactly he could not recall.⁴⁷⁵

In their post-hearing brief,⁴⁷⁶ Respondents relied on a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, *Canadian Imperial Bank*.⁴⁷⁷ Their reliance is misplaced. The issue in *Canadian Imperial Bank* was whether a private plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded the existence of a security for purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff alleged that a certificate of deposit from a Bahama bank was a security, but no document was attached that could be analyzed for purposes of jurisdiction. The Court held that the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to establish jurisdiction, but it hastened to say that its decision did not mean that only written instruments can be securities, noting that oral promises of participation in a profit sharing plan have been held to be investment contracts even where not evidenced in writing.⁴⁷⁸ The Court’s remarks regarding oral promises as investment contracts provide no basis for concluding that the oral credit line here was a security.

The oral line of credit, unlike an oral promise of participation in a profit sharing plan, was not represented to be an investment. Nor was it easily tradeable as an investment. There was no means of being certain of the terms, confident of the effective transfer of rights, or sure that those rights might later be enforced. Accordingly, the oral line of credit was not a security.

Moreover, even if written, the line of credit did not meet the *Reves* test. The line of credit was a loan to the issuer by a single individual. Such an individual transaction would not be viewed as a security by the public and would not ordinarily be traded as an investment.

⁴⁷⁴ *SEC v. Garber*, 959 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

⁴⁷⁵ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1711-17.

⁴⁷⁶ Resp. PH Br. 22 n.114.

⁴⁷⁷ *Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland*, 615 F. 2d 465 (7th Cir. 1980).

⁴⁷⁸ *Id.* at 466-67 & n.5.

iv. ORFG

The open-ended line of credit extended by Forward to ORFG for \$600,000 was not a security. As discussed above in connection with the other debt conversion transactions, it did not meet the *Reves* test. It was an individual transaction that was not designed to trade as an investment. Nor would the public view it as a security.⁴⁷⁹

b. The Firm Ignored Red Flags

Even if the notes had been securities, the transactions were not entitled to the safe harbor of Rule 144. Many of the red flags set forth in Regulatory Notice 09-05⁴⁸⁰ existed in the transactions at issue. The following red flags are examples:

- All the stock deposits in the transactions at issue consisted of large blocks of thinly traded, low-priced stocks issued by obscure companies. (Reg. Notice 09-05 Red Flag 1).
- CSCT had a pattern of making large deposits of thinly traded microcap stocks, selling the securities, and immediately wiring out the proceeds. Respondents knew that CSCT was acting on behalf of its FFI customers involved in the transactions and that the FFIs also engaged in the same pattern while acting on behalf of other entities and individuals. Despite the pattern, Scottsdale did nothing to investigate who actually was receiving the funds from the securities sales. Because the only account at Scottsdale was in the name of CSCT, Scottsdale could not and did not track where the proceeds ultimately went. It could not tell if the proceeds went to the different purported beneficial owners or to other persons who were repeatedly engaging in the deposit and immediate resale of securities. (Reg. Notice 09-05 Red Flag 2).
- The deposited shares were recently issued, which suggested that the issuer or its control persons could be initiating a distribution. Nothing in the due diligence packages indicates that Scottsdale took any note of that fact. (Reg. Notice 09-05 Red Flag 3).
- Although the issuer claimed not to be a shell corporation, there was little evidence of ongoing business operations. The Firm mainly relied on a representation by a principal of the issuer that the entity was not a shell. (Reg. Notice 09-05 Red Flag 7).
- Two of the issuers involved in this case had business histories that suggested shell status. Only a few months before the deposit of NHPI securities at Scottsdale, NHPI, a pharmaceutical company, announced it was going into the oil and gas business. ORFG,

⁴⁷⁹ Furthermore, even if the note had been a security, Forward did not transfer the ORFG note for securities of ORFG. He transferred a portion of the note for securities of a different entity, Anything Media. He also did so in connection with an agreement by ORFG to modify the terms of the original line of credit. His exchange involved securities of a different issuer and different consideration. Accordingly, Media Central was not entitled to tack back to Forward's original note.

⁴⁸⁰ See *supra* pp. 78-79.

which described itself as an automotive detailing company that used casual part-time labor as required, similarly indicated it was considering going into mineral exploration and set forth an anticipated payment schedule for three unspecified mining concessions. In both cases, the new business venture was radically different from the old line of business, the information regarding either line of business was scant, and the company's purported resources did not appear sufficient to engage in the new line of business. (Reg. Notice 09-05 Red Flags 7 and 9).

Finally, we note that it is critical in a Rule 144 transaction to know the identity of the purported beneficial owners and any relationship they might have to the issuers or affiliates of the issuers of the shares they seek to sell. Even after collecting voluminous documents, the Firm in fact knew nothing about the purported beneficial owners or about the businesses through which they held the securities except their names. Diekmann, who headed the Rule 144 team at the time of the transactions at issue, admitted that he knew nothing about the purported beneficial owner of one of the NHPI deposits other than that the person was a customer of Unicorn.⁴⁸¹ The Firm knew little more than that about any of the other purported beneficial owners involved in the transactions at issue. Diekmann's testimony is a stark confession that the Firm did not perform its gatekeeping function and did not adhere to high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.

c. Respondents' Arguments Are Unavailing

i. NHPI

Respondents' arguments relating to the NHPI deposits rest on treating the representations by the interested parties in the documentation for the NHPI deposits as though they were true. For example, Scottsdale asserts that Collins was not an affiliate of NHPI, and therefore he could freely sell the stock derived from his note in the fall of 2013 regardless of any tacking to the inception of the May 2012 note.⁴⁸² Respondents then reason that Collins' transactions with Sky Walker, Ireland Offshore, and Swiss National could not be fake loan transactions, as Enforcement portrays them, because, as a non-affiliate holder for more than a year, Collins could simply have sold the shares to the three depositors. Respondents conclude that there could be no reason to fake the loan transactions. Respondents likewise assert that the beneficial owners of Sky Walker, Ireland Offshore, and Swiss National were not affiliates of NHPI based on the representations to that effect by the interested parties.⁴⁸³

In making arguments that depend upon the truth of the representations made by the interested parties, Respondents only demonstrate their continuing lack of appropriate response to

⁴⁸¹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 911-13, 919.

⁴⁸² In so arguing, the Firm abandons the basis on which the deposit was justified at the time Scottsdale sold the shares. On its Checklist for the transaction, the Firm relied on tacking back to the inception of the May 2012 note. RX-1, at 1.

⁴⁸³ Resp. PH Br. 13-15.

the suspicious circumstances and glaring red flags raised by the NHPI deposits. As the SEC has noted, a broker-dealer may not rely on representations by interested parties because those interested parties have an incentive to make misrepresentations.⁴⁸⁴

ii. VPLM

Again, Scottsdale's arguments largely assume the truth of the representations by the interested parties. They assert that they reasonably relied on those representations.⁴⁸⁵ We reject Respondents' position. Red flags signaled that the transaction could be a scheme to evade the registration requirements while distributing securities to the public. The Firm could not sell the securities unless it investigated further and obtained better support for an exemption.

Scottsdale also argues that Enforcement failed to prove that any proceeds of the sales of VPLM flowed back to the issuer or that there were any links between the issuer and the persons involved in selling VPLM stock through CSCT and Scottsdale.⁴⁸⁶ As discussed above, the Firm misunderstands the law. It was not Enforcement's burden to prove who was behind the transactions; rather, it was Respondents' burden to probe the suspicious circumstances and establish that the transaction was entitled to the Rule 144 exemption before the Firm sold the securities.

iii. ORFG

As with the other transactions, Respondents' arguments assume the truth of the representations in the transaction documents. For instance, they argue that the Firm obtained satisfactory evidence that the transaction met the requirements of Rule 144 because the Firm obtained a letter from ORFG's Chairman and CEO dated May 19, 2014, confirming that Media Central and its purported owner were not affiliates of the company.

Given that the underlying transaction—the \$600,000 open-ended credit line giving the holder discretion to convert stock at will—made no sense, it was unreasonable to rely on that letter as the only evidence that the seller was not an affiliate. If the chain of transactions were really a series of steps in a distribution for the ultimate benefit of the issuer or those persons controlling the issuer, then such a representation by the issuer's Chairman and CEO would be in service of the unlawful distribution of securities without registration.

4. Hurry's Violation

The First Cause of Action also charges that Hurry was a necessary participant and substantial factor in the unlawful transactions, through his close management and control of all the entities involved in the process of depositing, approving, and reselling the securities, and

⁴⁸⁴ *Laser Arms*, 1991 SEC LEXIS 257, at *36.

⁴⁸⁵ Resp. PH Br. 21.

⁴⁸⁶ Resp. PH Br. 22.

through his prospecting for CSCT customers. It expressly alleges that Hurry purposely established CSCT as a means of evading regulatory scrutiny and enabling the Firm to make the unlawful sales. Enforcement proved the charges.

a. Hurry Was A Necessary Participant And Substantial Factor

Section 5 makes it unlawful for a person to offer or sell securities without registration. Liability, however, is not limited to the person or entity that ultimately passes title to the security. Courts have developed the “necessary participant/substantial factor” test as a way of holding other persons involved with the transactions accountable under Section 5 as offerors or sellers.⁴⁸⁷ The “necessary participant/substantial factor” test is based on statutory language in Section 5, which imposes liability on persons who “directly or indirectly” offer or sell securities in violation of Section 5.⁴⁸⁸

The “necessary participant/substantial factor” test distinguishes between those persons who have only a *de minimis* or insubstantial role in securities sales in violation of Section 5 and those who should be liable. The test is more than a “but for” test. Even if a person is necessary to the completion of the transaction, such as a transfer agent might be, that does not necessarily mean the person was a substantial factor in the violation. Determining whether someone was a substantial factor in the unlawful sales is a fact issue requiring extensive analysis.⁴⁸⁹

It is not clear that the “necessary participant/substantial factor” test is appropriate here. Hurry is not charged with offering or selling securities in violation of Section 5. He is charged with an ethical violation under Rule 2010. He does not have to be proven to be an offeror or seller in order to be proven to have violated Rule 2010.

The parties briefed Hurry’s liability using the “necessary participant/substantial factor” test, however, and we use it to assist in determining whether Hurry was sufficiently linked to the transactions at issue to hold him liable for violating Rule 2010 in connection with them. We also separately apply the more familiar standard for Rule 2010 violations, which we discuss below.

Based on the above factual record and analysis, which we do not repeat in detail here, we conclude that Hurry was a necessary participant and a substantial factor in the transactions. He was sufficiently linked to the transactions to hold him accountable for his conduct in connection with them. His role was not *de minimis* or insubstantial.

We reject Hurry’s argument that he cannot be linked to the transactions at issue. He asserts that there is “not a single document relating to the stocks in question with [his] name

⁴⁸⁷ *SEC v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc.*, 729 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2013).

⁴⁸⁸ *SEC v. Boock*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95363, at *47 & n.17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011).

⁴⁸⁹ *CMKM Diamonds*, 729 F.3d at 1255-57; *SEC v. Blackburn*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178325, *8-9 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2015).

anywhere on it.”⁴⁹⁰ While there was little in the way of a paper trail directly linking Hurry to the particular transactions at issue, the absence of such a direct link was the result of Hurry’s own demonstrated obsession with secrecy. He purposely concealed his involvement in CSCT’s business. It is not surprising that there is not a single document relating to the deposits at issue with his name on it, because he made sure of it.

In fact, Hurry was the master puppeteer for all the FFI business that flowed through CSCT to Scottsdale and, ultimately, to public investors. CSCT existed only because he established and closely managed it. Given Ruzicka’s lack of experience, qualifications, and contacts, CSCT could not have survived without Hurry’s active involvement. We reject Hurry’s assertion that, because Ruzicka had decades of experience as a real estate lawyer who ran his own law firm, hiring Ruzicka to run CSCT was a reasonable and logical decision.⁴⁹¹

With respect to the particular transactions at issue, there is sufficient evidence of a link between Hurry and the FFIs that made the deposits. Hurry developed CSCT’s business with the three FFIs that engaged in those transactions, Montage, Titan, and Unicorn. As set forth more fully above, Hurry admits that he flew to Panama to see Montage and to Belize to see Unicorn and that he discussed with Unicorn doing its business through CSCT. He admits to talking to the principals of Montage, Titan, and Unicorn multiple times using FaceTime. He admits to creating the spreadsheet that tracked CSCT deposits, including those by Montage, Titan, and Unicorn. D’Mura testified that he and Ruzicka talked about deposits with Hurry, and an email shows that Hurry specifically discussed trading in NHPI and VPLM with Ruzicka. Ruzicka testified that Hurry told him to deal with a specific contact at Montage. Both Ruzicka and D’Mura said they disliked dealing with Cem Can at Unicorn, but that they knew that they had no authority to decline his business without Hurry’s consent.

Hurry’s direct contact with the three FFIs involved in the transactions at issue made him a substantial factor in their transactions. He did not take Ruzicka with him when he flew to Panama and Belize to talk to Montage and Unicorn, and Ruzicka testified in his OTR that he did not participate in Hurry’s FaceTime calls with customers. Hurry was the critical link between CSCT and the three FFIs. Hurry’s importance was reflected in Unicorn’s demand for Hurry to join a telephone call with Miller, Diekmann, and Ruzicka to discuss the processes and procedures to be used in connection with Unicorn’s business with Scottsdale through CSCT. Whenever something beyond paper-pushing was involved, Hurry’s input was necessary. We reject Hurry’s argument that he merely displayed the normal interest of an owner in the overall financial performance of his firm.⁴⁹² His involvement in CSCT’s business was intense and pervasive.

⁴⁹⁰ Resp. PH Br. 45.

⁴⁹¹ Resp. PH Br. 43-44.

⁴⁹² Resp. PH Br. 46-47.

Hurry further argues that the case law only imposes liability under Section 5 where the defendant has either sold the unregistered securities himself or has taken concrete steps necessary to effectuate those sales, such as negotiating transactions, issuing opinion letters, or directing the issuance of shares. He contends that he engaged in no such activities here.⁴⁹³

We reject the argument. As noted above, Hurry is not charged with a Section 5 violation, but, rather, a Rule 2010 violation. Unethical conduct in violation of Rule 2010 is not constrained by case law defining who is liable as a statutory seller under Section 5. In any event, substantial participation is a broad concept without precise bounds. One who conceives of and plans a scheme, or one who is a substantial motivating factor behind it, can be liable under Section 5.⁴⁹⁴ To hold otherwise would allow a person to mastermind a Section 5 violation, and, by directing others to perform the mechanical tasks necessary to effect the sale of securities without registration, escape liability.

b. Hurry Acted In Bad Faith

FINRA Rule 2010 is a broad ethical principle that may be violated either by conduct that fails to meet ethical norms, regardless of intention, or conduct that is undertaken in bad faith. We find here that, in connection with the business he routed through CSCT, Hurry acted in bad faith and violated FINRA Rule 2010. We conclude that he was engaged in a scheme to evade the securities laws, in particular the registration requirements of Section 5.

Hurry claimed that he established CSCT because Alpine wanted to shed its IRS tax withholding obligations, but there was no evidence that it made business sense to set up an office in the Cayman Islands to do that. In fact, the insertion of CSCT into the process of preparing stock certificates for resale to the public made no business sense because, due to the discounts Scottsdale extended to CSCT, Hurry's enterprises as a collective group made no more money than when Scottsdale was handling the business directly—but CSCT imposed additional costs.

That Hurry had no legitimate business reason for setting up CSCT is further apparent from the way the Firm handled the business purportedly routed through CSCT. The Firm, through Miller and Noiman, continued to deal directly with the FFIs and often handled issues that arose with the deposits without involving Ruzicka or CSCT. Rather than independently preparing deposits for submission to Scottsdale, Ruzicka also sought guidance from Diekmann as to what deposits he should consider.

Further casting doubt on the legitimacy of Hurry's reasons for setting up CSCT, Diekmann testified that an individual in Belize or Panama could have a direct account with

⁴⁹³ Resp. PH Br. 46 and n.261.

⁴⁹⁴ *SEC v. Elliott*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91946, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011). See also *SEC v. Holschuh*, 694 F.2d 130, 139-40 (7th Cir. 1982); *SEC v. Friendly Power Co.*, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (a person has indirectly sold a security to the public if he has "employed or directed others to sell ... or has conceived of and planned the scheme by which the unregistered securities were offered or sold").

Scottsdale without going through an FFI like Unicorn or CSCT.⁴⁹⁵ Cruz admitted that it would be easier to conduct due diligence on a direct customer of the Firm than a customer who came through an FFI such as CSCT or Unicorn.⁴⁹⁶ In fact, the creation of CSCT diminished Scottsdale's access to information about the purported beneficial owners, and neither Scottsdale nor Alpine, Hurry's clearing firm, knew where the proceeds from sales of the securities were flowing.⁴⁹⁷ This testimony raises the question of the purpose served by the multiple layers of entities—if not to conceal the identity of the true beneficial owners of the securities.

Hurry's bad faith was amply proven by his elaborate stratagems for concealing his involvement in CSCT's business, including his use of the "x" email address at CSCT, his insistence on using the attorney-client privilege in inappropriate circumstances, and his use of FaceTime to conceal his contacts with customers. He specifically wrote to Ruzicka in an email that there should be no written record of Hurry's involvement, which is powerful evidence of Hurry's scheme to avoid regulatory scrutiny. Ruzicka testified in his OTR that Hurry told him he was going to the Cayman Islands so that he would not have to "give anything to anyone."

Hurry's actions betray an attitude antithetical to the public interest, and his attempt to evade regulatory scrutiny is inconsistent with his duties as a securities professional. He failed to adhere to high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade, thereby violating FINRA Rule 2010.

H. Supervisory Violations (Second And Third Causes Of Action—DiBlasi And Cruz)

1. NASD Rule 3010 Imposes Supervisory Duties

NASD Rule 3010(a) mandates that each member firm "shall establish and maintain a system to supervise" the activities of its associated persons. It further mandates that a firm's supervisory system be "reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the applicable securities laws and regulations, and with applicable NASD Rules."

Rule 3010(a)(1) provides that a firm's supervisory system "shall provide, at a minimum," for the "establishment and maintenance of written procedures." Rule 3010(b) details requirements for WSPs. Rule 3010(b)(1) requires that a member firm "shall establish, maintain, and enforce written procedures to supervise the types of business in which it engages." Those WSPs must be "reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and with the applicable Rules of NASD."

Rule 3010(b)(3) further requires that the WSPs set forth the titles, registration status, locations and responsibilities of each of its supervisory personnel, and that assignments be made

⁴⁹⁵ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1675.

⁴⁹⁶ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 220.

⁴⁹⁷ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 661-62; Hearing Tr. (Frankel) 2349-50.

covering all relevant areas of the firm's business and the applicable securities laws and FINRA Rules. Firms are required to preserve a record of these designations and their effective dates for at least three years. Under Rule 3010(b)(4), a firm is required to amend its WSPs as changes occur in its supervisory system.

Broadly speaking, WSPs are a written set of policies and procedures that describe concrete steps to supervise a firm's activities. They identify who is responsible for taking those steps and set up a system of documentation to allow for review and ensure proper implementation. Every broker-dealer firm must create, maintain, update, and adhere to those policies and procedures.⁴⁹⁸ Those policies and procedures contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a supervisory system that is reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the laws, regulations, and rules applicable to the firm's business. To achieve accountability and ensure compliance, the WSPs must be clear and accurate regarding the allocation of supervisory responsibilities.

2. DiBlasi's Violation

a. Charge

The Second Cause of Action charges that Scottsdale and DiBlasi, the Firm's CCO, violated NASD Rules 3010(a) and (b) and FINRA Rule 2010. The Complaint alleges that DiBlasi failed to establish a supervisory system, including WSPs, reasonably designed to ensure compliance with Section 5. This failure occurred even though DiBlasi knew that the Firm had been sanctioned once before in settling prior charges of selling unregistered nonexempt securities. Among other things, the Complaint charges that the Firm's WSPs were deficient because they did not set forth clear responsibilities for its personnel and did not provide for a reasonable inquiry into beneficial ownership. The Complaint alleges that the WSPs did not require that the Firm's personnel take steps to independently verify the self-serving representations made by parties interested in the transactions and did not address the possible use of nominees to obscure the identity of the true beneficial owners of unregistered securities deposited at the Firm for resale. Enforcement proved the charge.

b. DiBlasi Had Responsibility For The Firm's WSPs

Throughout the relevant period, DiBlasi was the Firm's CCO; and he is still the Firm's CCO. DiBlasi contends, however, that he has never had responsibility for the Firm's Rule 144 business. He asserts that he does only what he calls "broker-dealer compliance," and not Rule 144 compliance.⁴⁹⁹ According to DiBlasi, the Firm's former president, Cruz, had responsibility

⁴⁹⁸ *Dep't of Enforcement v. Ranni*, No. 20080117243, 2012 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 6, at *15-16 (OHO Mar. 9, 2012).

⁴⁹⁹ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1921-22, 1927, 1952-53, 1976-77. DiBlasi described what he meant by broker-dealer compliance. He makes sure that the Firm's filings, such as the Form BD and the Forms U4 and U5, are done. He maintains records and makes sure correspondence and emails are reviewed. He summed up his work as taking care of all the "back office" tasks. Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1976-77.

for Rule 144 procedures and everyone deferred to him.⁵⁰⁰ DiBlasi agreed that Cruz had a longstanding practice regarding responsibilities for Rule 144 compliance.⁵⁰¹

We reject DiBlasi's assertion that he had no responsibility for the Firm's procedures in connection with the Firm's Rule 144 business for two reasons. First, in the circumstances of this case, the assertion is inconsistent with his designation as the Firm's Chief Compliance Officer; and, second, the assertion is inconsistent with the WSPs themselves, as is plain from reading them.

First, DiBlasi is the sole person disclosed on the Firm's Form BD as CCO. There is no co-CCO.⁵⁰² That means that DiBlasi has been identified to the Firm's regulator as the one person responsible for establishing and maintaining the Firm's WSPs.

The Firm's WSPs were required to cover its Rule 144 business, since the Firm's business is almost entirely the liquidation of unregistered microcap stocks. DiBlasi acknowledged in his testimony that during the relevant period 95% of the transactions Scottsdale did for its customers involved penny stocks, and penny stocks accounted for most of the Firm's revenue.⁵⁰³ That business required heightened attention to compliance issues, as DiBlasi knew. The Firm had previously settled regulatory charges that it had improperly sold unregistered securities without an applicable exemption.⁵⁰⁴

In these circumstances, the designation CCO carried with it responsibility for the WSPs relating to the Firm's Rule 144 business. DiBlasi's abdication of responsibility as to that business is fundamentally incompatible with what it means to be the Firm's CCO.

We reject DiBlasi's assertion that Enforcement is trying to hold him liable by virtue of his title alone.⁵⁰⁵ Rule 3010 requires the designation and disclosure of a person responsible for establishing and maintaining a firm's procedures. By definition under the Rule, the person disclosed as the CCO has responsibility for the Firm's WSPs. The Rule further sets a standard for the design of those procedures, which must be reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the laws and regulations applicable to the firm's business. The designation and disclosure of a firm's CCO is more than a meaningless title. It is one of the building blocks of a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance, and the CCO designation carries with it

⁵⁰⁰ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1944-47, 1952-53, 1965-66.

⁵⁰¹ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1970. According to DiBlasi, his predecessor as CCO had no responsibility for Rule 144 compliance either. *Id.*

⁵⁰² Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1981.

⁵⁰³ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1923, 1946.

⁵⁰⁴ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1923-24; CX-12.

⁵⁰⁵ Resp. PH Br. 38 n.220.

responsibilities. If DiBlasi is not carrying out those responsibilities, then the disclosure on the Firm's Form BD is false and misleading.⁵⁰⁶

Second, throughout the relevant period the Firm's WSPs expressly provided that the CCO—DiBlasi—had the duty to establish, maintain, and enforce all of the Firm's WSPs. There were two sets of WSPs during the relevant period, the May 2013 WSPs that were in effect in October 2013 when DiBlasi became CCO, and the modified WSPs that became effective in May 2014. The main body of both sets of WSPs expressly assigned to the CCO responsibility to "[e]stablish, maintain and update, as required the firm rules and procedures" and specified that that responsibility included Appendix A and Appendix B to the WSPs.⁵⁰⁷ Appendix A to both sets of WSPs listed principals and branches.⁵⁰⁸ Appendix B to both sets of WSPs expressly assigned to DiBlasi, by name, the responsibility to "[e]stablish, maintain and update, as required, the firm rules and procedures."⁵⁰⁹ Appendix B assigned to Cruz, Diekmann, and others various operational tasks in conducting Rule 144 due diligence, but it did not assign them responsibility for the WSPs.⁵¹⁰

DiBlasi conceded that there was no written delegation in the 2013 WSPs that gave responsibility for Rule 144 policies and procedures to anyone other than the CCO.⁵¹¹ Moreover, the 2013 WSPs expressly imposed certain specific responsibilities on the CCO in connection with sales of unregistered securities. The main body of the WSPs included a specific section dealing with Rule 144 stock that was headed "Rule 144 Restricted and Control Stock Sales."⁵¹² In that section, the 2013 WSPs stated that the CCO was responsible for establishing procedures reasonably designed to ensure that a stock certificate was validly issued and owned by the customer.⁵¹³ Importantly, the 2013 WSPs also provided that the CCO should establish

⁵⁰⁶ The cases cited by Respondents are not relevant here. The cases did not involve the issue of whether a CCO was responsible for a firm's WSPs. *Dep't of Enforcement v. Mutual Serv. Corp.*, No. EAF0400630001, 2008 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 62, at *90-93 (OHO Dec. 16, 2008) (compliance department subordinates who were told to abandon red flag blotter review did not have supervisory responsibility for that review); *Dep't of Enforcement v. Kernweis*, No. C02980024, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 49, at *67-70 (OHO Feb. 16, 2000) (Director of Compliance held not to have line responsibility for unsuitable trading by registered representatives).

⁵⁰⁷ CX-179, at 6 ("The Chief Compliance Officer ('CCO') is responsible for the establishment and maintenance [of Scottsdale's] policies and procedures."); CX-180, at 6 (same).

⁵⁰⁸ CX-179, at 158; CX-180, at 151.

⁵⁰⁹ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1930; CX-181, at 2 (DiBlasi assigned to "[e]stablish, maintain and update, as required the firm rules and procedures, includes Appendices A and B"); CX-182, at 2 (same). It appears that Appendix B to the May 2013 WSPs were modified on November 13, 2013, to identify DiBlasi by name as responsible for the WSPs. CX-181, footer bearing date of "11/13/2013."

⁵¹⁰ CX-181, at 8-9; CX-182, at 8-9. For example, Appendix B assigned to Diekmann responsibility for Rule 144 stock deposit due diligence and approval. CX-181, at 9; CX-182, at 9.

⁵¹¹ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1933, 1945, 1955-56.

⁵¹² CX-179, at 63-65 (Rule 144 Restricted and Control Stock Sales, 8.18 through 8.18.11).

⁵¹³ CX-179, at 64 (8.18.2).

procedures to ensure that the resale of such a security was made in reasonable reliance on an exemption from registration.⁵¹⁴ The 2013 WSPs further provided that the CCO should be notified and consulted regarding the processing of Rule 144 sales.⁵¹⁵ They also specified that the CCO was responsible for “developing and implementing policies and procedures that provide for the review, approval and resale of Rule 144 transactions.”⁵¹⁶

Nevertheless, DiBlasi argues that he was not responsible for the 2013 WSPs because he inherited them.⁵¹⁷ The fact that the 2013 WSPs already existed when DiBlasi became CCO, however, does not absolve him of responsibility to examine them, and, if necessary, to amend them.⁵¹⁸ As noted above, Rule 3010 contemplates that amendments should be made to WSPs if there are changes in a firm’s supervisory processes, so that the WSPs accurately reflect what the firm is doing. Indeed, shortly after DiBlasi became the Firm’s CCO, in November 2013, the Firm modified Appendix B to identify DiBlasi by name as the person responsible for establishing, maintaining, and updating the Firm’s WSPs, including Appendices A and B.⁵¹⁹ If Cruz had responsibility for WSPs to the extent that they related to its Rule 144 business, the correction could and should have been made in November 2013.

DiBlasi also attempts to explain away aspects of the 2013 WSPs that contradict his position—such as the specific assignment of Rule 144 compliance tasks to the CCO. He testified that the 2013 WSPs “didn’t accurately reflect how the division of responsibility was set up throughout the company. And it needed to be corrected.”⁵²⁰ The 2013 WSPs, however, clearly stated that DiBlasi was responsible for the Firm’s policies and procedures and made him specifically responsible for policies and procedures relating to the Firm’s Rule 144 business. His disclaimer of responsibility cannot override that plain statement.

Approximately six months after DiBlasi became CCO, in May 2014, the WSPs were modified.⁵²¹ Even then, however, the WSPs did not clearly reflect the division of responsibility that DiBlasi described in his testimony. The WSPs did not say that Cruz had responsibility for all aspects of Rule 144 compliance, including the WSPs relating to Rule 144.

In place of the CCO, the main body of the modified WSPs designated the “General Principal” as responsible for developing procedures to ensure that a stock certificate was validly issued and owned by the customer, and that the resale of such a security was made in reasonable

⁵¹⁴ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1940-41; CX-179, at 64 (8.18.2).

⁵¹⁵ CX-179, at 64 (8.18.3).

⁵¹⁶ CX-179, at 64 (8.18.3).

⁵¹⁷ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1932-33. See Resp. PH Br. 38-39.

⁵¹⁸ *Ranni*, 2012 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 6, at *27 & n.93.

⁵¹⁹ CX-182, at 2.

⁵²⁰ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1969.

⁵²¹ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1921, 1932-33, 1939-42.

reliance on an exemption.⁵²² Similarly, the modified WSPs instructed that the General Principal should be consulted in connection with Rule 144 transactions. Under the modified WSPs, the General Principal was responsible for developing and implementing Rule 144 policies and procedures.⁵²³

Although the title “General Principal” might appear to refer to a single person, the term General Principal was defined in the modified WSPs as the “Management Committee.”⁵²⁴ The WSPs declared that the Management Committee had been set up to serve in the role of president of the Firm.⁵²⁵ The Management Committee was defined in yet another location to consist of four persons—including DiBlasi.⁵²⁶ Accordingly, even under the modified WSPs, as a member of the Management Committee, DiBlasi still retained some vaguely defined responsibility for Rule 144 transactions.

DiBlasi relies on the delegation to the Management Committee in arguing that he had no responsibility for compliance matters related to the Firm’s Rule 144 business. He maintains that the specific assignment of responsibility for the WSPs to him by name in Appendix B did not “overwrite” the provision in the main body of the WSPs referring to the Management Committee.⁵²⁷

Given the ambiguity of the delegation of responsibility in the main body of the WSPs—ostensibly to the General Principal but actually to a committee that included DiBlasi—we think the clear, explicit assignment of responsibility for the WSPs to DiBlasi by name contained in Appendix B forecloses DiBlasi’s argument. That conclusion is bolstered by the description in the main body of the WSPs of the CCO’s duties, which include responsibility for the Firm’s policies and procedures.

DiBlasi’s argument also is undermined by the fact that he took actions in connection with certificate deposits. For example, he signed a foreign account application by Unicorn under the label “Compliance Approval.”⁵²⁸ Furthermore, others at the Firm reached out to him in connection with issues regarding certificate deposits. For example, Diekmann had concerns about a deposit because Ruzicka said that the customer was pressing to start trading a stock when

⁵²² CX-180, at 64 (8.18.2).

⁵²³ CX-180, at 64 (8.18.3).

⁵²⁴ CX-180, at 7 (Compliance and Supervision 1.1.2).

⁵²⁵ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1972; CX-180, at 7.

⁵²⁶ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1933-34, 1939-40, 1942-43. The other members of the Management Committee were Cruz, Jay Noiman, and Elizabeth Arndt. Hearing Tr. (Noiman) 1065-66; Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1972.

⁵²⁷ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1974-75.

⁵²⁸ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1956-57. DiBlasi maintained that his signature meant nothing more than that a foreign financial institution was involved. Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1957. Whatever it meant, DiBlasi’s signature appeared under the heading “Compliance Approval,” and it demonstrated that he was involved in some type of compliance review in connection with the Firm’s penny stock accounts.

there was zero market for it, so Diekmann forwarded the correspondence to DiBlasi. Diekmann said that he did so because he thought Ruzicka's comment called into question whether the deposit should have been approved by Scottsdale in the first place. He sent the email to DiBlasi because DiBlasi was the CCO.⁵²⁹

c. The Firm's WSPs Were Not Reasonably Designed To Ensure Compliance With Section 5

i. The WSPs Did Not Accurately Reflect The Way The Firm Conducted Its Rule 144 Business

The Firm's WSPs were not reasonably designed to ensure compliance with Section 5 because they did not accurately reflect the way the Firm conducted its Rule 144 business. DiBlasi testified that Cruz was the principal responsible for Rule 144 compliance and the establishment of policies and procedures relating to that business. Cruz testified that DiBlasi never had any role in the Rule 144 review process.⁵³⁰ Cruz created the procedures for Rule 144 transactions that were in effect during the relevant period, the Firm's OTC Restricted Stock Deposit Procedures, dated November 2012.⁵³¹ He testified, however, that during the relevant period DiBlasi had responsibility for updating them.⁵³²

Accepting Respondents' testimony about the allocation of responsibilities, during the relevant period the WSPs should have clearly said which aspects of the WSPs were Cruz's responsibility and which were DiBlasi's. Neither the 2013 WSPs nor the modified WSPs had any clear indication of who was responsible for what.

DiBlasi admitted that the 2013 WSPs did not accurately reflect the way the Firm was operating its Rule 144 business.⁵³³ We further find that the modified WSPs also did not accurately reflect the way the Firm operated its business.

DiBlasi's testimony revealed that the modified WSPs allocated responsibility to a committee that no longer existed. DiBlasi testified that in January 2014 the Management Committee disbanded. He said that Justine Hurry took on the Committee's responsibilities in February 2014. Then, in March 2014, Cruz officially became president of the Firm and took on

⁵²⁹ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 782-87; CX-222a.

⁵³⁰ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 563-64.

⁵³¹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 582; RX-27.

⁵³² Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 665-66; RX-27.

Confusion over who had responsibility for the WSPs apparently is nothing new at the Firm. Cruz did not remember who the CCO was at the time he created the Rule 144 procedures, and he did not recall anyone specifically delegating to him the responsibility for creating the procedures. Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 665-66. When asked who now has responsibility to update the Rule 144 procedures, Cruz testified, "I believe that responsibility now falls on Henry Diekmann as president and also as head of the 144 cert team." Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 584.

⁵³³ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 783-86; CX-222a.

the responsibilities of the Management Committee. The Committee never reconstituted itself again—and yet in May 2014 the Firm put in place the modified WSPs that supposedly gave Rule 144 compliance responsibility to the Management Committee.⁵³⁴

Even if the Management Committee had been functioning in May 2014, we find that the modified WSPs were misleading regarding the allocation of responsibilities, and, therefore, not reasonably designed to achieve compliance. They purported to designate a registered principal as responsible for compliance with Rule 144. Rule 3010 requires that supervisory responsibilities be delegated to an appropriately registered principal. But, in fact, the WSPs delegated responsibility for Rule 144 procedures to a group of people. In so doing, the WSPs obscured who had responsibility, making it more difficult to hold anyone accountable for compliance oversight over the bulk of the Firm's business.

This failure to clearly indicate who was responsible for Rule 144 compliance is particularly egregious here. It would have been relatively simple to designate Cruz the responsible principal, since everyone agreed that he was.

It is fundamental that a firm's WSPs must clearly designate responsibilities to appropriately registered persons and must accurately reflect the way a member firm conducts its business. That is why Rule 3010 specifies that supervisory responsibilities be assigned to an appropriately registered principal. The person responsible for supervising a particular line of business must have the appropriate background to do it. That is also why a firm's WSPs must address the particular business and the particular circumstances of a firm. Only then will the WSPs be well designed to reasonably ensure compliance.⁵³⁵

ii. The WSPs Did Not Require A Reasonable Inquiry Into Beneficial Ownership

We also find that Scottsdale's WSPs were not reasonably designed to achieve compliance with Section 5 because the WSPs failed to require a reasonable inquiry into the identity of the purported beneficial owners of the stock the Firm was selling. The WSPs do not discuss the concept of nominees, and the Firm's principals responsible for approval of stock deposits did not focus on the potential problem of nominees in conducting their review. The due diligence files for the transactions at issue demonstrate that the Firm's general practice for reviewing stock deposits was inadequate to identify and investigate situations in which nominees might be concealing the identity of the true beneficial owners of securities. Diekmann testified that he knew nothing about the purported beneficial owner of Sky Walker but that the person was a

⁵³⁴ Hearing Tr. (DiBlasi) 1973. DiBlasi's testimony that Justine Hurry briefly served as president of the Firm in February 2014 is corroborated by the Firm's Form BD Amendment dated February 13, 2014, which lists Justine Hurry as president, as well as a director, of the Firm. CX-17, at 3. That document identifies Cruz as legal counsel since May 2008. CX-17, at 3.

⁵³⁵ See NASD Notice to Members 99-45 (June 1999), <http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p004311.pdf>.

customer of Unicorn. The lack of focus on the potential use of nominees to conceal the identity of the true beneficial owners is particularly egregious in light of the four prior SEC actions charging that nominees had been used to facilitate fraud and manipulation.

The Firm's listing of every FFI on its red flag list was not sufficient to address beneficial ownership or to ensure that an unlawful distribution was not occurring. The WSPs did not indicate why or what should be done in response to the red flag designation. When asked what additional scrutiny comes from the red flag designation, Diekmann could not think of any. He said that the designation "just reflects the heightened risk."⁵³⁶ To recognize a heightened risk but provide no guidance for dealing with it is not reasonable. WSPs must provide a "reliable mechanism" for identifying securities sales that should be investigated or halted.⁵³⁷

3. Cruz's Violation

The Third Cause of Action charges that Cruz failed to adequately and meaningfully analyze the collected documents and information. Consequently, he and the staff he supervised failed to respond appropriately to red flags strongly indicating that the transactions were not entitled to an exemption. He approved the deposits for resale based on a cursory collection and verification effort. Enforcement proved the charges.

There is no dispute that Cruz supervised the processing of deposits for resale pursuant to Rule 144. He drafted the Firm's procedures for handling restricted stock sold pursuant to Rule 144 and other forms used to process deposits. For each transaction, he also met with the person who had put together the due diligence file to support the Rule 144 exemption. After talking with the person, he gave the final approval that allowed Scottsdale to trade the securities without registration. He was critical to the transactions, and, even though the WSPs did not identify him as the responsible person, everyone at the Firm looked to Cruz as the person responsible for Rule 144 compliance.

Cruz violated his responsibility in two ways.

First, Cruz failed to analyze whether the debt obligations that formed the foundation for tacking were securities. In light of the circumstances, this failure was egregious. Diekmann, who is not a lawyer, was incapable of recognizing and correcting Cruz's error. The members of the Rule 144 team who were lawyers did not have experience with penny stocks before they came to the Firm and were trained by Cruz and the Firm's personnel. Everyone depended on Cruz's analysis and expertise. As an experienced securities lawyer, Cruz should have recognized the problem. But he failed to meaningfully analyze the information in the due diligence packages.

Second, Cruz failed to react appropriately to myriad red flags. As set forth above in connection with each transaction, the stock deposits were rife with discrepancies and suspicious

⁵³⁶ Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 990.

⁵³⁷ *Midas Sec.*, 2012 SEC LEXIS 199, at *51.

circumstances that constituted red flags. However, Cruz and his staff did not make the required “searching inquiry” or obtain independent verification.

Cruz’s failure is egregious because he knew that the Firm was acting as a gatekeeper,⁵³⁸ and that broker-dealer firms play a critical role in helping to prevent illegal unregistered resales of restricted securities into the public markets.⁵³⁹ He also acknowledged that at the time of the events at issue he was aware of the red flags in Regulatory Notice 09-05.⁵⁴⁰ It is well established that the “duty of supervision includes the responsibility to investigate ‘red flags’ that suggest that misconduct may be occurring and to act upon the results.”⁵⁴¹

Cruz argues, however, that he was an effective supervisor. He notes that he created the Rule 144 manual, the due diligence questionnaire, and beneficial ownership declaration, and that the Firm dedicated one-third of its staff to performing due diligence reviews on stock deposits. He states that he inserted himself into the review process as a second set of eyes and additional resource when Scottsdale began accepting stock deposits from customers of sub-FFIs. He also asserts that the due diligence packages at issue contained all the required paperwork and that there is no instance of an issue being brought to Cruz’s attention and him ignoring it. Finally, he maintains that the “rigor” of the stock deposit reviews under his leadership is demonstrated by the fact that Scottsdale frequently rejected stock deposits.⁵⁴²

All of this is beside the point. Cruz is charged with failing to respond appropriately to specific red flags identified in connection with the transactions at issue. The mere creation of paperwork does not qualify as effective supervision. As FINRA noted in conjunction with Regulatory Notice 09-05, in Rule 144 transactions, representations made by the interested parties have to be evaluated with a skeptical eye. Independent verification may be required. Instead, Cruz guided the staff through a check-the-box exercise.

Even when Cruz acknowledged that something might be a red flag, he indicated that his response would not be to obtain independent verification. Rather, his response would be merely to remind the interested parties of the information that needed to be disclosed. This is a totally inadequate response to a red flag.

Cruz’s testimony regarding language on Unicorn’s website illustrates the problem. The language on the website indicated that Unicorn would appoint nominees for its customers so that their names would not appear as an officer or director of the company on their account at

⁵³⁸ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 86.

⁵³⁹ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 89.

⁵⁴⁰ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 84-90.

⁵⁴¹ *KCD Fin, Inc.*, 2016 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 38, at *70 (quoting *Michael T. Studer*, 57 S.E.C. 1011, 1023-24 (2004), *aff’d*, 260 F. App’x 342 (2d Cir. 2008)). See also *Ronald Pellegrino*, Exchange Act Release No. 59125, 2008 SEC LEXIS 2843, at *33 (Dec. 19, 2008).

⁵⁴² Resp. PH Br. 40-41.

Unicorn. Cruz said he did not recall seeing that language at the time he reviewed Unicorn's deposits, but he agreed that if he had it "could have been" a red flag. In response to that red flag, however, he did not say that he would have sought independent verification of the identity of Unicorn's customers. Rather, he indicated that Scottsdale would merely emphasize to the interested parties that "they needed to – to disclose the underlying beneficial owner."⁵⁴³ In other words, he would continue to rely on the representations of the interested parties.

Cruz argues that he supervised more actively than did respondents in other disciplinary proceedings in which supervisory violations were found.⁵⁴⁴ Even if that were true (which we are not persuaded it is), the fact that other supervisors in other cases did even less than Cruz to respond to red flags is no excuse. The standard for reasonable supervision is not merely something marginally better than bad. Moreover, whether supervision is reasonable depends on the particular circumstances of each case.⁵⁴⁵

Cruz also argues that Enforcement is improperly second-guessing Cruz's exercise of reasoned business judgment, and that Enforcement has failed to provide affirmative evidence that his judgments were incorrect.⁵⁴⁶ This argument is erroneous in two regards.

First, the argument ignores the record. The transactions at issue were rife with red flags that could not be ignored, but Cruz did ignore them.

Second, the argument confuses the burden on the Firm when it determined that an exemption existed with the burden of proof in litigation. Cruz, acting on behalf of the Firm, had the burden of developing a reasonable basis for believing that an exemption existed before the securities could be sold without registration. Enforcement proved that he and the Firm did not have a reasonable basis for believing that an exemption existed, but nevertheless Cruz approved the sale of the securities at issue without registration. That is all that Enforcement had to prove for the supervisory violation.

In sum, Cruz did not make sure that the transactions met the legal requirements for an exchange of securities, and he was oblivious to numerous red flags strongly suggesting that the transactions at issue were sham transactions using nominees to effect unlawful distributions of securities without registration. He violated his supervisory duties.

IV. SANCTIONS

In considering the appropriate sanction for a violation, adjudicators in FINRA disciplinary proceedings look to FINRA's Sanction Guidelines ("Guidelines"). The Guidelines

⁵⁴³ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 307-08.

⁵⁴⁴ Resp. PH Br. 41 n.236.

⁵⁴⁵ *E.g., Dep't of Enforcement v. Wedbush Sec., Inc.*, No. 20070094044, 2014 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 40, at *27-28 (NAC Dec. 11, 2014).

⁵⁴⁶ Resp. PH Br. 41.

contain recommendations for sanctions for many specific violations, depending on the circumstances. They also contain overarching Principal Considerations and General Principles, both of which are applicable in all cases.⁵⁴⁷

The Guidelines are intended to be applied with attention to the regulatory mission of FINRA—to protect investors and strengthen market integrity.⁵⁴⁸ The Guidelines caution that sanctions must be significant enough to prevent and discourage future misconduct by a respondent and to deter others from similar misconduct. Sanctions also should encourage improved business practices.⁵⁴⁹

Applying the Guidelines, we first discuss below the appropriate sanctions for the Firm, DiBlasi, and Cruz. We separately discuss the sanction for Hurry.

A. Scottsdale

As authorized by the Guidelines, we aggregate all the Firm's violations.⁵⁵⁰ The violations are inextricably intertwined and are the result of a systemic failure at the Firm—the Firm's failure to have procedures in place that would reasonably ensure compliance and the Firm's failure to respond appropriately to red flags led to the Firm's failure to have a reasonable basis for an exemption before selling the securities. Furthermore, as discussed below, the Panel believes stringent sanctions are warranted here, and separately sanctioning the Firm for the different violations, even at the high end of the range of recommended sanctions, would not adequately remediate the Firm's misconduct. We view the Firm's systemic failure to perform its gatekeeping function better addressed as a whole, rather than in piecemeal fashion.

The Firm violated FINRA Rule 2010 because, in connection with the transactions at issue, it did not have a reasonable basis for an exemption. Selling securities without registration and without an exemption violated Section 5. The Guidelines contain specific recommendations for this type of violation. The Guidelines recommend a fine of \$2,500 to \$73,000, but in egregious cases the fine may be higher. In egregious cases, a firm may also be suspended with respect to any or all activities or functions for up to 30 business days or until procedural deficiencies are remedied.⁵⁵¹

The Firm, through DiBlasi, failed to have in place WSPs reasonably designed to achieve compliance with Section 5. For deficient WSPs, the Guidelines recommend a fine ranging from \$1,000 to \$37,000. They also suggest that adjudicators consider suspending a firm with respect

⁵⁴⁷ FINRA Sanction Guidelines (2016) ("Guidelines"), <http://www.finra.org/industry/sanction-guidelines>.

⁵⁴⁸ Guidelines at 1, Overview.

⁵⁴⁹ Guidelines at 2, General Principle No. 1.

⁵⁵⁰ Guidelines at 4, General Principle No. 4.

⁵⁵¹ Guidelines at 24.

to any or all relevant activities or functions for up to 30 business days or until the supervisory procedures are amended to conform to the rule requirements.⁵⁵²

The Firm, through Cruz, failed to supervise its Rule 144 process appropriately. The Firm, through Cruz, failed to adequately and meaningfully analyze the information collected and thus failed to respond appropriately to red flags that the transactions were unlawful distributions. For a failure to supervise, the Guidelines recommend a fine of \$5,000 to \$73,000. In egregious cases, they suggest that adjudicators consider suspending a firm with respect to any or all relevant activities or functions for up to 30 business days. An even longer suspension may be imposed, up to two years, or the firm may be expelled, where the case involves systemic supervision failures.⁵⁵³

We find the Firm's violations to be egregious. We also find that there are a large number of aggravating factors that increase the need for stringent sanctions. There are no mitigating factors.

1. Aggravating Factors

a. Specific Principal Considerations Related To Section 5 Violations

One of the specific Principal Considerations in a case involving a Section 5 violation is whether the respondent attempted to comply with an exemption.⁵⁵⁴ We conclude here that the Firm did not truly attempt to comply. Rather, it created the appearance of compliance. Although the Firm created thick due diligence packages, it did not meaningfully evaluate the information in those packages. If it had, it would have known it could not sell the securities without further investigation and the development of a reasonable basis for an exemption. We further find it aggravating that the Firm expended its resources on creating the appearance of compliance, rather than true compliance, because such conduct is deceptive and displays a lack of regard for the applicable law and regulatory requirements. This aggravating factor applies not only to the Firm but to Cruz, on whom everyone at the Firm depended for Rule 144 compliance.

Another specific Principal Consideration is the share volume and dollar amount of the transactions involved.⁵⁵⁵ The transactions at issue involved millions of shares and resulted in

⁵⁵² Guidelines at 103.

⁵⁵³ Guidelines at 102.

⁵⁵⁴ Guidelines at 24.

⁵⁵⁵ Guidelines at 24. See also Guidelines at 7, General Principal Consideration 18.

proceeds of more than \$1.75 million.⁵⁵⁶ The amounts involved are substantial and constitute an aggravating factor.

A third specific Principal Consideration is whether the respondent implemented reasonable procedures to ensure that it did not participate in an unregistered distribution.⁵⁵⁷ The Firm's procedures were not reasonable. To the contrary, they seemed designed to obscure who was responsible for Rule 144 compliance and they failed to require specific, reliable evidence to support the application of an exemption. Nor did the Firm implement good practices. Scottsdale's staff uncritically relied on the self-serving representations of the interested parties. When they did notice a discrepancy, the staff assumed an innocent explanation or accepted a plainly unreliable representation from the interested parties, rather than pursuing the "searching inquiry" that was required. This aggravating factor applies to DiBlasi, as the CCO, and to Cruz, as the person ultimately responsible for Rule 144 compliance, as well as the Firm.

A fourth specific Principal Consideration is whether the respondent disregarded red flags suggesting the presence of an unregistered distribution.⁵⁵⁸ As discussed above, the Firm repeatedly failed to identify and disregarded numerous red flags indicating that the transactions were unlawful distributions of securities. The multiplicity of red flags is another aggravating factor. This aggravating factor applies to Cruz as well as the Firm.

b. Specific Principal Considerations Related To Deficient WSPs

One of the specific Principal Considerations relating to deficient WSPs is whether those deficiencies allowed violative conduct to occur or to escape detection. We find here that the WSPs allowed violations to occur. The failure to provide guidance on dealing with discrepancies and suspicious circumstances allowed those involved with Rule 144 review to proceed in a rote fashion, without analyzing the information they collected. This aggravating factor applies to both the Firm and DiBlasi.

Another specific Principal Consideration is whether the deficiencies made it difficult to determine the individuals responsible for specific areas of supervision or compliance. We find that the failure to clearly and accurately delineate responsibility lessened transparency and accountability, making regulatory oversight more difficult. It is particularly aggravating that the person designated CCO should disclaim responsibility for the vast majority of the Firm's business. This aggravating factor applies to both the Firm and DiBlasi.

⁵⁵⁶ JX-268 (NHPI-Related Activity in CSCT Account: Total Net Proceeds of \$264,711.70); JX-281 (VPLM-Related Activity in CSCT Account: Total Net Proceeds of \$1,408,173.39); JX-310 (ORFG-Related Activity in CSCT Account: Total Net Proceeds of \$91,408.43).

⁵⁵⁷ Guidelines at 24. See also Guidelines at 6, General Principal Consideration 5.

⁵⁵⁸ Guidelines at 24.

c. Specific Principal Considerations Related To Failure To Supervise

One of the specific Principal Considerations in connection with a failure to supervise is whether the respondent ignored red flags warning of the need for additional supervisory scrutiny. Another is the nature, extent, size, and character of the underlying misconduct. Both of these are aggravating factors in this case. The Firm, through Cruz, ignored multiple red flags that the transactions required additional scrutiny. The transactions were substantial and were typical of the bulk of the Firm's business. The supervisory failure was in fact built into the Firm's standard practice for processing Rule 144 stock deposits, which is an aggravating factor. These aggravating factors apply to both the Firm and Cruz.

d. General Principal Considerations

Several general Principal Considerations are relevant to this case.⁵⁵⁹ Principal Consideration 1 is a respondent's relevant disciplinary history.⁵⁶⁰ Scottsdale has a disciplinary history, and some of that history involves misconduct like the misconduct here. As noted above, in the 2011 AWC the Firm settled charges that it had sold unregistered securities and that it had inadequate supervisory procedures and WSPs to detect and prevent the sale of unregistered securities. The Firm resolved other charges in the 2009, 2012, and 2015 AWCs. Finally, although the Firm was not charged in connection with the four SEC cases, *Ruettiger*, *Gibraltar I*, *Gibraltar II*, and *Tavella*, those cases did involve alleged misconduct through accounts at the Firm. These cases put the Firm on notice of the risk of sham transactions and the use of nominees to conceal beneficial ownership and facilitate unlawful distributions of securities. They heightened the need for the Firm to be alert to red flags. In light of this history, it is aggravating that Scottsdale performed its gatekeeping function so poorly.

Principal Consideration 2 concerns whether a respondent has accepted responsibility for and acknowledged the misconduct prior to detection and intervention. The Firm here has not. It maintains that its procedures are "market-leading" and create an "unfriendly environment" for stock manipulation.⁵⁶¹ The facts do not support that characterization.

Furthermore, in light of the fact that the transactions at issue involved persons who have been indicted for engaging in securities fraud and other crimes, it is particularly aggravating that the Firm's current president, Diekmann, testified that if any of the three deposits at issue were presented to him today—NHPI, VPLM, or ORFG—he would approve it. He expressed no qualms.⁵⁶² This means that the person in charge of approving stock deposits as satisfying the Rule 144 exemption is likely to commit the same violations again.

⁵⁵⁹ Guidelines at 6-7.

⁵⁶⁰ Guidelines at 6, General Principal Consideration 1.

⁵⁶¹ Resp. PH Br. 37-38.

⁵⁶² Hearing Tr. (Diekmann) 1799-80.

Adding to our concerns in this regard, Cruz echoed Diekmann. Cruz said that, despite the evidence presented to him during his testimony relating to the five certificate deposits charged in the Complaint (three NHPI, one VPLM, and one ORFG), he believed that the Rule 144 exemption applied and the transactions complied with Section 5.⁵⁶³

Principal Consideration 8 is whether a respondent engaged in numerous acts or a pattern of misconduct.⁵⁶⁴ Principal Consideration 16 is whether the misconduct is aberrant behavior.⁵⁶⁵ Scottsdale engaged in a pattern of misconduct and it was not aberrant behavior. Indeed, the Firm institutionalized its misconduct, by papering its files with documents that it did not meaningfully analyze. It is aggravating that the misconduct is actually the standard way the Firm conducts all its business. Moreover, Cruz testified that the pattern of deposits based on buying loan notes and exchanging them for stock was a typical transaction for the Firm. Because it was typical he saw nothing suspicious in it. These aspects of the misconduct are aggravating as to both the Firm and Cruz.

Principal Consideration 13 is whether the misconduct was the result of an intentional act, recklessness or negligence.⁵⁶⁶ The Firm's misconduct was not the product of negligence. It acted intentionally when it created and implemented the procedures for reviewing deposits of stock certificates for resale that created a false appearance of compliance. This aggravating factor applies not only to the Firm but to both DiBlasi and Cruz.

Principal Consideration 18 focuses on the number, size, and character of the transactions.⁵⁶⁷ The transactions at issue had many red flags indicating that they were schemes to evade the securities laws and the scrutiny that comes with registration. Given that character, it is aggravating that, as a result of Scottsdale's failure to perform its gatekeeping function, millions of dollars of securities were sold to the investing public without the safeguards that accompany registration.

e. General Principles

The Guidelines instruct adjudicators to take into account certain General Principles applicable to all sanction determinations.⁵⁶⁸ One of those General Principles is that disciplinary sanctions should be designed to deter misconduct, both by the respondent and by others, and should uphold high standards of business conduct. Adjudicators should impose sanctions that are

⁵⁶³ Hearing Tr. (Cruz) 555.

⁵⁶⁴ Guidelines at 6, General Principal Consideration 8.

⁵⁶⁵ Guidelines at 7, General Principal Consideration 16.

⁵⁶⁶ Guidelines at 7, General Principal Consideration 13.

⁵⁶⁷ Guidelines at 7, General Principal Consideration 18.

⁵⁶⁸ Guidelines at 2-5.

meaningful and significant enough to accomplish these goals, and the sanctions should reflect the seriousness of the misconduct at issue.⁵⁶⁹

The Firm's business is almost entirely the processing of penny stock deposits for resale into the public marketplace. In light of that fact, it is aggravating that the Firm had a check-the-box approach to its review of the deposits, without meaningful analysis of the multitude of red flags. The confession by Diekmann, the current president of the Firm, that, even after compiling a thick due diligence book, he knew nothing about the beneficial owner of one of the NHPI deposits is disturbing. It suggests that the person who now has authority to give final approval to stock deposits for resale has no understanding of what is required to ensure that the Firm does not participate in an unlawful distribution of securities without registration. The sanctions here must be stringent to deal with the seriousness of the misconduct and to show the Firm that it cannot simply continue with its business in its usual fashion. We believe that only a substantial sanction will deter the Firm from future misconduct.

Another General Principle is that disciplinary sanctions should be more severe for recidivists in order to deter and prevent future misconduct. The imposition of more severe sanctions emphasizes the need for corrective action.⁵⁷⁰ As noted above, the Firm has a disciplinary history. It has been disciplined for selling unregistered securities and for other violations. In light of this history, it is appropriate to impose more severe sanctions.

f. Overview

The mission of FINRA's regulatory and disciplinary process is to protect investors and promote market integrity. In fulfilling that mission, adjudicators are not limited to the sanctions recommended in the Guidelines. Based on the facts and circumstances presented in each case, adjudicators may impose sanctions that fall outside the ranges recommended and may consider aggravating and mitigating factors in addition to those listed in the Guidelines.⁵⁷¹

2. Potential Mitigating Factor

Principal Consideration 3, which is applicable to all sanctions determinations, concerns whether, prior to detection or intervention by a regulator, a firm voluntarily employed corrective measures to avoid recurrence of misconduct. This might be argued to be a mitigating factor.

The Firm maintains that it enhanced its procedures after the SEC filed the complaints in the four cases involving nominees. In particular, it claims that it enhanced its reviews of stock promotions and notes that it ended all commissioned representatives at the Firm. It asserts that its requirement of a beneficial ownership declaration is a "market-leading practice" that has been

⁵⁶⁹ Guidelines at 2, General Principle 1.

⁵⁷⁰ Guidelines at 2, General Principle 2.

⁵⁷¹ Guidelines at 1.

adopted as a recommended method for determining beneficial ownership. It also points to its use of a Red Flag List and a Stock Watch List as enhancements to its reviews.⁵⁷²

We find that whatever changes the Firm made in its procedures were insufficient to be mitigating. To some degree, they appear to be more of the same. They created the appearance of compliance without actual compliance. Even with the so-called enhancements, the Firm's procedures were woefully lacking. The record is replete with red flags that the Firm and Cruz ignored.

3. Sanction

In light of the egregious nature of the Firm's violation, the Firm's institutionalization of the misconduct as its standard way of doing business, and the other aggravating factors set forth above, we believe that a stringent sanction is appropriate. Only such a sanction will serve the remedial purposes of the disciplinary process. The Firm must be deterred from similar misconduct in the future. We impose on Scottsdale a fine of \$1.5 million.

B. Hurry

Hurry's violation of his duty to observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade was purposeful and egregious. These two qualities lead us to conclude that Hurry is a threat to investors and the integrity of the markets. Our concern is compounded by our credibility findings. We found that he repeatedly testified falsely, and that there was a pattern of doing so when he thought no contradictory evidence would come to light.

When misconduct is intentional, General Principle 1 provides that adjudicators should assess sanctions that exceed the recommended range in the Guidelines.⁵⁷³ Principal Consideration 13 also focuses on whether a respondent's misconduct is the result of an intentional act, recklessness, or negligence.⁵⁷⁴ When a violation is egregious, the Guidelines often suggest more severe sanctions. In egregious cases in connection with violations of Rule 2010 and Section 5, the specific Guidelines recommend that an individual be suspended for up to two years or barred.

Even though he has no disciplinary history, the devious nature of Hurry's violation evidences disregard for regulatory requirements, an aggravating factor under General Principle 2 and Principal Consideration 10.⁵⁷⁵ We have no confidence that if he remained in the securities industry he would not again devise a way to evade the law and regulatory requirements. For this reason also, we believe Hurry is a threat to the investing public.

⁵⁷² Resp. PH Br. 37-38.

⁵⁷³ Guidelines at 2, General Principle 2.

⁵⁷⁴ Guidelines at 7, General Principal Consideration 13.

⁵⁷⁵ Guidelines at 2, General Principle 2; Guidelines at 6, General Principal Consideration 10.

As discussed in connection with the Firm's violation and sanction, the scheme enabled large amounts of stock certificates to be sold in a number of transactions without the protections of registration and without an exemption. Under Principal Consideration 18, the size of the transactions is an aggravating factor.

Finally, we note that Hurry had by far the most to gain financially from setting up CSCT and enabling shares deposited from offshore customers to be shielded from scrutiny. He and his wife own all three entities involved in the process: CSCT, Scottsdale, and Alpine. And although Respondents emphasize that the particular transactions at issue did not generate a huge amount of money, the microcap securities liquidation business as a whole was highly remunerative for Hurry and his wife. We earlier noted that, from Scottsdale alone, in 2014 they received approximately \$6.2 million in directors' fees and \$1.45 million in net income. The compensation for all other employees and for professional and consulting fees for that year totaled less than half that—approximately \$2.7 million. It was to Hurry's financial advantage to facilitate the processing of FFI deposits and to minimize regulatory oversight. The misconduct added to his financial gain and is an aggravating factor under Principal Consideration 17.⁵⁷⁶

We bar Hurry from associating with any FINRA member in any capacity and believe it appropriately remedial to fine him \$100,000. In light of the bar, however, we do not impose the fine.

C. DiBlasi

The Guidelines provide with respect to an individual who is responsible for deficient WSPs that in egregious cases he may be suspended in any or all capacities for up to one year. The Guidelines also provide for a fine ranging from \$1,000 to \$37,000.

In this case we find more stringent sanctions appropriately remedial. DiBlasi's violation was egregious, and there are aggravating factors. The WSPs created the appearance of a set of procedures designed to achieve compliance, but they did not accurately reflect the way the Firm actually handled its Rule 144 deposits. They did not even reflect DiBlasi's true role. Even though he was purportedly the CCO, he claimed that he had nothing to do with the vast majority of the Firm's business. Essentially, he performed back-office functions for the Firm. The result of the deficiencies in the WSPs was that violations occurred and regulatory efforts to determine the persons responsible were hindered.

We suspend DiBlasi from associating with any FINRA member firm in any capacity for two years and fine him \$50,000.

D. Cruz

The Guidelines provide with respect to an individual supervisor who fails to respond to red flags that, in egregious cases, an adjudicator should consider suspending the person in any or

⁵⁷⁶ Guidelines at 7, General Principal Consideration 17.

all capacities for up to two years or barring him. A fine of \$5,000 to \$73,000 also may be imposed.

Cruz's violation was egregious. As a lawyer with considerable background in the securities laws, he had the background that others did not to scrutinize the due diligence packages and identify red flags. Furthermore, as the person at the Firm everyone else depended upon for Rule 144 compliance, he knew that he was critical to the Firm's performance of its gatekeeping duty. He was the principal at the Firm who gave final approval to the sales of deposited securities, signing under a certification that the transactions, to his knowledge, were lawful. In light of these circumstances and the many aggravating factors identified above, Cruz's failure to recognize and appropriately address multiple red flags was inexcusable.

We suspend Cruz from associating with any FINRA member firm in any capacity for two years and fine him \$50,000.

E. Respondents' Arguments For Lesser Sanctions Rejected

We reject Respondents' arguments for lesser sanctions. They assert that the relief requested by Enforcement cannot be reconciled with the Guidelines because the sanctions are more stringent than the recommended range.⁵⁷⁷ However, the Guidelines are not absolute. They are recommendations. As provided in the Overview, adjudicators may impose sanctions outside the recommended range where the particular facts and circumstances make that appropriate.⁵⁷⁸

We are concerned that the misconduct here is the Firm's standard approach to processing deposits of stock certificates for sale. As long as the Firm continues with that check-the-box approach, without a meaningful evaluation of the information it collects, it is a risk to public investors. More stringent sanctions are necessary to emphasize the necessity for corrective action and to remediate the violation.

Respondents also compare their case to other cases involving Section 5 and supervisory violations, asserting that in those other cases the misconduct was worse and the sanctions less.⁵⁷⁹ The appropriateness of sanctions, however, depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case and cannot be determined by comparison to sanctions in other cases that involve different facts and circumstances.⁵⁸⁰ Furthermore, Respondents' misconduct was far more egregious than Respondents acknowledge.

⁵⁷⁷ Resp. PH Br. 47.

⁵⁷⁸ Guidelines at 1.

⁵⁷⁹ Resp. PH Br. 47-49.

⁵⁸⁰ See, e.g., *William Scholander*, Exchange Act Release No. 77492, 2016 SEC LEXIS 1209, at *42 & n.65 (Mar. 31, 2016).


With respect to disciplinary history, Respondents argue that the individual Respondents have no disciplinary history.⁵⁸¹ It is well established that the absence of a disciplinary history is not mitigating as to sanctions. A wrongdoer should not be rewarded for acting in accord with his duties as a securities professional.⁵⁸²

In sum, we find that the sanctions we impose here are necessary, appropriate and remedial. They serve the twin goals of protecting public investors and contributing to market integrity.⁵⁸³

V. CONCLUSION

The Firm, Scottsdale Capital Advisors, violated FINRA Rule 2010. Accordingly, it is ordered to pay a fine of \$1.5 million. John J. Hurry violated FINRA Rule 2010. For his misconduct he is barred from association with any FINRA member in any capacity. He would be fined \$100,000, but, in light of the bar, the fine is not imposed. Timothy B. DiBlasi violated NASD Rules 3010(a) and (b) and FINRA Rule 2010. For his misconduct, he is suspended for two years from association with any FINRA member in any capacity and fined \$50,000. D. Michael Cruz violated NASD Rule 3010(b) and FINRA Rule 2010. For his misconduct, he is suspended for two years from association with any FINRA member in any capacity and fined \$50,000.

Respondents are also ordered to pay costs in the amount of \$22,124.29, which includes a \$750 administrative fee and \$21,374.29 for the cost of the transcript. If this decision becomes FINRA's final disciplinary action, Hurry's bar will take immediate effect. DiBlasi's and Cruz's suspension will begin with the opening of business on August 21, 2017. The fines and assessed costs shall be due on a date set by FINRA, but not sooner than 30 days after this amended decision becomes FINRA's final disciplinary action in this proceeding.


Lucinda O. McConathy
Hearing Officer
For the Extended Hearing Panel

⁵⁸¹ Resp. PH Br. 47.

⁵⁸² See, e.g., *Kenny A. Akindemowo*, Exchange Act Release No. 78352, 2016 SEC LEXIS 2522, at *5 & n.5 (July 18, 2016). See also Guidelines at 6 and n.2.

⁵⁸³ The Hearing Panel has considered and rejects without discussion any other arguments made by the Parties that are inconsistent with this decision.

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