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8 Bar No. 162426

9 Attorneys for Plaintiff George Sharp

10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, HALL OF JUSTICE

12 George Sharp) **Case No. 37-2015-00004673-CU-NP-CTL**
13)
14 Plaintiff,) **COMPLAINT FOR:**

15 vs.) **1) MALICIOUS PROSECUTION**
16) **2) ABUSE OF PROCESS**

17 LKP Global Law, LLP, a California Limited)
18 Liability Partnership; Luan K. Phan, an)
19 individual; Albert T. Liou, an individual;)
20 Waleed Ashari aka Deelaw Ashari aka Ahmad)
21 Ashari, an individual; and DOES 1 through)
22 100, inclusive,)
23 Defendants.)

24 Plaintiff George Sharp alleges as follows:

25 1. Plaintiff George Sharp (“SHARP”) is an individual residing in San Diego,
26 California. SHARP has become recognized internationally as a crusader against penny stock
27 fraud and has been loudly applauded for his efforts. There is no question that penny stock fraud
28 is a scourge of society, having replaced confidence games like “Three Card Monte” and Ponzi-
schemes and pyramid schemes as a way to relieve innocent victims most susceptible to get-rich-
quick schemes, such as seniors, students and single mothers, of their savings. Spam emails
making false and deceiving claims, are just one of several methods used to lure potential dupes

1 into such schemes. To date, the Plaintiff has been lauded on several reputable internet sites and
2 has received hundreds of letters from these victims, thanking him for his efforts to inhibit this
3 fraud. SHARP is also well known for prosecuting civil actions against penny stock frauds,
4 designed to enrich insiders, officers and financiers of small public companies through the
5 marketing and sale of artificially overpriced and often intrinsically worthless stock to an often
6 unsuspecting public. SHARP has been interviewed by the press and appeared on television with
7 respect to penny stock schemes that he first exposed.

8 2. Defendant LKP Global Law, LLP (“LKP”) is a California limited liability
9 partnership and a law firm practicing law in California with its principal place of business
10 located in Los Angeles County. It has not registered with the State Bar of California.

11 3. Defendant Luan K. Phan is an individual and a California licensed attorney, and
12 Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Phan resides in Los Angeles County,
13 California. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Phan was at all relevant
14 times a partner in LKP.

15 4. Defendant Albert T. Liou is an individual and a California licensed attorney, and
16 Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Liou resides in Los Angeles County,
17 California. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Liou was at all relevant
18 times a partner in LKP.

19 5. Defendant Waleed Ashari aka Deelaw Ashari aka Ahmad Ashari (hereinafter
20 “Ashari”) is an individual, and Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Ashari
21 resides in Tennessee.

22 6. Xumanii, Inc. (“XUII”) is a public company whose trades were previously
23 facilitated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Association’s (FINRA) OTC Link Quotation
24 System. Since the time of the conduct alleged in this complaint, XUII has changed its name
25 twice; first to Xumanii International Holdings, Inc. and then to Imerjin, Inc.

26 7. The true names and capacities whether individual, corporate, associate or
27 otherwise of the Doe Defendants, DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, are at this time unknown to
28 Plaintiff who therefore sues said Doe Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff is informed

1 and believes and thereon alleges that each of the Doe Defendants designated herein by a
2 fictitious name is in some way responsible for the events and happenings herein referred to
3 which proximately resulted in injury and damage to the Plaintiff as herein alleged and when the
4 true names and capacities of said fictitiously named Doe Defendants have been ascertained,
5 Plaintiff will amend this complaint to show same.

6 8. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court because Ashari consented to this Court's
7 jurisdiction when he maliciously prosecuted the class action against Plaintiff known as Waleed
8 Ashari v. George Sharp; San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2013-00050258 (the "Ashari
9 Class Action"), in this Court. Moreover, LKP, Phan, Liou and certain but unknown Doe
10 Defendants were his attorneys in the Ashari Class Action. In addition, certain other but
11 unknown Doe Defendants are vicariously liable as partners of LKP, Phan and Liou for the acts of
12 LKP, Phan and Liou because LKP did not properly register with the State Bar pursuant to
13 Corporations Code section 16306(f).

14 9. This action arises out of the Ashari Class Action wherein Ashari, LKP, Phan and
15 Liou filed a frivolous class action complaint against Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiff engaged in
16 market manipulation and fraud concerning the stock of Xumanii, Inc. ("XUII") in violation of
17 Corporations Code sections 25400(d) and 25500. The class action was filed in retaliation,
18 among other things, for SHARP's exposure of the XUII stock manipulation and for his own
19 action against XUII alleging violations of California's anti-SPAM email statute.

20 10. In response to the Ashari Class Action, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the
21 complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, known as the Anti-SLAPP
22 Statute. The Court granted the Anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the Ashari Class Action with
23 prejudice finding, among other things, that Ashari and his attorneys had failed to present
24 evidence to establish any element of Ashari's one and only cause of action. The Court also
25 awarded Plaintiff his fees and costs in the Ashari Class Action in excess of \$33,000. True and
26 correct copies of the Notice of Ruling granting the Anti-SLAPP motion and the Notice of Entry
27 of Judgment are attached hereto respectively as Exhibits A & B. The Ashari Class Action was
28 frivolous and filed without probable cause because Ashari and his attorneys had failed to present

1 evidence to establish any element of Ashari's one and only cause of action and because LPK,
2 Phan and Liou admitted to the Court that they had no evidence to establish any element of
3 Ashari's one and only cause of action.

4 11. The Ashari Class Action was filed against Plaintiff with malice because the
5 Ashari Class Action was filed only to further an ulterior motive, not to actually prosecute
6 Plaintiff for market manipulation. Specifically, the ulterior motive was that the Ashari Class
7 Action was solely filed for publicity purposes to impact positively or negatively the price or
8 value of XUII stock and to discredit and punish Plaintiff in connection with his complaint and
9 public statements regarding the spam email promotion of XUII stock. The purpose of the
10 promotion was to create artificially high share price and trading volumes so that certain insiders
11 would have the opportunity to divest themselves of intrinsically worthless stock. Defendants
12 LKP, Phan, and Liou were hired as counsel for XUII and filed the Class Action Lawsuit to
13 further the interest of their client XUII rather than the purported plaintiff in that case Ashari.
14 Defendant Ashari was an investor in XUII who lost money in his investment after Plaintiff Sharp
15 exposed the stock manipulation and sought retaliate against Plaintiff Sharp by acting as the
16 Plaintiff in this class action suit despite having no knowledge or belief in the truth of the
17 allegations contained in that suit. The Defendants' ulterior motive is demonstrated by the
18 following facts: A press release was issued soliciting XUII investors to become named plaintiffs
19 and class representatives in a class action against Plaintiff and even circulated a form class action
20 complaint in an attempt to lend legitimacy to their actions and claims. Right after XUII, LPK,
21 Phan and Liou were successful in bringing in Ashari, who is judgment proof, to perpetrate their
22 scheme, they filed the Ashari Class Action and immediately issued a press release to XUII
23 investors, as well as the public at large, as part of the ongoing fraudulent promotion of XUII
24 stock. In response, Plaintiff filed his Anti-SLAPP motion and shortly thereafter, Ashari, LPK,
25 Phan and Liou attempted to dismiss the Ashari Class Action, contrary to California Code of Civil
26 Procedure § 425.16. This clearly showed that the Defendants did not believe that their complaint
27 had any merit but were purely intending to harass and injure the SHARP. In addition, LPK, Phan
28 and Liou harbor personal hatred against Plaintiff. They had been engaged in previous litigation

1 on behalf of other client and had engaged in similar conduct in the past. In another frivolous
2 action filed by LPK against Plaintiff known as Forex International Trading Corp. v. George
3 Sharp; San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2011-00092840 (the “Forex Action”), the action
4 was also dismissed as frivolous pursuant to Plaintiff’s Anti-SLAPP motion. The Court also
5 awarded Plaintiff his fees and costs in the Forex Action in excess of \$12,000. The Defendants’
6 have showed a pattern of malicious conduct in this case as in the Forex Action, which they also
7 attempted to wrongfully dismiss once the Motion to Strike under CCP § 425.16 was filed.

8 12. Since the time the Defendants’ class action complaint was struck by the court
9 under CCP § 425.16, XUII shares have been temporarily suspended from trading by the United
10 States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), “because of questions regarding the
11 adequacy and accuracy of information”; have been denied the right to trade under FINRA’s OTC
12 Link quotation system; and several perpetrators of the XUII penny stock scheme are currently
13 being prosecuted by the SEC.

14 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR**
15 **MALICIOUS PROSECUTION**
16 **(Against All Defendants)**

17 13. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding
18 paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

19 14. Defendants were actively involved in bringing and/or continuing the Ashari Class
20 Action.

21 15. The Ashari Class Action ended in Plaintiff’s favor.

22 16. No reasonable person in Defendants’ circumstances would have believed that
23 there were reasonable grounds to bring the Ashari Class Action against Plaintiff.

24 17. Defendants acted primarily for a purpose other than succeeding on the merits of
25 the Ashari Class Action.

26 18. Plaintiff was harmed, and Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing
27 Plaintiff’s harm.

28 ///

Exhibit “A”

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ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Superior Court of California,
County of San Diego
10/15/2013 at 08:00:00 AM
Clerk of the Superior Court
By Rebecca Vela, Deputy Clerk

6 Bar No. 162426

7 Attorneys for Defendant GEORGE SHARP

8
9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

10 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, HALL OF JUSTICE

11 WALEED ASHARI, an individual, On Behalf) **Case No. 37-2013-00050258-CU-SL-CTL**
12 Of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated;)
13 Plaintiff,) [Assigned For All Purposes To The Honorable
14 vs.) John S. Meyer - Department C-61]
15 GEORGE SHARP, an individual; and DOES) **NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANT**
16 1 through 100, inclusive,) **GEORGE SHARP'S MOTION TO**
17 Defendants.) **STRIKE COMPLAINT UNDER THE**
18) **ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE [CCP § 425.16]**
19) Date: October 11, 2013
20) Time: 10:30 a.m.
21) Dept.: C-61

22 Complaint Filed: May 24, 2013
23 Trial Date: None Set

24 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

25 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 11, 2013, Defendant George Sharp's special
26 motion to strike under the Anti-Slapp statute [CCP § 425.16] came on for hearing in Department
27 C-61 of the San Diego County Superior Court, the Hon. John S. Meyer.

28 Prior to the hearing the Court issued its tentative ruling, which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A." Each party appeared at the hearing through counsel. Counsel for the Plaintiff
acknowledged that they had presented no evidence to support any of their claims. Counsel for


1 the Plaintiff argued that Plaintiff had no way of knowing if George Sharp ever owned or sold any
2 stock in Xuamanii and that Plaintiff had no means of discovering such information without being
3 permitted to conduct discovery and requested the Court to continue the hearing of the special
4 motion to strike under the Anti-Slapp statute and permit him to file his motion to allow
5 discovery. The Court having considered this request for discovery previously (both in the ex
6 parte motion and in connection with the opposition to the Anti-Slapp motion) found that no good
7 cause was shown to permit such discovery or continue the hearing of the Anti-Slapp motion.

8 After considering all of the papers and argument of counsel, and finding good cause, the
9 Court adopted the tentative ruling as the final ruling and granted Defendant Sharp's special
10 motion to strike under the Anti-Slapp statute.

11 Dated: October 14, 2013

Law Offices of David J. Harter, APC

12
13 By:



David J. Harter, Attorney for Defendant
George Sharp

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - October 10, 2013

EVENT DATE: 10/11/2013

EVENT TIME: 10:30:00 AM

DEPT.: C-61

JUDICIAL OFFICER: John S. Meyer

CASE NO.: 37-2013-00050258-CU-SL-CTL

CASE TITLE: ASHARI VS. SHARP [IMAGED]

CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited

CASE TYPE: Securities Litigation

EVENT TYPE: SLAPP / SLAPPback Motion Hearing

CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

The anti-SLAPP law provides that "[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." CCP §425.16(b)(1). The purpose of the statute is to encourage participation in matters of public significance by allowing a court to promptly dismiss unmeritorious actions or claims brought to chill another's valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. CCP §425.16(a).

The anti-SLAPP law involves a two-step process for determining whether a claim is subject to being stricken. In the first step, the defendant bringing an anti-SLAPP motion must make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff's suit is subject to section 425.16 by showing the plaintiff's claims arise from conduct by the defendant taken in furtherance of the defendant's constitutional rights of petition, or free speech in connection with a public issue, as defined by the statute. *Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 733. If the defendant does not demonstrate this initial "arising from" prong, the court should deny the anti-SLAPP motion and need not address the second step. *City of Riverside v. Stansbury* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1594; *Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 790, 811.

If the defendant does satisfy the first step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate there is a reasonable probability it will prevail on the merits at trial. CCP §425.16(b)(1) In this phase, the plaintiff must show both that its claim is legally sufficient and that there is admissible evidence, if credited, sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. *Wilcox v. Superior Court* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 823, disapproved on other grounds by *Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.*, (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 53, 68, fn. 5; *Robertson v. Rodriguez* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 358. In making this assessment, the court must consider both the legal sufficiency of, and evidentiary support for, the pleaded claims. *Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 398-399.

First Prong

In the first prong of an anti-SLAPP motion, the Court "'examine[s] the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies' ... We assess the principal thrust by identifying 'the allegedly wrongful and injury-causing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.'" [*Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc.* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189]

Plaintiff complains that on May 1, 2012, defendant allegedly listed XUUI on his "Pumps and Dumps Watch List" after XUUI stock began to experience its first significant market activity on or about April 30, 2013. Defendant allegedly falsely claimed that XUUI was engaged in an illegal pump and dump scheme through the dissemination of allegedly misinformation or misrepresentations.

Acts that arise from protected activity include "(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." [CCP §425.16(e)]

This case falls under §425.16(e)(3) and/or (e)(4).

"The California Supreme Court held that Web sites accessible to the public are 'public forums' for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (*Barrett v. Rosenthal* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 41, fn. 4, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.) 'Cases construing the term "public forum" as used in section 425.16 have noted that the term 'is traditionally defined as a place that is open to the public where information is freely exchanged.' [Citation.] 'Under its plain meaning, a public forum is not limited to a physical setting, but also includes other forms of public communication.' ' (*ComputerXpress [, Inc. v. Jackson* (2001)] 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1006, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625.) Statements on SHAC USA's Web site are accessible to anyone who chooses to visit the site, and thus they 'hardly could be more public.' (*Wilbanks v. Wolk* [(2004)] 121 Cal.App.4th [883,] 895, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 497; see *ComputerXpress*, at p. 1007, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625.)" (*Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.*, *supra*, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521.) *Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Data Base, Inc.* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 950.

It is undisputed that the website is a "public forum." The website is accessible free of charge to any member of the public where members of the public may read the views expressed.

"Courts have held that Internet postings about corporate activity constitute an issue of public importance upon considering the following pertinent factors: (1) whether the company is publicly traded; (2) the number of investors; and (3) whether the company has promoted itself by means of numerous press releases. (See *Global Telemedia Intern., Inc. v. Doe 1* (C.D.Cal.2001) 132 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265; *ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson*, *supra*, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1007–1008, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625.)" *Ampex Corp. v. Cargle* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1576.

Here, XUUI is a publically traded company. At the time the complaint was filed, there were purportedly 341,300,302 outstanding shares, which implies a large number of investors. Defendant has submitted copies of numerous press releases in which XUUI promoted itself.

Additionally, in the current financial climate, the public is quite interested in scandals involving publicly traded corporations purportedly mistreating investors. See, e.g., *GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP* (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 3, 2013, B231794) 2013 WL 5492575, alleged investment scam concerning a public company is a matter of public interest.

Defendant has met the first prong.

Second Prong

The complaint alleges a single cause of action for violation of Corp.C. §§25400(d) and 25500.

It is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in this state, "[i]f such person is a broker-dealer or other person selling or offering for sale or purchasing or offering to purchase the security, to make, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others, any statement which was, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omitted to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, and which he knew or had reasonable ground to believe was so false or misleading." Corp.C. §25400(d).

"Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of Section 25400 shall be liable to any other person who purchases or sells any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction for the damages sustained by the latter as a result of such act or transaction. Such damages shall be the difference between the price at which such other person purchased or sold securities and the market value which such securities would have had at the time of his purchase or sale in the absence of such act or transaction, plus interest at the legal rate." Corp.C. §25500.

Plaintiff has not submitted evidence that (1) that the alleged statements were false or misleading; (2) the statements were made with the intent to induce purchase or sale of plaintiff's stock (3) that defendant, or anyone with whom defendant acted in concert, purchased or sold XUII stock; (4) that defendant, or anyone with whom defendant acted in concert, profited from said purchase or sale; or (5) damages to plaintiff and the putative class as a result of those activities.

Plaintiff has not established any element of plaintiff's claims.

Request for Continuance

Plaintiff requests this motion be continued to November 8, 2013 so that plaintiff can bring a noticed motion for an order permitting discovery. Plaintiff already brought a similar motion, on an ex parte basis, which was denied without prejudice. Plaintiff asserts his "good cause" arguments in his opposition papers to this motion.

"All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this section. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. The court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this subdivision." CCP §425.16(g).

Plaintiff has made no effort to produced evidence in support of this motion that plaintiff should have in his possession.

There is no evidence that of false statements, that defendant's statements caused the run on the stock, or that plaintiff suffered damages as a result.

The complaint does not identify the alleged false statements. The opposition lists statements made on the pumpsanddumps twitter account, but most appear to be opinions as opposed to facts. There is also no allegation in the complaint that defendant used the Twitter accounts to make statements against XUII. The complaint alleges false statements were made on the website.

It is reversible error to permit discovery when the plaintiff has not introduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of false statements. *Paterno v. Superior Court* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1351.

"Trial judges should refrain from ordering "unnecessary, expensive and burdensome" discovery proceedings 'if it appears from the SLAPP motion there are significant issues as to falsity or publication-issues which the plaintiff should be able to establish without discovery....' (*Garment Workers Center v. Superior Court* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1162, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 506 (*Garment Workers*) [no "good cause" for discovery under § 425.16, subd. (g), on issue of actual malice because trial court

failed to determine whether defendant's allegedly defamatory statements were false].)." *Paterno*, at 1349, emphasis added. See also, *Krinsky v. Doe 6* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, plaintiff required to make a prima facie showing the message board statement was libelous.

Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to prove the elements of his case, evidence that should be in plaintiff's possession. There is no good cause for a continuance or for discovery.

THEREFORE, Defendant George Sharp's motion to strike pursuant to CCP §425.16 is **GRANTED**. This action shall be dismissed forthwith. Defendant is entitled to attorney fees as a matter of right "to compensate ... for the expense of responding to a SLAPP suit." CCP §425.16(c).

Objections

Plaintiff's Objections 1-3 are sustained as irrelevant.

All other objections are overruled. Most of plaintiff's objections are to documents/information obtained from the Internet or pertain to other lawsuits. It is worth mentioning that nearly all of plaintiff's evidence is also from the Internet and the complaint alleges the existence of nine other lawsuits.

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE - CCP. 1013A, CG 002015.5**
2 **STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE**

3 I, the undersigned, am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I
4 am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action. My business
5 address is 13681 Newport Ave., Suite 8-608, Tustin, CA 92780. My electronic service
6 address is djh@djh-law.com.

7 On October 14, 2013, I served true copies of the foregoing document described as
8 **NOTICE OF RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE UNDER THE ANTI-SLAPP**
9 **STATUTE** on the interested parties in this action, addressed as follows:

10
11 Luan K. Phan
12 lphan@lkpgl.com
13 ktokushige@lkpgl.com

14 BY ELECTRONIC. MAIL SERVICE: At approximately 7:00 a.m. I
15 electronically served the document to the electronic mail address set forth above.

16 I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and
17 that this declaration was executed October 14, 2013.


18
19 
20 _____
21 David J. Harter

Exhibit “B”


ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): David J. Harter Law Offices of David J. Harter A Professional Corporation 13681 Newport Ave., Suite 8-608 Tustin, CA 92780 TELEPHONE NO: 714-731-2550 FAX NO (Optional): 714-731-2595 E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): djh@dh-law.com ATTORNEY FOR (Name): George Sharp	FOR COURT USE ONLY
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San Diego STREET ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway MAILING ADDRESS: CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Diego, CA 92101 BRANCH NAME: Central Division	
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Waleed Ashari DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: George Sharp	
<p style="text-align: center;">NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER</p> <p>(Check one): <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNLIMITED CASE (Amount demanded exceeded \$25,000) <input type="checkbox"/> LIMITED CASE (Amount demanded was \$25,000 or less)</p>	CASE NUMBER: 37-2013-00050258-CU-S

TO ALL PARTIES :

1. A judgment, decree, or order was entered in this action on (date): February 11, 2014
2. A copy of the judgment, decree, or order is attached to this notice.

Date: February 19, 2014

David J. Harter

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF ATTORNEY PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY)

 (SIGNATURE)

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ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Superior Court of California,
County of San Diego
02/11/2014 at 02:10:00 PM
Clerk of the Superior Court
By Calvin Beutler, Deputy Clerk

6 Bar No. 162426

7 Attorneys for Defendant George Sharp

8
9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, HALL OF JUSTICE
11

12 WALEED ASHARI, an individual, On Behalf) **Case No. 37-2013-00050258-CU-SL-CTL**
13 Of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated;)
14 Plaintiff,) [Assigned For All Purposes To The Honorable
15 vs.) **John S. Meyer - Department C-61]**
16) **[Proposed] JUDGMENT**
17 GEORGE SHARP, an individual; and DOES 1)
18 through 100, inclusive,)
19 Defendants.)
20)
21)

22 WHEREAS, on October 11, 2013, the Court granted Defendant George Sharp's motion
23 to strike the complaint pursuant to the Anti-Slapp statute [CCP § 425.16(c)].

24 WHEREAS, on October 15, 2013, Defendant George Sharp filed his memorandum of
25 costs setting forth costs in the sum of \$713.72. No motion to tax costs has been filed and the
26 time for such a motion has now elapsed; and


27 WHEREAS, on January 31, 2014, the Court granted Defendant George Sharp's motion
28 for Attorney's Fees setting the reasonable attorney's fees in the sum of \$33,150.00; and

1 WHEREAS, on February 3, 2014, the Declaration of David J. Harter was filed setting
2 forth another name under with the Plaintiff is known and seeking to have an AKA of Ahmad
3 Ashari added to the name of the plaintiff in the judgment being sought.

4 NOW THEREFORE,

5 Judgment is for Defendant George Sharp and against Plaintiff Waleed Ashari aka Ahmad
6 Ashari. Defendant George Sharp is entitled to recover from Plaintiff Waleed Ashari aka Ahmad
7 Ashari costs in the sum of \$713.12 plus attorney's fees in the sum of \$33,150.00 for a total
8 judgment of \$33,863.12.

9
10
11 Dated: 2-11-14



Hon. John S. Meyer
Judge of the Superior Court

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Waleed Ashari	CASE NUMBER:
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: George Sharp	37-2013-00050258-CU-S

**PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER**

(NOTE: You cannot serve the Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order if you are a party in the action. The person who served the notice must complete this proof of service.)

1. I am at least 18 years old and **not a party to this action**. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing took place, and my residence or business address is *(specify)*:
13681 Newport Ave., Suite 8-608, Tustin, CA 92780

2. I served a copy of the *Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order* by enclosing it in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid and *(check one)*:
 a. deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service.
 b. placed the sealed envelope for collection and processing for mailing, following this business's usual practices, with which I am readily familiar. On the same day correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service.

3. The *Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order* was mailed:
 a. on *(date)*: February 19, 2014
 b. from *(city and state)*: Santa Ana, CA

4. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:

a. Name of person served: Luan K. Phan
 LKP Global Law, LLP
 Street address: 1901 Avenue of the Stars
 City: Suite 480, Los Angeles
 State and zip code: CA 90067

c. Name of person served:
 Street address:
 City:
 State and zip code:

b. Name of person served:
 Street address:
 City:
 State and zip code:

d. Name of person served:
 Street address:
 City:
 State and zip code:


Names and addresses of additional persons served are attached. *(You may use form POS-030(P).)*

5. Number of pages attached _____

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: February 19, 2014

David J. Harter
 (TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF DECLARANT)


 (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT)